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## PHANTOM BORDERS IN THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF EAST CENTRAL EUROPE: AN INTRODUCTION

SABINE VON LÖWIS

### 1 Phantom borders and electoral geography in Ukraine

Phantom borders as we understand them are political borders, which politically or legally do not exist anymore, but seem to appear in different forms and modes of social action and practices today, such as voting behaviour (HIRSCHHAUSEN et. al 2015). Considering the visibility of historical borders in the territorial distribution of election results, the question occurs as to whether this visibility indicates a persistence of historical (social or political) spaces, or why else these phantom borders seem to be visible.

The territorial patterns of election results in Ukraine since independence show a similar picture in most of these elections. While local and regional results may differ depending on whether they are presidential, parliamentary or local or regional elections, we nearly almost see an obvious divide between eastern and southern, and central and western Ukraine; the regional patterns being even more fragmented.

The regional macro-pattern appears astonishingly similar to historical regions, and thus historical borders. As we know, the territory of contemporary Ukraine has been part of different empires and states in the past. Ukraine is a fairly new state, which, aside from short periods of independence during the Ukrainian People's Republic (1917–1921) or the Western Ukrainian People's Republic (1918–1919), was only founded in 1991 (KAPPELER 2009; MAGOCSI 2010). The shape of Ukraine today is the same as that of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic since 1954, when Khrushchev gave Crimea as a present to the Ukrainian SSR. Before that, different regions of contemporary Ukraine were, in changing constellations, part of Russia, the Habsburg Empire, the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Hungary, if we focus only on the last 150 years (KAPPELER 2009; MAGOCSI 2010).

Considering the visibility of historical borders in the territorial distribution of election results in Ukraine, does this visibility indicate a persistence of historical (social, economic, cultural or political) spaces? If not, why else, and how, do these phantom borders or regions seem to be still relevant? Although phantom borders are our research focus, the question behind the phenomena of occurring phantoms of historical spatial orders is, how does history matter in contemporary political behaviour and space?

To explain and understand the spatial divide of electoral results is one of the main topics of electoral studies. When we look closely at the complex history of what today is Ukraine and its complex composition of ethnicities, use of languages or religion as well as social and economic factors, we may find this a challenging task. Electoral interpretations in the media dealing with the case of Ukraine, however, tend to see a clear East–West divide – exactly the divide which nowadays is prominent in politics and discourse inside and outside of Ukraine, and which seems to offer an easy explanation of current events. As we will show, this is not the most convincing one.

Some authors have complemented the East–West divide by a bit more differentiation, finding fragmentations into East, South, Centre and West (e.g. BIRCH 2000; CLEM and CRAUMER 2008; COLTON 2011). A few studies recognise and analyse even more spatial patterns, for instance, BIRCH (1995), who concentrates on the intra-regional differences in western parts of the Ukraine, or OSIPIAN and OSIPIAN (2012) who analyse the election results from an eastern Ukrainian perspective to point out that this part often perceived as homogenous is very diverse in itself and needs a nuanced analysis. BARRINGTON and HERRON (2004) propose eight regions of analysis to escape the one-sided pattern of “the East” and “the West”, complemented by Centre and South.

Whatever regional segmentation is applied, in most studies, regions are considered crucial and persistent, and justified or explained by history and historical legacy. A number of studies deal with the question of which other compositional factors play a role and/or are crucial as regional effects, e.g. economics, use of language, ethnicity etc. Various studies try to show that the regional variable decreases in importance, while other compositional factors become more important, indicating that the regional variable is dominant, but not always and not everywhere (e.g. HESLI et al. 1998; BIRCH 2000; BARRINGTON and HERRON 2004; MYKHENKO 2009; COLTON 2011).

Studies that focus on a regional variable as most important or one of the most important explanatory factors, assign first and foremost history and legacy or a historical regional context to it. MYKHENKO describes this often used East-West divide as “Ukraine’s geo-cultural divide”, mentioned for instance in almost all publications on the Orange Revolution (2009, 283). It is functionalised and exploited as pro-Russian eastern Ukraine and pro-European western Ukraine (BIRCH 1995; BIRCH 2000; HARAN 2002; BARRINGTON 2002; ROPER and FESNIC 2003; BARRINGTON and HERRON 2004; KATCHANOVSKI 2006; MELESHEVICH 2006; COLTON 2011), also for the latest elections in 2014 (SIMON 2014); the political parties are reduced to the question of whether they are pro-Russian or pro-European even in statements and articles of social scientists, leaving no space in-between. This attribution comes usually with the assumption of a more vs. less democratic attitude of those parties and the population voting for them. This again becomes associated with the belonging to past empires, usually identifying the pro-European stance with the Habsburg Empire, and the pro-Russian with the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union (BIRCH 1995; BIRCH 2000; ROPER and FESNIC 2003). Other affiliations used are pro-communist/pro-Russian vs. pro-nationalist/pro-independence (KATCHANOVSKI 2006). The underlying idea is a persistence of a certain political identity or culture across time, but firmly located in space. Other aspects of orientation besides “East” and “West” and “pro-Russian” and “pro-European”, such as “pro-Ukrainian”, “none of them” or “both depending on context”, do not seem to be a political or analytical option.

For many reasons the assignment between political identities, cultures and territory (here in the case of Ukraine) is difficult, complicated and surely not helpful in understanding and explaining the spatial pattern if overly simplified. More often than not, orientalist stereotypes are evoked and transported, and a narrow culturalist generalisation of Eastness

vs. Westness is employed. It is to say, there is more regional differentiation than (pro-Russian) east and (pro-European) west (1.1), there are often myths of political cultures assigned to empires and states (1.2), the assumed transfer of culture and identity across different political systems is not sufficiently explained (1.3), the programmatic dynamics within the parties and in-between parties are high and do not allow easy or unambiguous allocations (1.4), and finally: Some studies of political identities and preferences tell often slightly different than easily spatialised or historicised stories (1.5).

### 1.1 More regional differentiation than (pro-Russian) east and (pro-European) west

A closer look at electoral maps show complex regional fragmentations and an electoral behaviour which does not correspond to an East-West divide: For instance, inhabitants of the regions of Transcarpathia and Chernivtsy (historical north of Bukovyna) in western Ukraine seem to vote similarly to those in the Eastern regions. Obviously this does not fit into the main argument of the “Habsburg” West-oriented areas which the Bukovyna and also Transcarpathia had been a part of. Also, Eastern Ukraine shows itself to be something other than a homogenous macro-region when we look for instance at the results of Tymoshenko and Yanukovich in the 2010 elections. In most recent studies, phenomena like these which do not fit into this East-West divide are simply ignored.

### 1.2 The myths of political cultures and identities assigned to empires and states

The construction of a pro-Russian East of Ukraine and a pro-European West of Ukraine are more often than not connected to orientalist stereotypes of a less democratic legacy vs. a more democratic legacy due to historical experience. In his study MYKHENKO summarises the literature referring to the Orange Revolution as a celebration of “a ‘civilization breakaway’ from Russia, confirming Ukraine’s long-overdue ‘return to Europe’”. (MYKHENKO 2009, 279) Interesting about the assigned political identities is that pro-Russian and pro-European are inadequately identified with further attributions such as pro-independence for pro-European, and hence, logically, anti-independence for pro-Russian. The latter is usually not expressed explicitly, but it is inherently part of the attribution. In consequence, assignments of politi-



cal identity are fuzzy in their apparent un-ambiguity. Beyond that, the description of what exactly is to be the political identity and experience of past empires and states remains sufficiently unclear and cryptic, neglecting historical changes even during the times referred to. One should bear in mind that unambiguous political identity of individuals, let alone of collectives or “regions” is so rare as to be impossible, and that both the Habsburg and the Russian Empires in their turbulent history have accumulated historical (social, cultural, political) experiences of nearly every kind imaginable. Astonishing is the fact that orientalist stereotypes are still (or again) functional today and particularly (re)produced by social scientists and intellectuals. Of course, Russian heritage and influence on Ukrainian politics is usually regarded as negative and problematic while the European/“Western” influence is regarded as normal and desirable (MYKHENKO 2009; COLTON 2011).

### 1.3 Transfer of a certain culture and identity across different political system changes

The studies do not so much scrutinise the fact that such myths are made functional or transferred to present societies, and how this is done; rather, they reproduce them. Regional belonging is essentialised as a matter of “cultural tradition”. (BIRCH 1995) Studies refer to the past affiliation to a state or empire and the (mostly not sufficiently qualified) participation in their political institutions as decisive for the emergence and permanent structuration of political culture in present societies. (BIRCH 1995; BIRCH 2000; KATCHANOVSKI 2006) “Dnieper Ukraine has longer association with Russia (in both its imperial and Soviet manifestations), less contact with the West, and a longer experience of communism. It almost goes without saying that these characteristics should incline its residents to be more pro-Russian and pro-communist.” (BIRCH 2000, 1025) Thereby comparatively short times under another rule are not properly considered, such as Romanian martial rule from 1918 to 1928 in formerly Austrian Bukovyna, or Polish rule in the interwar period in Galicia in Western Ukraine with its deep and violent interventions into the population structure and cultural upbringing of the population. The same goes for proto-democratic traditions in the Cossack regions of Central and Eastern Ukraine. The conclusion here should rather be that maybe not the fact of history but the way history is reconstructed in every new master narrative is the adequate question to investigate. One topic here is of course the use of the past by politicians

to mobilise the electorate (OSIPIAN and OSIPIAN 2012). In any case the existence of a persistent and unchanging political identity is an oversimplification, even more its transfer across different political systems.

### 1.4 Political dynamics

Looking at the sometimes eruptive party development and the dynamics within and in between parties in Ukraine, it is hard to say which parties were to be considered as pro-Russian and which pro-European, and even harder to determine whether a party might be more or less democratic, let alone the question of whether the electorate even of apparently “non-democratic” parties can be considered longing for dictatorship and vice versa. The founding and dissolution of parties happens very fast and often; 117 parties were registered in May 2010, for example. (RAZUMKOV CENTRE 2010, 9) Regional election results may be a consequence of only regionally focussed parties and candidates, (ibid. 25) while the multitude of parties is a result of conflicts within the parties which often lead to splits. (GÖLS 2008, 51) The dynamics of orientations of and between parties and party members is continuously changing. At the same time, there are no discernible differences between the parties concerning key issues of the political and economic system of the country. About the Party of the Regions, the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko, and Our Ukraine we read: “Each party is in support of market economy, democracy, human rights, and joining the European Union. Also, all three parties use elements of populist demagoguery that come from the Socialist era. The major distinction between these parties is in the way they interpret the country’s past.” (OSIPIAN and OSIPIAN 2012, 616) It is not possible to assign parties unambiguously to a particular orientation towards Russia or Europe since what we are dealing with are continuously changing, situational political priorities that might even be intersecting.

### 1.5 Political identities and preferences

It is obviously dangerous to rely only on one type of data for the description and explanation of regions in Ukraine and subsequently subordinate other variables (ethnicity, language, religion) under the assumption of an East-West divide. Some authors combine the regional distribution of election results with the identification of either Ukrainian or Russian speaking and/or ethnically uniform West

vs. East, thus implicating a kind of coincidence of language, ethnic belonging and pro-Russian or pro-Western voting preferences. (O'LOUGHLIN 2001, 3; MYKHENKO 2009, 279; KHMELKO et al. 2011, 96). Questionnaires show however that identities within the Ukraine are not as unambiguous as it may seem or be constructed. A survey by the RAZUMKOV CENTRE in 2006 shows that language is not equivalent to identification with Ukrainian culture: 20% of Russian speakers identified with a Ukrainian cultural tradition, while 25% of Ukrainian speakers identified with Soviet cultural tradition (RAZUMKOV CENTRE 2006). In another opinion poll in 2012 concerning the question of whether people liked to think of themselves as patriots, 82% answered "certainly" or "generally, yes". Those results were similar with slight variations, in the regions considered as suspiciously pro-Russian as the Donbas (Luhans'ka, Donetsk region) (76%), the South (Krym, Odes'ka, Khersons'ka, Mykolaivs'ka region, city of Sevastopol') (73%) or the East (Dnipropetrovs'ka, Zaporivs'ka, Kharkivs'ka region) (79%). (SOTSIOLOGICHNA GRUPA "REITYNG" 2012, 7)

In summary, what all these studies have in common is the assertion of a strong effect of a regional variable and the fact that the answer to the questions of how, why and when the regional factor is intertwined with other compositional factors, how the regional factor is related to history and which regional scales and segments are useful to analyse remains foggy at best. A critical re-evaluation of electoral studies reveals that none really are able to explain the spatial/regional pattern they find. In the end, the case of Ukraine as perceived in different studies indicates that place matters (AGNEW 1996), and that presumably history matters too. It is however not yet distinctly established how they matter, since the use of history as an explanatory variable is inconsistent and maybe impossible to measure through statistical analysis (as the main method for electoral studies). Finally it shows that not only the type of data but also their scale is important, and above all, that the way categories and interpretations are constructed is crucial to the outcome. Scientists thus seem to be trapped in stereotypes of Eastness and Westness; they oversimplify data and explanations in the tradition of orientalisation, as ZARYCKI (2014) has very convincingly analysed for Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, this special issue of *Erdkunde* focuses on different assessments of the role and explanatory value of history for contemporary political behaviour.

## 2 Political behaviour and identity in space and place

The topic of our special issue is located in different fields of political geography since it involves electoral geography, border studies and historical and political geography with their conceptions of the legacies of states and empires. Electoral geography has lost importance in overall political geography approaches, for good reasons. The analysis of phantom borders however might support an advancement and rehabilitation of this discipline. It allows the analysis and understanding of regional differences following the traces of territorial distributions of electoral results as one example. It also allows and requires one to apply various methodological approaches of researching and analysing political behaviour and election results using the advantages and disadvantages of macro- and micro-sociological studies, as well as quantitative and qualitative studies.

Electoral geography basically asks: why do political parties draw more electoral support from some places than from others? And when it comes to political behaviour beyond the electoral act, why do some political initiatives occur more often in these places rather than in others? The question is not only why the attractiveness of political parties/candidates is spatially differentiated, but why these spatial differences seem to redraw political borders/states of the past, i.e. they seem to show the persistence of historical borders and historical spaces. We have discussed this for the case of Ukraine; other case studies about Poland (ZARYCKI 2015; JAŃCZAK 2015), Romania (RAMMELT 2015; ZAMFIRA 2015), Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic (ŠIMON 2015) and other regions in Central and East European countries (ZAMFIRA 2015; BAARS and SCHLOTTMANN 2015) are referred to in the contributions to this volume.

Despite all caveats mentioned above, understanding and explaining electoral maps may reveal a lot about the key questions and phenomena at stake. As the contributions try to show, this persistence or reconstruction of spatial manifestations or materialisations of political systems over long periods of time regardless of the continuity or discontinuity of these systems happen through representations, but also through institutional (including social and cultural) continuity, transmission and re-construction.

Hence, the fact that the modern nation-state governs through space over territory and thus makes the spatialisation of political, social, and cultural phenomena, needs to be considered – under particular consideration of the role of elections within this

endeavour. Further, the effects of spatially charged or grounded identities and cultural distinctions not only as essential elements of the construction of a powerful state, but also as processes of spatial socialisations that are not necessarily political, but may be political exploitable, are relevant avenues. Finally, the borders between states or within states, as the result and material manifestation of the territorialisation of power, but also as distinctions between social groups, are an issue here. The question will be: which spatial and structural effects exactly are pertinent and crucial here, where does their influence originate, and how is it effective? What socio-cultural, possibly spatially mediated practices remain despite population changes, and how are these “spatialisations” of bygone political orders appropriated, used, transformed and exploited by the new inhabitants on the one hand, and the new political order on the other? What are the relations, differences, interdependencies between these two? And finally: What role does family and the transmission of (cultural, spatial) heritage in displaced families play in new spatial contexts?

### 2.1 The nation-state and elections

The visibility of historical borders in electoral maps leads to the question as to how historical territorial limits of a state become visible regardless of the fundamental rescaling processes that have occurred in these states during the last 150 years. How – once established – do state orders remain, be it in discourse or in institutions, procedures, structures and practices. And beyond that, what makes them attractive to be reanimated or reintroduced? What does this tell us about the agencies operating those reanimations and their part in designing and developing the state nowadays? Developing and controlling territory as a powerful instrument involves not only the institutional/spatial structure, but also the application of adequate geopolitical images. It furthermore involves the transmission of such images to the individuals and their implementation into daily practice. In a next step, it may develop through daily social practice into a spatial phenomenon and a spatially defined identity. This identity may then be addressed to gain support or to legitimise political hierarchies and programmes. This involves the establishment or sustaining of images in institutions and mechanisms at different scales/levels – from the individual to the local to the regional to the national and international and vice versa. So the issue here is

how processes on different scales refer to historical orders. Key questions of electoral/political geography as PATTIE and JOHNSTON (2009, 405) formulate it are: “Do people behave and think as they do because of who they are (compositional) or because of where they are (contextual)?” Even though the line between those layers seems sometimes blurred it becomes particularly crucial in areas where ethnic cleansings and an exchange of population has taken place, like in Poland, Czechoslovakia or Ukraine. This is particularly true when voting behaviour seems to reflect the spatial political order that was in place before this exchange, so personal continuity cannot be a viable explanation.

### 2.2 Space and identity

Space and territory-related identities, so our assumption, are necessary or at least useful to win elections and to sustain in modern times territorially mediated political orders and systems of power. Parties and candidates battle about the votes in the territory to sustain their power and often address aspects of identity relating to locality and region to gain support for a seat in the (national) parliament. Although not all aspects of regional identity are necessarily political, but first of all social and cultural, most layers or dimensions of regional identity or belonging can eventually be politicised – such as, for instance, language or religion – and be used for political concerns. Of course, these differences must first be constructed, accepted and internalised as relevant for political and cultural scissions.

Spatially mediated identity even on a local level might then be the result of geopolitical conceptions of space that are transmitted through media or school textbooks. They may be a constituent of social, economic or cultural capital, as ZARYCKI (2015) discusses in his contribution. But they are not received by a society, locality or region that is entirely void of spatial identity: Usually we deal with pre-existing (though shifting) identities that derive in sedentary societies from former political or/and socio-cultural “socialisations” and “structurations” of space, which are embedded in the daily practices of the individuals and collectives. Practices and images of spatially mediated identities exist over time and sometimes become to a certain degree culturally, socially or politically charged. They receive different treatments – promotion, prevention, prohibition and so on – and contextualisation, when new political systems or states are put into place.

### 2.3 Borders between states and individuals – past or present

Distinction and the construction of identity convey the differentiation between the “me” or “us” and the “other”. In the context of (modern) statehood based on social disparity and inequality and on power organised through territory, the demarcation of political and social borders in space is the consequence. The individual, connected to certain norms and values, is located “here” – “the other” is on the opposite side of a borderline, in the next village, in another region, in another country – in Central Europe or in Eastern Europe, in the European Union, in Russia. Each scale requires an adequate geopolitical imaginary. The organisation of political space – and particularly the spatial organisation of voting, as in the construction of voting districts – mediates borders inside states, as administrative borders. These subdivisions have a history of their own. They are embedded in social and political practices as well as in institutions. JOHNSON et al. (2011, 63) have described it very adequately when stating the role of borders as social and political as well as cultural: “The strands of power that constitute (and are constitutive of) the border make it increasingly difficult to think of certain borders as local and others as global. It is the increasing complexity of the contexts of borders that forces scholars to reflect borders in relation to such categories as space/territory/region, agency and power, to social practices such as politics, governance and economics, and to cultural processes such as ethnicity and spatial (national) socializations. Contextual research gains added value in comparative perspective. An analysis of the geo-historical forms of spatial socialization and daily life experiences related to identity, citizenship, and politico-territorial loyalties can reveal the roles of borders in the making of the geographies of ideologies and hegemony in states.”

The issue of scale concerns first of all the analytical and methodological perspective. NEWMAN and PAASI (1998, 198) indicate that the border plays a rather socio-spatial role for the individual living close to it since it is/was part of daily spatial practices, while for someone living far from it, the border is/was more of a social construct of statehood. So the research on different levels of the phantom border might result in different explanations of the phenomena, but also, as the studies in this issue show, disclose different aspects or avatars of the same phantom borders.

### 2.4 (Geo-)political images

(Geo-)political images may range from rather individual and societal perspectives of phantom borders, to a regional political concept of a phantom region, towards different images of geostrategic thinkers and finally, to colonial perceptions and orientalist imaginations and perspectives of Western European imaginations of East Central Europe, and vice versa; including the self-orientalisation of countries of the East as different from what is perceived (desirably or perniciously) as “the West”. This indicates the manifold aspects of geopolitical images and again their relevance on different scales, but also the broad varieties of how they materialise, are distributed and institutionalised. An interesting and important question here is: how are these images and imaginaries constructed and in which way do they differentiate between the “own” and the “other”? And most interestingly, how do those images of spatially mediated identity “take space” or become “socially and culturally spatialised” – i.e. translated into spatial practice. The analysis of political behaviour in this issue is one approach to these questions.

## 3 The articles in this issue

This special issue brings together selected papers from the conference “Phantom Borders in Political Behaviour and Electoral Geography in East Central Europe”. It was jointly organised by JAROSŁAW JANCZAK (Frankfurt/Oder, Poznań), THOMAS SERRIER (Paris, Frankfurt/Oder) and SABINE V. LÖWIS (Berlin) and took place in November 2013 at the European University Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder) and at the Collegium Polonicum in Slubice and was hosted by the BMBF-funded research network “Phantom Borders in East Central Europe” ([www.phantomgrenzen.eu](http://www.phantomgrenzen.eu)). The authors come from different disciplinary fields and locate their studies in the intersection of these fields.

The contributions address phantoms of different spaces in various manners and diverse ways and approaches. They describe more or less phantom regions which are demarcated by either borders of nation-states/empires or areas which were characterised by a concentration of a certain ethnic and/or religious group. ZARYCKI (2015) and JANCZAK (2015) both discuss the Polish case. While ZARYCKI proposes an interpretation using forms of social capital in the sense of Pierre Bourdieu and focuses on the national level, JANCZAK describes different analytical levels, down-scaling the phenomena of the Polish phantom



borders from the national to the regional and local scale. He also uses a mixture of methods, combining quantitative with qualitative, to show how the image of the phantom border changes from different points of view. ZARYCKI deals with the perspective on the national level, critically discussing orientalist stereotypes of the positively depicted western and the negatively connoted eastern (formerly Russian) part of the Polish territory. Using Bourdieu's concept of social capital allows him to describe and understand historical heritage without a fall-back into "orientalism" and to offer an alternative explanation.

ŠIMON (2015) and RAMMELT (2015) describe phantom regions in surprising ethnic and religious effects on political behaviour in the Czech Republic/Czechoslovakia and Romania. ŠIMON shows the voting patterns in the historic area of the Sudety region with reference to turn-out. Astonishing is a significantly high turn-out in the region where population exchanges took place twice. In a second case study, he shows similar voting patterns of the Catholic population and the votes for Catholic parties in the elections of the 1920s and 1930s and in the 1990s and 2010s. RAMMELT focuses on regional patterns of social mobilisation in Romania by showing that in Transylvania, which in the past was known for its ethnic minorities and religious pluralism, social mobilization is higher than in the rest of the country except for the urban centres.

An additional explanation for the higher share in social mobilisation is offered by the multi-country analysis of ZAMFIRA (2015). Her article discusses the effects of historic ethnic minorities on voting behaviour in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia which were characterised by multi-ethnic regions. ZAMFIRA shows that parties which focus on minority interests often get their votes from a population that does not belong to the represented ethnic group, a fact that she explains with the multi-ethnic experiences of these voters in their own or their families' pasts. In her paper she shows under which conditions such an effect most likely occurs, and how to analyse it adequately.

BAARS and SCHLOTTMANN (2015) finally interpret the phantom border approach from a slightly different angle than the other authors, as they describe the contemporary construction of the Central German Metropolitan Region as a continuously changing spatial concept in political discourse. Here the focus is on the multi-dimensional character of regions with contextually changing and fluid spatialities, which in the end are spatial phantoms.

All authors use and approach the concept of phantom borders in different ways. All are based on empirical work and discuss sometimes astonishing spa-

tial patterns in an innovative way beyond stereotypes, avoiding historicising simplifications, and instead critically and analytically dealing with historical legacies and their social, cultural and political repercussions.

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## THE ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY OF POLAND: BETWEEN STABLE SPATIAL STRUCTURES AND THEIR CHANGING INTERPRETATIONS

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With 6 figures

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**Summary:** The main goal of the paper is to discuss various interpretations of the heritage created during the so-called ‘partition’ of Poland in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the ways of its possible reproduction. This goal will be achieved by analyzing patterns of Poland’s electoral geography, which is known for its considerable stability. After a discussion of the historical background and a summary of the main patterns of the country’s electoral geography, the main types of dominating interpretations of the reproduction of structures, brought about in the Polish space during the period of its partitions in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, will be discussed. The paper will show how the recent transformation of the Polish political scene, which happened about 2005–2007, affected both the structures of the electoral geography and the dominant ways of its interpretation. As it will be argued, the above mentioned changes have emphasized the role of the East-West differentiation of the Polish space. The rise to prominence of that dimension was also related to the emergence of a number of new interpretations, many of which could be seen as heavily relying on orientalist stereotypes, including those of the very negative images related to the heritage of the Russian rule. These mainstream interpretations, based on models of opposition between the positive Western “civilization” and the negative Eastern (Russian) “backwardness”, will be confronted with what seems to be a more nuanced view on the basic East-West split of the Polish space. The proposed model will be an attempt to apply the theory of different types of capital by PIERRE BOURDIEU. In particular, Eastern Poland and its heritage of the Austrian and Russian rule will be presented as more cultural-capital oriented, while Western Poland and its heritage of the Prussian rule - as more economic-capital oriented. In this way the paper will propose a new, more general model of analysis of the spatial *longue-durée* effects.

**Zusammenfassung:** Das Ziel des Artikels besteht darin, verschiedene Interpretationen des Erbes, das durch die Teilungen Polens im 19. Jahrhundert entstanden ist, und seine mögliche Reproduktion zu diskutieren. Dieses Ziel wird durch die Analyse von Strukturen in der polnischen Wahlgeographie erreicht, die sich durch beträchtliche Stabilität auszeichnet. Nach einer Diskussion des historischen Hintergrunds und einer Zusammenfassung der Hauptstrukturen der Wahlgeographie Polens werden die wichtigsten Interpretationen der Reproduktion von Strukturen diskutiert, die aus der Zeit der Teilungen Polens herrührten. Der Artikel zeigt, wie jüngste Veränderungen der polnischen politischen Landschaft von 2005 -2007 sowohl die polnische Wahlgeographie als auch deren Interpretation grundlegend veränderten. Es wird argumentiert, dass diese Veränderungen die Ost-West-Differenzierung des polnischen Raumes hervorheben. Die zunehmende Bedeutung dieser Dimension hing auch mit der Herausbildung einer Reihe neuer Interpretationen zusammen, die in vielen Fällen stark auf orientalistischen Stereotypen aufbauen, insbesondere bei den negativen Repräsentationen des Erbes der russischen Herrschaft. Diese etablierten Interpretationen, die auf einem Gegensatz zwischen einer positiven westlichen „Zivilisation“ und der negativen östlichen (Russischen) „Rückständigkeit“ basieren, werden einer differenzierteren Betrachtung der Ost-West-Teilung des polnischen Raums gegenübergestellt. Das vorgeschlagene Modell ist ein Versuch, die Theorie der unterschiedlichen Typen von Kapital von PIERRE BOURDIEU anzuwenden. Insbesondere das östliche Polen und sein Erbe der österreichischen und russischen Herrschaft ist stärker durch kulturelles Kapital gekennzeichnet, während das westliche Polen und sein Erbe der Preußischen Herrschaft stärker durch ökonomisches Kapital gekennzeichnet ist. In dieser Weise schlägt der Beitrag ein neues, generalisierteres Modell zur Analyse räumlicher *longue-durée* Effekte vor.

**Keywords:** Electoral geography, Poland, types of capital, political cleavages

### 1 Introduction

The main goal of this paper is to discuss various interpretations of the heritage created during the so called ‘partition’ of Poland in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the ways of its possible reproduction. These ques-

tions are under constant discussion in contemporary Poland, both in academic and media debates. One of the main reasons for wide public interest in these theoretical issues is the regular reemergence of historical patterns in electoral maps in consecutive elections. After a discussion of the historical



background and a summary of electoral geography patterns, this paper will discuss the main types of dominating interpretations of the phenomenon of reproduction of structures brought about in the Polish space during the period of its partitions. This will be concluded by a discussion of the heritage of the East-West differentiation of Polish space referring to the theory of different types of capital by PIERRE BOURDIEU (BOURDIEU 1986). That part of the paper can be considered to be a preliminary exploration of ideas on incorporation of BOURDIEU'S theory of capitals into the study of the *longue durée* effects in spatial variation in electoral outcomes. Let me remind that BOURDIEU distinguished three fundamental forms of capital. First, economic capital is defined as command over economic resources and possession of financial assets. In addition to this, BOURDIEU distinguished two other types of capital: social and cultural. Social capital, according to his definition, consists of relationships and networks of influence and support that people can tap into by virtue of their social position. It can be also defined as membership of formal and informal groups that gives privileged access to different types of resources. Cultural capital refers to explicit and implicit, formal and informal cultural competences. These include the skills with which parents provide their children when they develop the attitudes and knowledge that make the educational system a comfortable and familiar place where children can succeed easily. According to BOURDIEU'S definition, cultural capital appears as: the "embodied" state (personal character, life-style, ways of thinking, aesthetic taste, manners, etc.), the "institutionalized" state (formal educational qualifications, competences confirmed by credentials), and the "objectified" state (objects of cultural value, especially works of art). I would like to propose that these three types of capital are three relatively separate dimensions in the reproduction of social structures and, in effect, of spatial structures. Thus in the second part of the paper, after review of data and earlier interpretations, I will present an attempt to discuss the heritage of the partition period in Poland in the context of these three forms of capital. In particular, following EYAL et al. (1998) who have shown how the different nature of social stratification systems could be described using the system of different types of capital developed by PIERRE BOURDIEU, I will argue that the regional differentiation of social structure in Poland can be theorized as a privileged status of cultural and social capital in the southern and eastern parts of Poland.

## 2 The period of partition as a key heritage in the Polish social space

As it has been already mentioned, observers of the Polish political geography are often impressed by the regularity of the 19<sup>th</sup> century heritage reappearance on the electoral maps of the country. Let me briefly remind the key historical and geographical facts which define this heritage. The partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth started in 1772 with the first wave of annexations by Austria, Prussia, and Russia. A second wave took place in 1793 (Austria did not participate this time), and the final one came in 1795, when the Polish-Lithuanian "Rzeczpospolita" or Republic finally ceased to exist. It was, however, not until the Vienna Congress in 1815 when stable borders between the three empires were established. They lasted in an almost unchanged form for the next 100 years until, in 1914, the First World War suddenly erupted and Polish territories become the theater of Prussian-Russian and Austrian-Russian confrontation. [Fig. 1]

### 2.1 The heritage of the Prussian sector

The influence of the Prussian economic and administrative system, in this context, is usually considered as more positive than that of the Russian one. As ZUKOWSKI (2004) points out, agriculture in the Prussian zone "was technically and organizationally modernized, and it relied on local credit, cooperatives, and self-aid associations. Competing with the local Germans, who were prominent in banks and bigger enterprises, and also enjoyed the backing of the Prussian state, Poles had to increase their efficiency and outdo their competitors. Especially food processing, breweries, crafts, and smaller industries made steady progress. In addition, a Polish middle class was making its appearance on a scale unknown in other parts of the partitioned country" (ZUKOWSKI 2004).

There is, nonetheless, another aspect of this situation. Prussian Poland, especially the province of Greater Poland (Wielkopolska), acquired a key regional role in supplying agricultural products to the Berlin metropolis and developed largely on the basis of agriculture and light industry. Thus, the development of the area was restricted, to a large extent, only to a primary economy in contrast to the Russian part of Poland. Even if the agricultural sector's developmental level was high and modern infrastructure of all sorts (from transportation to sewage systems) had




Fig. 1: Administrative divisions of Poland and historical regions

been developed concurrently, Greater Poland was, if compared to other Prussian regions, not developing on a level proportionate to its potential capabilities. JANUSZ HRYNIEWICZ (HRYNIEWICZ 2004) has even argued that the period of partitions slowed down the development of Polish lands under the Prussian administration, foremost among them being the region of *Wielkopolska*.

Nevertheless, one should emphasize the uniqueness of the Prussian land reform, which started as early as 1823 and ended in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. It produced a pattern of mid-sized and large farms. The rural population surplus had been successfully absorbed by the developing industry and service sector in the cities of *Wielkopolska* and other urban centers of Prussia. Such successful transformation of the socio-economic structures of rural areas never happened under Russian and Austrian administration. This change is the source of the greatest and, possibly, deepest divide of the Polish economy, and as a result – of the social and political space until

today. According to KAZIMIERZ WAJDA (WAJDA 1990), one of the crucial differences between the Prussian land reform and those implemented in Austria and Russia, is that the primary aim of the two later reforms was mainly political: the restriction of the Polish nobility's position in the region. In the case of the Prussian reform, the main aim was primarily economic: rationalization of the land ownership structure. As a result, the Prussian reform eliminated sources of tensions between the gentry and the peasants in Greater Poland. In effect, the petty peasants as well as their traditional villages practically disappeared from the region while their traditional villages which still dominate the landscape of the former Russian and Austrian zones of Poland. Consequently, no peasant parties emerged in the region in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and their base of support has been relatively weak until today. Socialist movements have been also weak in Greater Poland (in contrast to the Russian zone, in particular) as most of the social tensions with partial class-conflict aspects in the

region were perceived as national conflicts between “German owners” and Polish workers or farmers.

The cultural and political dimension of the heritage of Prussian and German rule in contemporary Western Poland is even more ambiguous. While Germany was a relatively efficient state of law (*Rechtsstaat*), and the Polish population was exposed to a system of values favorable to capitalist development, the state was much more active in repressing manifestations of Polish national identity than, for example, Austria, and pursued its brutal policy of Germanization. Prussia, and later Germany, according to its ideologues, was supposed to be a “modern”, culturally homogenous state (*Kulturstaat*) and Poles were widely considered as an obstacle to achieving this end. Interestingly, such a view has also been shared by one of the founding fathers of modern sociology – Max Weber (ABRAHAM 1991), who actively supported anti-Polish organizations like the Hakata (German Eastern Marches Society). The preponderance of such visions of German identity resulted in actions by the state directed against Poles in economic, political, and cultural domains. Fortunately, from the Polish point of view, most of these actions backfired and effected a strengthening of Polish national identity, Polish civic and political institutions, and a network of protection of Polish economic interests in Greater Poland. At the same time, ZUKOWSKI argues that, in the Prussian zone, “in contrast to Russian, and less so, to Austrian partitions, Poles living under Prussian rule, were hard-working, disciplined, and marked by rigorous work ethic” (ZUKOWSKI 2004). This argument can, however, be countered by the fact that majority of Poles had been integrated into the German social system as farm or factory workers and all higher level jobs required fluency in German language and culture, which often resulted in Germanization as a result of upward social mobility. This mechanism was, in particular, reinforced by the fact that the Prussian/German part of Poland was the only zone where no universities existed until the rebirth of the Polish state in 1918. Moreover, secondary education was conducted only in German. On the other hand, this was the only part of former Polish territories where, at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, practically the entire population, including the inhabitants of the rural areas, had been provided access to a well-organized universal primary education system and, in effect, became fully literate by the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The situation in this context was the worst in the Russian zone, where illiteracy in some rural areas was still a problem long after 1945. The state of af-

fairs in the elementary education system was slightly better in Austrian Galicia. The positive legacy of the Prussian high quality elementary school system is often seen as having an influence on present day electoral behavior, in particular high electoral turnout in the former Prussian zone. However, some stereotypical theories explain the same fact in terms of the legendary “Prussian discipline”. This explanation could be backed by an observation that the turnout in Greater Poland had also been the highest in the late communist period, when electoral absentia was the main form of expression of dissent. Some also interpret this as a manifestation of the spirit of loyalty to any state structures attributed to the region. At the same time, it is often emphasized that the former Prussian region enjoyed some democratic freedoms, especially in the last year of its existence, when Poles could elect their representatives in the Reichstag. The democratization of the Prussian state, however, was progressing at a slower pace compared to that of Austria, but at a higher pace compared to the democratization of Russia.

## 2.2 The heritage of the Russian sector

On the other side of the border, Russian Poland, as it was already mentioned, was the most Western province of the Romanovs’ Empire. This fact appeared to be an advantage in the development of industrial centers in the region. Łódź is the best example of a large industrial city, an important center of the textile industry, famous for its industrial boom in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and even in present-day Poland. Łódź developed mainly because of its location near the Prussian border. This allowed investors from Prussia to build factories not far from their native country and, at the same time, to have access to the enormous Russian market. In other words, the sudden emergence of the industrial growth axis in Łódź was possible only because of the division of Poland and the tariff policies of the Russian Empire. Most authors agree that the Russian sector experienced the most pronounced impact of the industrialization process during the 19<sup>th</sup> century. One has, however, to note that it was restricted to a small number of centers (mostly Warsaw, Łódź and Dąbrowskie Basin around Sosnowiec) and much dependent on foreign capital. In general, the contrasts between urban and rural areas are much higher in the former Russian region than in any other part of Poland. This seems to be related to a more general pattern

of contrast between Germany, with low urban-rural tension, and Russia, with high polarization between large metropolises and rural areas.

The development of industry in the Russian zone started in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century under the relatively autonomous, so-called “Kingdom of Poland”. The Russian part of Poland saw primary land reform implemented in 1864. At that time peasants were given property rights to their plots. As KOCHANOWICZ noted “the enfranchisement was relatively favorable for peasantry, if compared either with the Prussian and Austrian reforms of the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, or the Russian reform of 1861. Not surprisingly – the motives were predominantly political. The reform was an answer to a manifest of the insurrectionist National Government (January 1863) granting peasants full rights to the land. The Russian government wanted to neutralize peasantry by all means, and to punish the rebellious landed gentry as well. For the peasantry, the enfranchisement – together with better market conditions and some technological progress in the agriculture – led to the improvement of their economic situation, and to the rise of their demand for industrial products, particularly textiles” (KOCHANOWICZ 2006)

In contemporary Polish mainstream historical discourse, the Russian sector is usually ascribed the worst stereotype of the three sectors of divided Polish lands of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Russia left a legacy of corrupt administration, authoritarianism, and civilizational backwardness, which were often perceived as factors hampering the development of the region. The Russian Empire is viewed as one which left neither democratic traditions nor impressive technical infrastructure. It did, however, stimulate the emergence of left-liberal educated intelligentsia, a class or stratum of an ambiguous role with ambitions of preserving some of the values of the nobility and a frequent anti-system political orientation. The Russian sector gave Poland its most famous 19<sup>th</sup> century poets, writers and the majority of its national heroes of this period, but that sector also had the lowest level of education and the least advanced process of nationalization of its large peasant population<sup>1)</sup>.

As economic historians point out, one of the

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<sup>1)</sup> Regional differences in levels of elementary education between the Russian sector and other parts of Polish lands are well demonstrated in the so called „Romer’s Atlas” of Poland published in Lviv/Lwów in 1916 [*Geograficzno-Statystyczny Atlas Polski* by Dr. Eugenjusz Romer]. A second edition map of elementary education’s regional differentiation from 1921 is available at <http://www.maproom.org/00/31/present.php?m=0017>.

key factors in industrialization of the Congress Kingdom was the availability of huge markets in economically underdeveloped Russia. KOCHANOWICZ argues that the process of industrialization in the Congress Kingdom had both spontaneous (especially during the economic boom at the turn of 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries) and conscious state policy aspects (KOCHANOWICZ 2006). State involvement was present in the planning of the so called Staropolskie Basin (Old-Polish Industrial Region) around Kielce as well as in the construction of railway connections in the Russian controlled part of Poland. The Vienna-Warsaw-St.Petersburg railway, and other railways gradually developed in the second part of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, made Warsaw the largest transport junction in the region, further reinforcing its economic position. One could argue, despite the obviously negative balance of the Russian occupation of Polish lands, that the memory of this period in Poland is highly one-sided. Among many forgotten aspects of the history of Russian Poland are the successful careers of many Poles in state administration (in particular, in mainland Russia and in the non-Polish sectors of the Empire) as well as the emergence of numerous fortunes based on successful economic ventures. These aspects do not, however, fit the dominant negative perception of Russia which plays a central role in the development of the modern Polish national identity (ZARYCKI 2004).

### 2.3 The heritage of the Austrian zone

The former Austrian part known as Galicia is widely viewed in Polish discourse as the most “nationally developed” and “democratically mature” from the point of view of its historical experience. It was the first one to participate in almost universal elections. At the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries electoral laws were constantly democratized and political liberties extended, thus allowing for the diffusion of Polish culture, Polish political organizations, and the strengthening of national awareness. The Austrian zone was the only sector where Polish language was allowed at all levels of education from elementary schools to universities. Moreover, after the reform of 1868, Poles dominated all levels of self-government in the province of Galicia.

However, Galicia’s stereotype also includes a negative economic aspect. The region was one of the poorest and most peripheral parts of the Habsburg Empire. It inherited exceptionally bad farm structure and widespread rural poverty – all these factors lead



to mass emigration to America. The land reform was conducted particularly ineffectively which led to lasting tensions between peasants and landlords. Despite the early discovery of considerable oil deposits in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the region was not able to profit from these assets and little industry emerged here until the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Exceptions included the Chrzanów Basin, Biała textile industry as well as the main urban centers of the region that is Lwów and Kraków. Among the positive aspects of the Austrian heritage was the development of primary, secondary, and university education. Modern bureaucracy is also often considered in this light. An interesting legacy of Austrian rule is the exceptional strength of the Catholic Church in the region. Let it be remembered that Austria was the only part of 19<sup>th</sup> century Polish lands where no persecution of Catholic Church members took place, as Austria was itself a Catholic monarchy. The high level of cultural conservatism and religiosity made the former Austrian zone's image quite controversial in modern Polish academic and media discourse. As I have discussed with much more detail elsewhere (ZARYCKI 2007), the perception of Galicia and its historical heritage is very much dependent on the analysts' own political and cultural orientation.

In short, if we adopt the point of view of the Polish left, the former Austrian zone appears as the "worst" part of Poland (e.g. GORZELAK and JAŁOWIECKI 1996). Its fundamental traits are parochialism, collectivism, authoritarian inclinations, and clericalism which turn the region into a heritage park of feudal, pre-modern Europe. Thus Galicia, from this point of view, with its conservatism, moral rigorosity, and traditionalism is considered unable to integrate with the modern societies of the European Union. At the same time, regional development conditions are seen as the worst in the country due to the inhabitants' tendency to think in ideological and moral terms rather than to use pragmatic and rational logic, supposedly prevailing in Western Poland. Because of its collectivism and the role of traditional social structures, Galicia, in this view, resembles the backward Mezzogiorno in Southern Italy in its most negative image (KUKLIŃSKI 2010).

On the other hand, from the Polish right's point of view, Galicia is usually depicted as the "best" part of Poland. As it has been asserted, the region has the longest democratic tradition in Poland. Moreover, as the conservative interpretation reminds us, the traditions of pre-Communist times are vivid in the region, which makes its inhabitants more adapted to a market economy and European integration than those in other parts of Poland. It is also usually emphasized

that private property is something natural in the region. Many families retained their property over several generations. All these factors make people allegedly more independent and self-reliant. Strong religious traditions result in a high level of national identity, self-esteem, and high moral standards (e.g. MAJCHEREK 1995). Moreover, in the right's interpretation, the high level of religiousness in Galicia makes its people more responsible and law abiding, thus leading to the lowest crime rates in the country and creating strong social networks. As a result, the region is depicted as having the highest level of social capital and the best potential for self-organization. Thus, it is not surprising that, in this view, the conditions for regional development, in what is presented as the most resourceful and most European region of the country, are portrayed as nearly optimal. These positive interpretations can be linked to a popular idealization of the heritage of the Austrian Empire – often related to the myth of the peaceful multicultural 'MittelEuropa'. This is often the way that memories of Galicia are invoked in the region and symbolized by the portraits of the 'good old emperor' Franz Joseph (BIALASIEWICZ 2005).

Interestingly, Galicia is the historical region which has been most often referred to in Polish debates on "contextual" or "ecological effects". Let me remind that the thesis on the importance of regional and local patterns of political behavior as crucial elements for the explanation of individual voting patterns was first presented by KEVIN COX in his seminal article "The Voting Decision in a Spatial Context" (1969) and later popularized by PETER J. TAYLOR and RON J. JOHNSTON in their work "Geography of Elections" (1979). One of their best known opponents was GARY KING (1996) who argued in support of the restricted nature of ecological effects. His argument was largely based on examples in which differences in regional behavior could be explained by compositional effects, that is, by regional deviations of average values of selected individual traits of voters. In Poland it is RADOSŁAW MARKOWSKI who is among the most ardent proponents of the anti-contextual approach pioneered by KING. MARKOWSKI argued that "there is nothing 'mysteriously rightist' in Galicia; rather the socio-structural composition of the electorate is different, with average age as the major factor which 'explains' the Galician phenomenon" (MARKOWSKI 2006, 826). I would argue however, that even if the "regional variable" can be eliminated in a statistical model of voting behavior by its substitution with relevant individual characteristics of survey respondents, the problem concerning

the origin and nature of the geographic differentiation of average individual traits of inhabitants across regions remains a valid research question.

### 3 Electoral geography of Poland

#### 3.1 The structure of the Polish political scene and its evolution

Electoral geography is widely considered to be the most remarkable dimension in which the lasting spatial structures of the partition period manifest their vitality. The geography of voting patterns in Poland has been the subject of numerous systematic studies (BARWIŃSKI 2006; JASIEWICZ 2009; KOWALSKI 2000; ZARYCKI and NOWAK 2000). Below I will shortly discuss the most spectacular instances of the reappearance of 19<sup>th</sup> century borders on contemporary electoral maps. First, let me present the structure of the Polish political scene and its evolution after 2005. As it has been already discussed, the two dimensional structure of the current Polish political scene was identical with the two dimensional structure of Poland’s electoral geography in the period of 1990–2005 (TWORZECKI 1996; ZARYCKI and NOWAK 2000). In the 2001 elections, in which the post-communist SLD came in first, we can see cleavage structures characteristic for the entire 1990s<sup>2)</sup>. The first factor was the clear rural-urban cleavage, while the second one was the so called “post-communist cleavage” (GRABOWSKA 2003), known also as the Polish variant of the left-right axis. In the 2005 election the post-communist left suffered a major defeat, while two right-wing, anti-communist parties – Civic Platform (PO) and Law and Justice (PiS) – emerged as winners (MARKOWSKI 2006). This didn’t change the two-dimensional cleavage in logic described above. Only the escalation of conflict between the liberal, pro-Western, and free-market oriented PO, on the one hand, and the conservative, euro-skeptical PiS, on the other hand, after they emerged as two major actors on the political scene following the 2005 parliamentary elections, led to a major change in cleavage structure in the 2007 elections (KRZEMIŃSKI 2009). The first factor, after a varimax variation, changes from rural-urban opposition into the PO vs. PiS axis, which is often interpreted as the lib-

eral vs. conservative factor or the Euro-enthusiasts vs. Euro-skeptics. The second factor can be interpreted as a fading old post-communist cleavage or as the left-right axis. It’s worth pointing out that the new liberal vs. conservative factor emerging in 2007 dominates the scene by explaining as much as 53% of the variance before rotation. This seems to confirm the largely one-dimensional character of that election.

When we analyze the correlation between values of factor loading by gminas (in other words, the measure similarity of maps) for each of the elections, we can see that the 2005 factors are still relatively similar to the two cleavages in the 2001 election, which, as it has been mentioned, are almost identical with factors that emerged in all elections in 1990s. In contrast, the 2007 factors are not directly linked to the old factor structure. The first and dominating factor of the 2007 election, in particular when we analyze its relation to “old” factors without rotation, appears to be a product of the combination of both of these factors. It is correlated to them in a similar restricted way. The emerging liberal axis in the new cleavage structure appears to be located between (or cutting) the old “left” (in post-communist cleavage) and “urban” (in urban-rural cleavage) camps (see Fig. 2). The emerging conservative (Euro-skeptical) pole appears between the old “right” (anti-communist) and old “rural” poles. One can note that, while the varimax rotation doesn’t considerably change the results of the 2001 and 2005 election matrixes, it clearly modifies 2007 outcomes. The factor structure after that considerable rotation of 2007 data appears to be again much more similar to the




Fig. 2: Interpretation of the Polish political space and its transformation after 2005

<sup>2)</sup> Results of the statistical analysis discussed in this paper are available in a working paper at the following location: <http://www.iss.uw.edu.pl/zarycki/pdf/east-west.pdf>

logic of 2001. The evolution of the Polish political scene and political geography in 2007 can be thus described as a rotation of the old two dimensional system. The emergence of the new dominant cleavage as a result of the two old cleavages does not imply their disappearance, but rather - their fading.

In any case, this evolution of Poland's political scene and electoral geography can be interpreted as a delayed effect of change in the geopolitical context. While the "old" dominating axis of the "right-left" or post-communist cleavage could be interpreted as a pattern of reaction to Soviet domination over Poland, the "new" one can be seen as emerging in reaction to Western domination (ZARYCKI 2011). Thus, while the "old" anti-communist option could be identified as peripheral in relation to Moscow as a symbol of the Soviet Union, the "new" conservative option could be labeled as peripheral in relation to Brussels as a symbol of the West. Analogically, the "old" post-communist camp could be seen as pro-central, while, in the new configuration, the liberal camp appears as the pro-central option (ZARYCKI 2000).

## 3.2 Interpretations of electoral geography

### 3.2.1 Patterns in the period 1990–2005

Since, as previously mentioned, the structure of Polish electoral geography in the period of 1990–2005 had a stable two-dimensional form, it is possible to discuss it while referring to two synthetic maps. They represent the two dimensions of the Polish political scene discussed above. The first one is the symbolic "left-right" conflict, known also as the "axis of values". Here the main controversy concerns the attitudes towards the communist system. On one side of the axis we find the post-communist parties and candidates. The opposite side of the axis is occupied by the right wing, religious, traditionalist anti-Communist groups and candidates. The second dimension representing the so-called "axis of interests" relates to differences in views on the economic system of the country. On the one hand we have supporters of the liberal, free-market option and, on the other hand, we have the supporters of the agrarian option – redistributive policies of state, etc. In the context of Polish politics, this cleavage took the form of opposition between a liberal, well-educated urban electorate and the rural electorate of the Polish Peoples Party (PSL). If we look at a map of the "left-right" cleavage, or the "values axis" (for example in

the form it manifested itself in the 2001 elections, see figure 3), the visibility of 19<sup>th</sup>-century borders is most clear in the case of the former Austro-Hungarian partition zone – Galicia. Conservative attitudes are similarly apparent both in the Polish and Ukrainian parts of the former Austrian province (DRUMMOND and LUBECKI 2010; HRYTSAK 2005). The Russian-Austrian border is sharply noticeable, first of all, along the Vistula river. However, it is also visible in the Eastern part of Poland, where no natural reinforcement of any kind exists. Galicia is clearly a region of high and stable right wing, anti-Communist party support. The former Prussian and German territories are much less conservative and more often support post-communist candidates. Another place where the 19<sup>th</sup> century border is still visible on the same map is in the Silesian region – more precisely along the border between the former Prussian Upper Silesia and the former Russian Dąbrowa Coal Basin. The Dąbrowa Basin in the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century was one of the main power bases of the socialist and communist parties in Polish territories. These traditions have survived until the present day and the region is still one of the strongholds of the left-wing, mostly post-communist parties in Poland. On the other side of the 19<sup>th</sup> century border, the political profile of the Upper Silesia is balanced, with a slight advantage for right-wing parties.

The 19<sup>th</sup> century political borders were much more visible in the second dimension of the Polish political space in the 1990–2005 period – the rural-urban/liberal-socialist economic cleavage, or the interest's axis (see figure 4 for its 2001 manifestation). Here the borders of the Russian Empire are discernible practically along the entire historical line of the current Polish territory. Generally, Western Poland is more urban and thus, economically more liberal, while the Eastern part of the country is more rural and, in effect, supports more socially oriented views with a stronger involvement of the state in the economy. If we start an examination of the map from the North, we see a clear difference along the former East Prussian border. Also, in Central Poland, the curve of the former border between Prussia and Russia is clearly visible. It becomes even sharper in the South, near the region of Silesia, as in the case of the first dimension of the political space. The difference between the former Austrian and Russian zones is also visible. [Fig. 5]

Another insight into the political map of the country can be gained through a look at the map of the turnout (Fig. 6) which, especially in the case of parliamentary and presidential elections, is very sta-






Fig. 3: Spatial patterns of factor 1 loadings based on a factor analysis of parliamentary election data from 2001. (Data source: Polish State Electoral Commission (Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza) <http://pkw.gov.pl/>)




Fig. 4: Spatial patterns of factor 2 loadings based on a factor analysis of parliamentary election data from 2001. (Data source: Polish State Electoral Commission (Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza) <http://pkw.gov.pl/>)




Fig. 5: Spatial patterns of factor 1 loadings based on a factor analysis of parliamentary election data from 2007. (Data source: Polish State Electoral Commission (Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza) <http://pkw.gov.pl/>)




Fig. 6: Spatial patterns of voter turnout based on parliamentary election data from 2007. (Data source: Polish State Electoral Commission (Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza) <http://pkw.gov.pl/>)



ble. Here, already at a first glance, we see the shape of the former Prussian sector. It is clearly the region of the highest turnout in Poland. Its borders in the East (with the former Russian zone) as well as in the West (with the former German territories) clearly follow historical lines. The former Prussian zone is not restricted only to the Greater Poland (Wielkopolska) region. It forms a long North-South belt from the Kaszuby region on the Baltic coast to Silesia on the Czech border. The turnout map permits us to recognize this shape along the entire area as the region of highest electoral participation in the country (with the exception of the largest urban centers).

### 3.2.2 Pattern after 2005

Let us look now at the new pattern of the Polish electoral geography after the transformation of the cleavage structure from a two dimensional to a one dimensional system. Figure 5 presents the map of the new liberal vs. conservative axis as it emerged in 2007 elections. The juxtaposition of the two previous maps resulted in a much clearer east-west pattern where the former Prussian zone and the former German territories (Silesia, Pomerania and Eastern Prussia) and former Eastern Prussia are contrasted with the former Austrian and Russian sectors with the obvious exceptions of large towns, non-Catholic regions (in particular, the Orthodox part of Podlasie or Protestant Cieszyn Silesia) and areas with considerable exchanges of population after 1945. The former German lands (or the so called Western and Northern Territories) represent the most liberal and secularized part of Poland. This translates into the highest levels of support for the liberal pro-Western camp and earlier considerable support for left parties, in particular, for former-communists. A similar effect to that observed in Western Poland can be also observed in other regions in Central and Eastern Europe where an exchange of population took place after the last war (ZARYCKI 1999). In particular, in Czech lands, from which German population was expelled just after the war, in the post-Communist period we observe a similar propensity toward support of the post-communist parties, as well as those considered to be populist (KOSTELECKÝ 1994).

Returning to present day Polish Northern and Western Territories, we can observe that they appear to be among the most ardent supporters of Polish integration with the European Union (WASILEWSKI 2004). This is not surprising as the pattern of support of Poland's EU membership in the 2003 ref-

erendum was almost identical to the geography of the new liberal vs. conservative cleavage. This may be seen as a manifestation of a more general trend in these regions, namely that of orientation towards formal, institutional structures (in particular, the state) as a framework of social life rather than informal, family type circles still dominant in Eastern and Southern Poland. The level of turnout is, however, not the highest in these lands, rather, it is below the national average and parties considered as populist (e.g. Samoobrona) often gain their highest levels of support in this part of the country. One can note that a considerable internal spatial differentiation is visible inside these former German areas. A higher uniformity of settlers coming from single regions made Lower Silesia much more coherent in social terms, compared to other regions resettled after 1945 – in particular, Western Pomerania and former Eastern Prussia. The settlers coming to Lower Silesia were not only more homogenous, but also arrived predominately from former Austrian lands (Galicia). In effect, they transferred some of the characteristic traits of these regions, including their relative conservatism and religiosity, into their new areas of settlement (BARTKOWSKI 2003). Lower Silesia has, until today, a higher degree of population stability and is clearly more conservative than other parts of former German territories. One may also speculate about the influence of the structures of settlements abandoned by former German inhabitants. While Lower Silesia had a dense network of smaller and middle-sized farms, more similar to patterns observed in Eastern Poland, Pomerania and former Eastern Prussia, as mentioned above, were dominated by large Junker estates. While the Lower Silesian farms were largely taken over by Polish petty peasants coming from Eastern Poland and former Eastern Galicia, former Junker estates were turned into state farms and, in effect, a large population of rural proletariat working on such farms emerged in the region. Observation of these differences induced JACEK LUBECKI to form a hypothesis that “one should expect above-average and consistently high levels of electoral support for the successor parties in the regions that in pre-communist times were agrarian ‘crisis’ zones of latifundism and rural poverty and thus experienced communism as an era of unprecedented economic development” (LUBECKI 2004). LUBECKI was able to confirm this hypothesis of the long-lasting heritage of “latifundism” not only in Poland's example but also using data from several other post-Communist countries including Hungary and Russia. He concluded his study stating that “re-

gions where communism built its own order on the pre-communist legacy of bitterness and poverty today show above-average levels of electoral support for the parties symbolically representing the communist system. This framework allows a contextual and historical understanding of regional variance in the successor vote" (LUBECKI 2004).

The other side of the post-2005 dominant cleavage is constructed by the combined support of the more radical parts of earlier "anti-communist" and "peasant" camps, which had their respective major stronghold in the former Austrian and Russian zones. In effect, we are dealing today with a much more pronounced east-west pattern in Poland's electoral geography than earlier. Looking from the point of view of the liberal pro-Western camp, these interpretations are often simple: Western Poland is more liberal due to the stronger historical influences of the West (e.g. JAŁOWIECKI 1996). Eastern Poland, in contrast, had weaker Western heritage and stronger "bad" Eastern influences. In the conservative narration, the East appears as a mainstay of the "true" Polish identity, not distorted by the secularization and massive population movements in the early post-war years. However, one can also find references to Western heritage in that region, although that heritage is usually understood in its conservative, traditional aspects.

#### 4 Types of capital as dimensions in the reproduction of spatial structures

##### 4.1 Economic capital

The 19<sup>th</sup> century was a crucial period for the development of modern states, modern nations, and modern economies. It was a period of national and economic modernization when the foundations of the development of modern structures of economy were laid all over Europe. It is thus not surprising that, given the diversity of the countries controlling the Polish territory, the development paths of particular Polish regions were often very specific and different. The most tangible aspect of the partition heritage can be seen in the economic space of the country. Here, the 19<sup>th</sup> century borders are visible on several maps - most clearly in the social and political sphere. Several examples could be adduced. First, let me take the case of per capita revenues of Polish communes. The former Russian zone (with the exception of larger cities) is, until the present day, much poorer than the rest of the country - especially when compared to the

Prussian sector. Different measures of infrastructure density show a similar picture. Until recently, that is, till early 1990s, almost one hundred years after the outbreak of the First World War the railway network was still more dense on former Prussian and German lands than in the Russian sector<sup>3)</sup>. Similar differences are seen in different measures of living conditions such as the quality of housing stock, availability of apartments with water supply and sewage systems, etc. What is also important is that the Russian and Austrian sectors remain until the present day much more rural as regions than those of Western Poland. In the Polish context patterns of land ownership seem to constitute the most stable dimension in the reproduction of structures of social space. Thus, as it has been already mentioned, the farms in former Austrian and Russian zones are, on average, much smaller and less efficient, often oriented towards subsistence agriculture.

One can note that the Third Republic, as post-communist Poland is often called, despite the radical reform of the economic system, did not considerably influence the structure of land ownership with the main exception being the bankruptcy of state farms (PGRs) in former German territories. The lands of many of these farms had been already privatized but the large sizes of the farms were usually preserved. Thus, the structures of Polish agriculture remained largely intact after 1989. It is worth emphasizing that no political power administering Polish territories after the partition period was ever able to considerably reduce the fragmentation of land property, which reinforced the strength of identity and the political position of Polish petty peasants - in particular those residing in former Russian and Austrian sectors. The Second Republic's government embarked on a restricted program of redistribution of large estates among small peasants. The intention of Communist Poland was to nationalize all private farms, as did other countries in the Soviet Block. The first stage of the project was to nationalize large estates. It was fully implemented and the nationalized land had been, to a considerable degree, redistributed among "landless peasants" in order to legitimize the new Moscow-imposed government. This move further increased fragmentation of land ownership, particularly in the former Austrian and Russian sectors. At the same time, the domination of middle-sized farms in the former Prussian sector made

<sup>3)</sup> One has to note that recently most of the local railway lines in Western Poland have been dismantled or withdrawn from use effecting in equalization of the density of the railway network across entire country.

most of the farms non-eligible for nationalization or partition. In this way the structure of land ownership in the region remained largely unchanged. Land was, however, mostly acquired and retained by the state in former German regions, which included the so called Western and Northern Territories. Subsequent attempts at collectivization of petty peasants' farms in the former Austrian and Russian zones appeared to be futile. The peasants, who accounted for over half of the country's population, actively resisted such attempts. The Catholic Church, particularly influential in South-Eastern Poland, unanimously supported the peasants' protests against the nationalization of farms. In this way Poland had become the only country in the Soviet bloc where private ownership of arable land remained and even prevailed. This gave the peasants of Poland relative independence from the structures of the Communist state and allowed them to retain their specific traditions and ways of life. Moreover, petty peasants were able to gain several privileges from the state including subsidized fertilizers and equipment as well as guaranteed prices and long term contracts for their products. The resulting structure of the geography of agriculture in Poland has been heavily influenced by the 19<sup>th</sup> century political borders. The arable lands of the former Russian and Austrian zone remained in petty peasants' hands. Today, the former Prussian zone is dominated by large and middle-sized private farms, while in the former (pre-1945) German regions farms are, on average, large. This historically produced pattern of economic differentiation of the country seems to still strongly influence its electoral geography. The agrarian electorate consequently supports rather conservative and statist-oriented parties that promise to defend petty farmer's privileges. In the former Russian part of Poland, Polish People's Party (PSL) usually prevails in rural areas (with the major exception of the highly religious Podlasie region), while in the former Austrian zone, despite or because of its pre-communist legacy of strong independent peasant movements, conservative-right wing groupings usually gain the majority of votes. Inhabitants of rural areas in both regions appear to be, on average, the least enthusiastic regarding Poland's entry into the European Union. The EU was seen by them as another institution challenging their traditional ways of life. Finally, the farmers and small (land) holders have managed to find their place in the new realities after EU accession and their political position has remained strong. This makes the prospect of a reduction in the crack between the rural, conservative East and the liberal, urbanized West on the map of Poland very unlikely.

## 4.2 Social capital

Now let me briefly discuss the patterns of distribution of social capital. I will refer in this place to a distinction between its bonding and bridging forms introduced by ROBERT PUTNAM, who suggested that the long-lasting structures of Italian geography, including electoral geography, were defined in the dimension of social capital (PUTNAM 1993). While it seems quite difficult to assess the level at which long-term spatial structures in Poland have been defined and reproduced, dependencies between the regional differentiation of social capital and voting patterns have been established. As PAWEŁ SWIANIEWICZ and JAN HERBST (SWIANIEWICZ et al. 2008) as well as JAROSŁAW DZIAŁEK (2014) have shown, the two basic dimensions of social capital have a largely opposite geographical differentiation in the Polish space. At the same time, they appear to be highly related to the left-right dimension in Poland's electoral geography. Thus, the geography of bonded social capital (that is, close social networks usually of family character) is similar to the support of the conservatives in the Polish political scene. In other words, Southern and Eastern regions stand out in this dimension although the former Prussian Wielkopolska also has relatively high scores of bonded social capital. It is very clearly related to levels of religiousness. On the other hand we have the so-called bridging social capital which is based on trust for all members of civil communities, irrespective of their origin and family relationships, as well as on trust in formal institutions. The highest scores of bridging social capital are found in the former German territories in the West and North of Poland. This can be linked to their relative secularization and to the weakness of traditional communities which have been based on informal social networks that have been developed for several generations. In these regions, involvement in non-governmental organizations serving interests wider than those of small local communities is higher than elsewhere in Poland, and social life seems much more formalized and "rational" than in Southern and Eastern Poland, where "pre-modern" social networks seems to endure subsequent political and economic transformations.

## 4.3 Cultural capital

Another important social asset that may be seen as a dimension in the reproduction of social and spatial structures is what PIERRE BOURDIEU called "cultural capital". It's worth noting in this context

that Western Poland (in particular, the province of Greater Poland or Wielkopolska) had historically a relatively lower number of nobles (landed gentry) than other parts of the country, in particular Mazovia – even long before the partitions of Poland. On the other hand, cities grew faster and their network was denser in that region; thus, the number of burghers was consequently higher than in remaining parts of the country. The 19<sup>th</sup> century saw a transformation of a large part of the poorer landed gentry into an educated urban stratum called the intelligentsia, which could be seen as a Central-Eastern European substitute for the middle class (SZELÉNYI 1982). That process, which is usually considered as largely specific to this part of Europe, originated due to a number of factors: land expropriations (especially in the Russian sector where Poles have been often punished in this way for their rebellious actions and attitudes), restricted access of ethnic Poles to positions in the state administration of occupying powers, and, last but not least, underdevelopment of industry and cities (GELLA 1976). Lower numbers of landed gentry in the region of Greater Poland could have also translated into smaller population and lesser importance of the traditional intelligentsia in the region, although the institutional developments in the 19<sup>th</sup> century seem to have played a crucial role. Let me remind in particular that the Prussian zone of partitioned Poland, as mentioned earlier, was the only part of the Polish lands where no single university-level institution existed until the resurrection of the Polish state; the first university in Poznań did not open until 1919. Yet, it was the Prussian part of Poland where the most efficient and universal system of elementary education was created. Illiteracy was practically eradicated by the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. Greater Poland, just like the rest of Prussia, also saw the development of a network of professional schools. These schools have been very helpful in turning peasants into workers in large farms, light industry and services in the region, and in heavy industry in other Prussian industrial centers. On the other side of the border, universities in Russia (Warsaw and Wilno/Vilnius, but also in Tartu/Dorpat, St.Petersburg and others where many sons of the Polish gentry studied) and Austria (Kraków and Lwów/Lviv/Lemberg, but also Vienna and others) were producing a stream of graduates, mostly over-educated from the point of view of the needs of the local economy and administration (JEDLIŃSKI 2008). In this way, they supplied a constant influx of new members of the intelligentsia. At the same time, the classical gymnasia, for which both the Austrian and the Russian regions were known, have been, first and

probably more importantly, elements of the mechanism that turned the Polish national elite from gentry into intelligentsia<sup>4</sup>.

The transformation of the large part of the more affluent and active gentry into intelligentsia can be viewed in a Bourdieusian theoretical perspective as a conversion of social capital into cultural capital. The intelligentsia, as many of its critics point out, not only suffered from a constant deficit of economic capital (or more precisely, from an unusual surplus of cultural capital in relation to its restricted assets of economic capital), but also developed an ideology depreciating the value of economic capital. The prevailing type of intelligentsia identity emphasized a moral vocation for its members, a responsibility for the nation, and usually a need of a sacrifice for the benefit of the people (or the working class, in the leftist version of the intelligentsia identity, which has been generally less radical in Poland than in Russia) (WALICKI 2005). The idea of sacrifice encompassed a cult of suffering, often in a direct sense, for example, in the capacity of victims of an unequal fight with foreign invaders. The roles of a businessman or a clerk was downgraded in this outlook, as businesses and state administrations usually belonged to the occupying powers and were not easily accessible for ethnic Poles<sup>5</sup>. On the other hand, the sphere of culture and sciences, in particular humanities and arts, has become particularly valued as Polishness has been principally defined in the symbolic sphere of high culture and identity, with its main guardians being poets, writers, or painters. BOHDAN JAŁOWIECKI (JAŁOWIECKI 1996) argued in this context that such an idealistic vision of Polish identity, in particular in the form that was developed by the Polish intelligentsia of the Russian zone, had been, to a large extent, imposed on the remaining regions of Poland; it dominated the institutionalized narratives of modern national identity.

<sup>4</sup> One may note that the intelligentsia has not been developing solely on the basis of former gentry members. It has been also absorbing people of other origin including former landowners, peasants, or Jews. On the other hand, part of the impoverished petty gentry, in particular outside large towns, has been gradually losing its status and not being able to join the intelligentsia, thus transforming into peasantry. Nevertheless, considerable part of the villages composed of former gentry members, in particular in the Podlasie region, retain their identity and distinction from non-gentry neighbours until today (KOWALSKI 2000; ROGOWSKA-AUGUSTYNOWICZ 2008).

<sup>5</sup> One has to note that Galicia after 1868 was an exception, while in the Russian zone only the highest administrative posts have been reserved for Russians (CHWALBA 1999).



One can note that the above described differences between the regions in terms of the role of the intelligentsia as well as the status of its identity can still be detected. One could try to relate them to the differentiations in the results of national high-school tests, which were introduced a couple of years ago into Poland's school system. Recent comparisons of average scores of students from different regions brought considerable surprises when they were first published (BAŃSKI et al. 2002; HERCZYŃSKI and HERBST 2002). Taking into account the results from rural areas (there was no particularly significant difference between large urban centers, where results were usually above the national average irrespective of the region), differences between the former Prussian and German parts of the country, on the one hand, and former Russian and Austrian parts, on the other hand, emerged. Contrary to the expectations of many analysts, students in South-Eastern Poland are systematically scoring better than their peers in the Northern and Western parts of the country. Moreover, there is a noticeable correlation between voting for conservative parties (as PiS – Law and Justice and LPR – League of Polish Families) and higher test scores in the rural areas. Experts analyzed several hypotheses but no clear explanation of this intriguing outcome seems to be found so far (e.g. HERBST 2009; ŚLESZYŃSKI 2004). One could speculate that the former Prussian part of Poland has been better integrated into the relatively more “modern” economic system represented by the Prussian state. However, as mentioned above, Poles have been functioning in this system on a relatively low level of social hierarchy and in a peripheral region – mostly in positions where no university level education has been required. In the context of the less modern societies of Russia and Austria, where modernity was not defined in such a direct opposition to Polishness as in Prussia, social ‘rise’ or conservation of previous social position for Poles was easier. At the same time, the Austrian and Russian societies, where not so much economic capital, but rather social capital (as defined by social origin) and cultural capital, inherited from family and gained by education, were decisive for defining social status and provided more incentives for pursuing education and investing in degrees – even degrees which did not directly translate into higher income or better position on the job market (GELLA 1976). If the hypothesis concerning the stronger influences of intelligentsia ethos and its wider population, especially of those of its members with a gentry or-

igin, is justified, we could also assume that, to some extent, the regional differences in educational attainments can be explained by those factors. Some observations confirming the thesis regarding the stronger values of cultural capital in the social milieu of Southern and Eastern Poland have been provided by JERZY BARTKOWSKI (BARTKOWSKI 2003). In particular, in the Western and Northern Territories (former German lands) BARTKOWSKI noted a relative lack of interest in investment in real estate or generally – in economic, material capital in communities where the majority of inhabitants had familial roots in the former region of Austrian Galicia. At the same time, orientation towards education (cultural capital) was visible in these communities, for example in the form of a higher budget allocation for culture and education. Such cultural capital-oriented attitudes and indicators correlate positively, according to BARTKOWSKI, with the number of settlers coming from Galicia and negatively with those originating in former Prussian territories where investments in material infrastructure are more privileged. Upper Silesia, bordering with the Dąbrowa Basin, is also a very interesting laboratory of the above mentioned processes. Functionally forming one industrial region, it actually constitutes two opposing and largely conflicted worlds (ROST et al. 2007). The former Russian controlled Dąbrowa Basin appears to be strongly left-oriented and secularized and also demonstrates higher school test results than neighboring cities with a heritage of Prussian administration. Upper Silesia is more conservative and religious, and shows, on average, slightly lower test results, which can possibly be linked to a historical absence of Polish intelligentsia in that region.

## 5 Conclusion

Thus, as we can see, the partition period left a legacy of division in Poland into a Western part – more pragmatic but less sophisticated in terms of cultural ambitions, and a South-Eastern part – more backward and rural in economic terms but having higher intellectual ambitions, possibly influenced by intelligentsia dominated social elites. The current configuration of the Polish political scene, which after 2005 has been dominated by liberals vs conservatives cleavage, has made this East-West division of the Polish space very visible. In Western Poland, the higher rate of urbanization and the smoother integration of the educated population



into the modern German economic and social system translated into a lower percentage of intelligentsia in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and a stronger bourgeois identity. Efficient larger farms which emerged after the Prussian land reforms reduced the role of petty peasants and were conducive to the development of a modern and competitive agricultural sector. On the other hand, the lack of universities in this region until 1918 prevented the production of overeducated graduates which would join the ranks of the national intelligentsia. In effect, a stronger middle class culture developed in the region with weaker presence of the influence of traditional Eastern European intelligentsia. Institutionalization of social life appeared stronger than in the east; more specifically, bridging (that is, mostly formalized) social capital played a greater role. Cultural capital today is also more important in its institutionalized pragmatic forms. In other words, economic capital seems to have relatively higher status in the logic of social stratification and reproduction, which makes this region more similar to a typical Western European society in terms of the model developed by EYAL et al. (1998).

Eastern Poland appears to have retained a logic of social hierarchy developed through different mechanisms and without strong German (Prussian) influences. However, the pre-partition heritage seems to also play a role in this region. A high number of gentry and, in particular, petty gentry, whose traditions are still alive in some regions until today, translated into numerous intelligentsia dominating in the symbolical social hierarchy of the region and imposing their idealistic ethos and life-style as norms of a higher class identity. One could speculate that the Bolshevik revolution had a stronger impact on the elite of Eastern Poland as it deprived most of the Russian-based Poles of their economic capital and real estate already by 1917. This could strengthen the role of the logic of status oriented, post-aristocratic forms of cultural capital as key dimensions in social structure, especially that of embodied cultural capital. This capital was transferred during family socialization rather than in formal academic institutions. There were also limitations to land reforms and their specific restricted forms under Austrian occupation. Russian and Soviet rule led to overpopulation of rural areas in Eastern Poland and to widespread subsistence farming. The economic weakness of agriculture in this part of Poland reinforced the role of traditional cultural capital as well as bonded social capital functioning with the support of the church as a compensatory

asset for inhabitants of rural areas. In effect, the economic capital could be seen as having a relatively lower status in the logic of social hierarchies in the region<sup>6</sup>.

Let me emphasize that the above discussion has been only a preliminary exploration of ideas on the incorporation of BOURDIEU's theory of capitals into the study of the *longue durée* effects in spatial variations in electoral outcomes. To fully validate the hypotheses presented here, one would need to collect data allowing a direct correlation between diverse types of capital and political orientations. However, systematic and precise measurement of the resources of different types of capital as they have been defined here following BOURDIEU, could be a challenging task. First, because of importance are not only their absolute but rather their relative assets (e.g., the fact of having much more cultural than economic capital typically defines intelligentsia members). Another challenge in this respect is that not only capital assets but also the importance assigned to them by particular individuals may be of relevance. Thus, an intelligentsia member can be economically affluent but will usually consider his or her economic assets of secondary importance compared to his or her cultural capital. Moreover, an adequate measurement of cultural capital may appear to be quite difficult. As BOURDIEU himself has argued, its definition is always contextual and as the most recent studies prove it, it is constantly changing (e.g. ANNICK PRIEUR and MIKE SAVAGE 2013). In the context of the culture of Central and Eastern European intelligentsia, of importance in this respect is not only formal education, or even the number of books, which are usually used as typical measurements of cultural capital (LEWICKA 2005), but also the mastery of the informal intelligentsia's ethos (ZARYCKI 2009). Also those developing measures of social capital may face challenges, although progress in this field has been much greater so far. Still, many ambiguities remain concerning the role of religion and religious institutions. The Catholic

<sup>6</sup> One has to emphasize that by referring to economic capital, the wider sphere of institutionalized social relations defining social status and career opportunities is understood. During the communist period private ownership of houses and farms persisted mainly in the Eastern part of Poland, while most of the real estate in Western Poland has been nationalized and collectivized. This, however, did not translate into marginalization of the role of social and cultural capital in Eastern Poland, because the private ownership scale was restricted and not integrated into a modern system of capitalist economy which normally sets the economic capital as the principal dimension of social prestige.

Church is undoubtedly one of the key institutions generating networks of social trust in Poland; their character is, however, difficult to assess and translate into measures of social capital. As evidence from other countries, for example Hungary (WITTENBERG 2006), proves, the Catholic Church plays crucial role in the reproduction of social and political structures. In the case of Polish regions, however, its role may not be as obvious as it could seem. In particular, the level of religiosity still appears to be higher in the former Prussian region of Greater Poland than in the adjacent part of the former Russian sector, which in political terms appears to be more conservative. This seems to be just one of the challenges related to the task of developing a detailed map of Poland in terms of different types of capital.

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**PHANTOM BORDERS AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR IN POLAND  
HISTORICAL LEGACIES, POLITICAL CULTURE AND THEIR INFLUENCE  
ON CONTEMPORARY POLITICS**

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With 3 figures and 2 tables

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**Summary:** The article deals with phantom borders in electoral behavior in Poland. Being aware of the already wide literature in this field, the author tries to fill a gap existing in the research by investigating scale as a factor determining phantom borders' construction. Two historical-administrative regions, Wielkopolska and Pomorze (crossed by relict boundaries) were tested quantitatively and qualitatively. By employing double de-scaling (territorial and electoral) the author discovered that in both the macro and micro scales phantom borders are present, however, their construction and manifestation differs significantly. Consequently, this finding brings a new perspective to phantom border studies, widening the currently dominating historical perspective (with its structural and normative dimensions) by adding a new element: scale. It seems to bring a new perspective in understanding the investigated processes.

**Zusammenfassung:** Der Beitrag setzt sich mit Phantomgrenzen im Bereich des Wahlverhaltens in Polen auseinander. Der bereits existierenden umfangreichen Literatur zu dieser Thematik durchaus bewusst, versucht der Autor eine Forschungslücke durch Untersuchung der Skala (Mikro-/Makroebene) als vorausbestimmenden Faktor der Konstruktion von Phantomgrenzen zu schließen. Die quantitative und qualitative Untersuchung wurde in zwei historisch-administrativen Regionen, Wielkopolska und Pomorze (durchschnitten von historischen Grenzen), durchgeführt. Durch den Einsatz einer De-scaling-Methode (territorial und elektoral) stellt der Autor fest, dass sowohl in der Makro- als in der Mikroebene Phantomgrenzen vorhanden sind, obgleich sie sich in ihrer Konstruktion und Artikulation bedeutend unterscheiden. Im Endeffekt eröffnet dieses Ergebnis eine neue Perspektive für Phantomgrenzen-Studien, indem die derzeit vorherrschende historische Perspektive (mit strukturellen und normativen Dimensionen) um das neue Element der Skalenebene erweitert wird.

**Keywords:** Political geography, Poland, phantom borders, central elections, local elections, scale change

## 1 Introduction

*Phantom borders* are a phenomenon present in the everyday lives of many European states. In some cases, as in Ukraine, they are violently visible in political-territorial conflict, in others, as in Romania or Slovakia, they form a part of the ethnic-political relations with their neighbor. But it is mainly Poland where – due to its complicated territorial past – the debate on old, non-existent boundaries attracts not only academics, but also politicians, commentators, businessmen and ordinary people.

The eighteenth century partitions of Poland deeply diversified its economic, political and cultural realities in the *Prussian/German, Russian and*

*Austrian*<sup>1)</sup> parts. This process was additionally supplemented by post-Yalta border shifts and population resettlements. Consequently, in contemporary Poland four *zones* can be identified when analyzing economic indicators, cultural habits or crime rates, and also – what is especially interesting for an author who is a political scientist – political behavior (BARTKOWSKI 2002). They reflect four different historical legacies and result in contemporary political processes.

Most of the current studies on the above described phenomena apply a macro-scale perspective, by concentrating on the state, its unity or diversity. They consider Poland as a single territorial-admin-

<sup>1)</sup> The name *Austrian* is used for the territories belonging to the Habsburg State (Austrian Empire and after 1867 to Austria-Hungary).



istrative unit, crossed by detectable dividing lines. Those divisions are usually regarded as being identical to the administrative divisions on the regional level (*voivodship* – in Polish *województwo*). This leads to simplifications in the spatial-political mapping of processes analyzed. The author is, however, interested if these phenomena are noticeable on levels other than the macro level and, if so, if the pattern of political behavior remains the same. And, as a result, how are historic borders reproduced in current political life, and how are they constructed or deconstructed by the actors involved? Finally, how can the *phantom borders* concept be developed with the help of scale manipulation to better explain the current political landscape of investigated territorial units?

This article presents the elements of a recently conducted research using a micro-approach, by investigating regional (DONAJ 2013; GRYGO and SECLER 2010; JAŃCZAK 2010; JAŃCZAK 2013) and local units (JAŃCZAK et al. 2013). It proposes double downgrading of the investigation's scale by reducing the territorial level and election type to explore tested phenomenon. Two Polish historic-administrative regions (representing different types of historical traditions and different *phantom borders*) have been thus selected: Wielkopolska (Greater Poland) and Pomorze (Pomerania). Electoral behavior (understood as participation level and political preferences) in central and local voting were tested there at regional (*voivodship*) and county (in Polish *powiat*) levels, which made it possible to draw a scale-related map of the historical borders' relevance. The text is based on quantitative analyses of electoral statistics, supported by a qualitative investigation (ten interviews conducted in 2011–2012 among the regional and local political elites in various parts of the investigated regions). Analytically, the concept of de-scaling frames the investigation, similarly to boundarization and frontierization models, what results from still missing widely recognized *border theory* (BRUNET-JAILLY 2005; KOLOSOV 2005; PAYAN 2014) or *phantom border theory*, that could more convincingly serve as a framework for analysis.

## 2 *Phantom borders* – towards conceptualization

After the collapse of communism, a revival of *border studies* in the United States and Europe can be observed. Consequently the nature and transformation of borders has been intensively investigated, also including historical borders in what

today are politically homogeneous states. Border scholars are looking for a border theory that shall “render explanatory and predictive models” (PAYAN 2014, 1), assuming often that “borders are separate objects of social research” (PAASI 2005, 668). Phantom borders are understood in this paper – following their conceptualization developed within the “Phantomgrenzen” project as – “former, predominantly political borders that structure today's world (...), historical spaces [that] persist or re-emerge”(Phantomgrenzen). As the author is especially interested in political behavior, and consequently, manifestations of relict borders visible in political life, he concentrates on the influence of former political boundaries on this thematic field. The critical approach requires, however, two interventions here: answering the questions of the mutual relations between *border studies* and the *phantom border* concept, as well as defining the reasons why historical borders re-emerge.

With regard to the former, the definition and approach to *phantom borders* shall be placed in the wider context of *border studies*. The *phantom border* concept seems to be related to the latest developments in the field of studying borders. A conceptual development in *border studies*, recently redesigning the dominating approach, moved the attention of scholars towards understanding borders as social constructs. As VLADIMIR KOLOSOV remarks, a “boundary is not simply a legal institution designed to ensure the integrity of state territory, but a product of social practice, the result of a long historical and geopolitical developments, and an important symbolic marker of (...) political identity” (KOLOSOV 2005, 652). This political identity is an outcome of the bordering process. LADIS KRISTOF sees a boundary as a “meeting place of two socio-political bodies, each having its particular interests, structure, and ideology” (KRISTOF 1959, 277). Political identities on the respective border sides are structured then by various powers. Borders are seen as “*participation* in a collective consciousness (rituals, customs, traditions, laws, historical knowledge, and even language) associated with a particular territory” (O'DOWD and WILSON 2002, 19).

This approach would mean that borders are complex phenomena of multidimensional composition. However, their transposition to *phantom borders* seems not to be automatic, and is not academically obvious. On the other hand, a careful investigation of already existing findings on the character of borders paves the way for a better understanding of *phantom borders* and their nature: they are rooted in

political boundaries and boundarization processes both in their historical and functional aspects. This conclusion makes it possible to concentrate on the second of the above indicated questions.

With regard to the latter (reasons for the re-emergence of historical borders): from the perspective of history-present day relations, actual state borders are considered to be outcomes of historical processes. They are “reminders of the past, (...) the products of previous conquests, invasions, population movements or treaties. Any redefinition or transformation of borders means engaging with the past” (O’DOWD and WILSON 2002, 8). One can assume that state borders that have disappeared are characterized by very similar features, and also in their case changing the state of art is a game with (or against) historical developments.

Functionally, as stressed by scholars, old boundaries are hardly erasable due to several reasons. As NAIL ALKAN points, “everywhere where borders have been removed new ones have to be created (...), keeping this in mind, borders have to be understood as boundaries enclosing a space of identification and orientation” (ALKAN 2002, 37). This happens because of the logic of the European integration, where borders devalue (O’DOWD and WILSON 2002, 10), but where, at the same time, mental (...) borders become more important (EHLERS et al. 2001, 2). Relict borders constitute one of the ways of finding differences. Additionally, state related processes contribute to the process: the more safe the state borders are, the more visible the internal divisions are (O’DOWD and WILSON 2002, 17). Consequently, any form of bordering – also with regard to old borders – seems to be the key concept for organizing political and social space. As DAVID NEWMAN claims, “all borders share a common function to the extent that they include some and exclude many others” (NEWMAN 2003, 16). So one could conclude that *phantom borders* are (re)constructed as a form of virtual enclosure, and any “enclosure fosters a feeling of security and people prefer to live in familiar circumstances” (ALKAN 2002, 37).

At the end, it shall be emphasized that scholars engaged in *phantom border* research are intensively looking for theoretical support in their investigation. Among various approaches, the concept of *path dependency* could be mentioned (PETERS et al. 2005), assuming that “history matters” in understating current political processes (PAGE 2006) and concentrating on relations between continuity and change in them (BOAS 2007).

### 3 Political, historical, geographical and analytical context

To conduct further investigations into the Polish case, several contextual remarks have to be made, framing the analysis and settling it in the wider political, spatial and historical landscape of Poland.

First of all, the political ruptures in Poland are reflected in the ruling political options at the central level. In the 2001–2005 period, the Polish political scene was dominated by the social democrats (rooted in post-communist traditions), the SLD (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej – Democratic Left Alliance). In 2005–2007 it was marked by conservative governments, PiS (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – Law and Justice), since 2007 by liberals, PO (Platforma Obywatelska – Civic Platform). Those three political orientations have dominated the political scene both at the central and local levels in Poland.

Secondly, there is the location of the above-mentioned four *zones* (Fig. 1). *Prussian/German* Poland (no. 1) contained three regions ((Eastern) Pomorze, Wielkopolska and Górny Śląsk – Upper Silesia) in the nineteenth century, ethnically mainly Polish at that time, but sharing a century long tradition of neighboring Germany and exposed to German influences. *Russian* Poland (no. 2) consisted of central and eastern regions, with the capital – Warsaw – and was also dominated by Poles and Polish culture in the nineteenth century. *Austrian* Poland (no. 3) was located in the southern part of the country, around Cracow, and, similarly to the previous two, being Polish in terms of culture and language. All three belonged to their respective empires in the nineteenth century. Finally, the post-German (the name applied to the lands given to Poland after the end of the Second World War) territories (no. 4) were, by 1945, ethnically and politically German. They were granted to Poland as compensation for the Polish eastern provinces which were transferred to the Soviet Union after the end of the Second World War. The German population fled and was expelled, and replaced by Polish settlers from the east (previously exposed to Russian influences).

Thirdly, the electoral map of Poland, when analyzing parliamentary and presidential voting in the last two decades, reveals territorially marked preferences. As demonstrated by subsequent election results charts (for example Fig. 2), the western and northern regions (administratively *voivodships*) usu-



Fig. 1: Voivodeships of Poland and historical borders

ally opt for liberal/social democratic parties and candidates (so-called *liberal Poland*, in Polish *Polska liberalna*), the central and eastern provinces are dominated by conservative voters (so called *solidary Poland*, in Polish *Polska solidarna*<sup>2)</sup>). The borders (usually very sharp) of the indicated splits (not surprisingly correspond with the historical borders within the Polish state: the nineteenth century boundaries of Prussia/Germany, Russia and Austria (JANICKI et al. 2005). Additionally, post-German territories are also visible in this puzzle.

Fourthly, despite different interpretations, interdependence between historical borders and actual electoral behavior (participation level and political preferences) is widely recognized as an explanatory factor. It is related to the nineteenth century as a period of the creation of modern nations and states, with all their consequences for power structures within the states' borders. It shall be stressed that the implementation of the

<sup>2)</sup> The idea of *solidary Poland* refers to the concept of *solidarity* and the opposition movement of *Solidarity* – collective action based on mutual support and strong social ties.

Westphalian state model by European powers led at that time to the disintegration of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century. The legal and political consolidation and centralization of the *partition states* within their borders resulted in a weakening of what had belonged to the *Polish legacies*. In the following decades, Polish territories were treated as a Prussian-Russian-Austrian borderland. However, centripetal tendencies (related to the consolidation of those states) boundarized (JONES 1959) the previously existing frontiers (KRISTOF 1959). Internal standardization within the three empires was visible in different economic models, language and cultural influences (Germanization and Russification policies), but also in the proliferation of specific political norms and values organizing public life in the three states, especially the principle of the rule of law in Germany, of tsarist autocracy (*самодержавие*) in Russia, and parliamentarianism in Austria. The Polish territories followed the development paths of their respective capitals.

Fifthly, in looking for explanations for the existence of phantom borders in contemporary Polish political life, researchers have proposed various models explaining the phenomenon. Two



dimensions can be identified within those efforts: structural and normative<sup>3)</sup>. The former stresses objectively existing differences in economic development levels (higher in western and northern Poland, lower in central and eastern), economic models (industrial west versus rural east), infrastructural density, closeness to the western markets, and so on (ZARYCKI 2000). The latter pays attention to the norms and values dominating in various parts of Poland, and resulting from the nineteenth century political traditions of the powers occupying the Polish provinces (the *German*, *Russian* and *Austrian* Polands) as well as the displacement and re-settlement of the population after 1945 (in the case of the post-German provinces) (RACIBORSKI 1997). Those historical legacies were to contribute – in the interpretation of many political scientists – to different types of political culture in the four *zones*. The former is not the same as the latter, but forms the context for a specific type of development of political culture.

The author represents the norms and values oriented school in the above presented debate, and is of the opinion, that in trying to categorize political behavior in the four Polish *zones*, a classical approach of political culture may be academically useful. In this view – after SIDNEY VERBA – political culture is “a system of empirical beliefs, symbols and values that define situation where political action takes place” (VERBA 1965). LUCIAN PYE describes it as a “sum of the fundamental values, sentiments and knowledge that give form and substance to political process” (PYE 1995). ALMOND and VERBA (1963) enumerated three types of political culture: parochial (low knowledge about the system and low involvement of individuals), subjective (individuals share knowledge and sensitivity towards the authorities’ activities and the functioning of the system, however they still

remain passive) and participatory (consciousness is followed by involvement). They can all be identified in the presented *zones*. This will be the approach applied in this text.

Unfortunately, the limitations of this publication do not allow the author to discuss more widely either the development of the concept of political culture, or the literature on voting behavior. It is, however, relevant to stress at least the main tendencies in both research fields.

In the case of the concept of political culture, three phases in approaching the issue can be enumerated here (STREET 1993, 97). The one initiated by ALMOND and VERBA (1963) (applied by the author) concentrated on civic culture and the link between individual’s behavior and the functioning of the system. The second phase is constituted mainly by academic criticism and the development of the concept, seeing, among others, political culture not as a cause but as an effect of political processes, and stressing that the concept does not explain how it is created and how political socialization happens (STREET 1993, 100–101; BARRY 1978, 51–52). The third phase is the rediscovery of the concept in the 1980s, widening the understanding of political culture, including, for example, emotions and beliefs that constitute specific meaning for political processes (ROSE 1980), attitudes allowing interpretation of politics (STREET 1993, 103), or even popular culture. Individuals not only passively obtain ideas, they also select what they obtain depending on the context (BEETHAM 1991). Still, however, those approaches stress the explanatory power of culture “in the way in which interests are identified and then acted upon” (STREET 1993, 113). This has been demonstrated by the enormous interest of researchers in political culture as a tool for explaining the transformation and democratization processes in Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism, often using traditional approaches. The model of ALMOND and VERBA “provides sufficiently universal tools to begin making sense of people’s orientations toward political objects in Central and Eastern Europe” (PETTAI 2007, 92). Another question posed was if the old cultural patterns change rapidly under circumstances of transformation or rather tend to remain stable (BERNIK and MALNAR 2003, 200–201).

The wide literature on voting behavior should also be mentioned here. Investigators try to extract determinants of how decisions in electoral activities are made, testing various factors. Simplifying the categorization it can be stated that at least two opposite grand schools are present in the debate: stress-

<sup>3)</sup> This distinction is supplemented in the literature in the reflections on mutual relations between both approaches, linking structure and norms. For example, functionalist political theory stresses “nationalization” of a state’s population by means of infrastructural linkages, but resulting in theories of indoctrination. Structural functionalism tries to relate one element of the social system to another (FISHER 2010, 75). In the structural approach, legal and constitutional elements are stressed, which is visible in the policies of the executive. In the normative vision “political culture and political norms constitute images that a state transmits” (MAOZ and RUSSETT 1993, 625). Both explanations are considered not to be mutually exclusive, but rather present various facets of the investigated phenomenon (MAOZ and RUSSETT 1993, 625).

ing the role of rationality and non-rational elements in voting behavior (NORRIS 2004, 6). The latter is the perspective where, among others, the concept of culture is researched, including political culture. The former is represented, for example, by rational choice institutionalism. Scholars of each of the schools (and often of both of them) test electoral behavior, concentrating on various factors, such as the influence of political information (HOBOLT 2005), formal rules (NORRIS 2004, 6), party, individual and issue orientation (CAMPBELL et al. 1954), social class or ethnic group belonging, previous electoral activity (GREEN and SHACHAR 2000), and many others.

Finally, a remark has to be made, linking the above discussed phenomenon of electoral preferences and the concept of political culture. The question is whether the historical legacies bring not only various levels of participatory political culture, but also a more plural political culture? This is in fact the question of whether culture defines the environment, or if it also leads to clear voting preferences? This issue could be solved by comparing not only the winners or the strongest party (as presented above) but more or less the whole 'palette' of political options that gain support in the given regions.

For example, when comparing the position of PiS in the *Russian* and *Austrian* Polands and PO and SLD in the *German* Poland and post-German territories, one can see an interesting regularity. Using the example of presidential elections in 2010, it can be noticed that in the first round Kaczyński got support of between 40% and 55% in the eastern

and southern regions (getting over 50% in one of them), and between 24% and 32% in the northern and western regions. Komorowski, in turn received between 29% and 37%, and between 45%–52% (getting over 50% in three of them). The candidates of other parties and committees (there were 10 altogether) attracted the support of about only 1%–2% per candidate, with exception of the SLD candidate who gained almost 14%. His votes were concentrated in *German* Poland and the post-German territories (Fig. 2 a). This reveals the more pluralistic political culture in those regions, with a clearly liberal profile, and an openness, with a wider spectrum of candidates. In *Russian* and *Austrian* Polands the culture is less pluralistic, with more polarized political preferences.

The parliamentary elections reveal a similar pattern (Fig. 2b). In 2007, PO dominated in the North and West, with support of between 45% and 58% (counted at the level of electoral constituencies) and PiS won in the rest of Poland, gaining between 35% and 51% of the votes. Only two other parties got the support higher than 1.5%, the alliance of left-wing parties got over 13%, mainly in *German* Poland and the post-German territories, PSL mainly in the other regions. The elections in 2011 confirmed these regularities.

Those two examples more open up this aspect of investigation than allows the author to formulate clear conclusions. They definitely show once again the existence of *phantom borders*, visible in various forms of pluralistic political culture. PO is essen-




Fig. 2: Results of the presidential elections 2010 (a) and the parliamentary elections 2007 (b)

tially stronger in the North and West than PiS in the East and South, but on the other hand, the former competes there with stronger competitors than the latter in their own areas of domination.

#### 4 The sample: Pomorskie Region and Wielkopolskie Region

The above described tendencies in electoral behavior are usually related to the regional scale (in practice, the macro-scale), where the borders of regions often correspond with the *phantom borders* in Poland. However, an empirical look shows that this is not always so. There are some cases where historical divisions cut through homogeneous administrative units (Fig. 1). Two regions: Pomorze and Wielkopolska represent the case.

Both the Pomorskie and Wielkopolskie Regions (see Fig.1 and in detail Fig. 3) are ancestors of the regional traditions of the first and second Polish republics. They existed then as administrative units with very specific economic, cultural and linguistic profiles. Both were incorporated in the Prussian/German state. Both were granted regional self-governance in the interwar period (which was the case of only three Polish regions at that time). Both were reduced in terms of territory during the communist period and finally reconstructed in something approaching their historical spatial forms as a result of the 1999 administrative reform aiming at decentralization. Finally, both are populated by communities sharing a strong regional identity, based on both historic legacies and current developments, and sometimes characterized by a feeling of superiority over other Polish provinces, especially those in the east.

Today's Pomorskie Region is inhabited by about 2.2 mln residents, who are concentrated in the metropolitan area of Gdańsk (Danzig), Gdynia and Sopot, the Vistula River valley and the city (in Polish *miasto*) of Słupsk. It is administratively divided into 20 counties and 4 cities. The region is dynamically developing, based on both maritime industries and services, as well as on tourism and education (Strategia).

In terms of the most recent history, the Pomorskie region consists of three parts (Fig. 3: the central strip (forming a part of the Polish state in the interwar period, and being Slavic at that time, inhabited by an ethnic group of Kashubians), no. a, the Free City of Gdańsk (an independent city governed by the league of Nations and mainly ethnically German by 1945), and two parts in the eastern and western parts of the

region (belonging to the German state by the end of the Second World War and ethnically German), no. b. As a consequence of the war, and then the Potsdam Conference, the German population fled and was expelled (PISKORSKI 2013), the empty spaces in the region were re-inhabited with Polish settlers mainly expelled from the former eastern Polish provinces that were transferred to the Soviet Union (NITSCHKE 1999). Consequently the central part of the region represents Polish/Kashubian traditions of a long-residential character, strongly influenced by nineteenth century Prussian/German political and cultural legacies. The western and eastern parts share a migratory character and are rooted in the eastern Polish type of politics and culture.

The Wielkopolskie Region has 3.4 million inhabitants, concentrated mainly in the metropolitan area of Poznań, and then around other bigger cities (Leszno, Konin, Pila, Kalisz). The region consists of 35 counties (including 4 cities). The economy of the region is based on industry and services located mainly in the metropolitan areas, as well as on agriculture, also making it one of the most developed Polish regions.

The actual region consists of three parts: the main one (belonging in the nineteenth century to the German state, but ethnically Polish at that time, no. x), the eastern outskirts (belonging in the nineteenth century to the Russian state but also ethnically Polish, no. y) and northern parts (by 1945 a part of the German state and by then ethnically German, no. z). Consequently, in the first: Polish legacies with German influences dominate, in the second: Polish traditions influenced by Russian legacies, and in the third: Polish resettlement traditions (related to the post-Second World War expulsion and resettlements).

#### 5 The regions during parliamentary and presidential elections

The starting point for empirical investigation into political behavior is the central elections and the macro-level. In parliamentary and presidential elections, the political behaviors of the investigated regions inhabitants reveal the existence of *phantom borders*. Analyses locate both Pomorze and Wielkopolska in *liberal Poland*, characterized by relatively high turnout and anti-conservative attitudes. Those two features can be comparably confronted with the Polish central and eastern provinces, where participation levels are lower and anti-liberal ten-




Fig. 3: Phantom borders in the Pomorskie and Wielkopolskie Regions and voter turnout in the 2006 local elections at county level. Data source: Self-Government Elections 2006 and JANCZAK et al. 2013

dencies stronger. Political scientists tend to explain this phenomenon by the political culture dominating in both regions and resulting from nineteenth century Prussian/German influences. It is claimed that belonging to the Prussian/German state created participative attitudes (contrary to parochial ones in the provinces under Russian rule) and openness towards *western values*.

The political profile of the regions in parliamentary election reveals the more liberal character and higher voting participation in these regions than in the Poland-wide results (Tab. 1). Both SLD and PO gained more votes than average in both regions while turnout has always been higher than elsewhere.

The same tendency has been visible in the case of presidential elections (Tab. 2). Turnout is higher than the Polish average and liberal candidates (Donald Tusk, Bronisław Komorowski) collect more votes than in the central and eastern regions of Poland, where Lech and then Jarosław Kaczyński collected the majority of their votes.

## 5.1 Step one: territorial downscaling

However, still looking at parliamentary and presidential elections, when reducing the scale of the analyses and replacing region-average indicators with a county level comparison, both regions are no longer homogeneous in terms of their political behavior and political preferences. *Phantom borders*, reflecting the German, Russian and population replacement legacies, are visible in both participation levels and political preferences. In the case of Pomorze, turnout is higher in the central part (representing Prussian/German legacies and more participative political culture) and lower in the western and eastern parts (re-settlement territories, with populations representing more parochial traditions). Similarly in Wielkopolska the eastern parts (Russian legacies) have been characterized by lower participation than the rest of the region. Also, the winning party or candidate varies locally. In Wielkopolska in 2005 PO won on the regional scale. However, in the eastern outskirts it was the SLD the collected



Tab. 1: Parliamentary elections in Poland, Pomorskie and Wielkopolskie Regions

	2001		2005		2007		2011	
	Winner	Turnout	Winner	Turnout	Winner	Turnout	Winner	Turnout
<b>Poland</b>	SLD 41%	46%	PiS 27%	40%	PO 41%	54%	PO 39%	49%
<b>Pomorskie</b>	SLD 36%	47%	PO 40%	43%	PO 55%	57%	PO 62%	52%
<b>Wielkopolskie</b>	SLD 46%	50%	PO 38%	41%	Po 44%	55%	PO 55%	55%

Source: The author (following National Electoral Commission, Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza, <http://pkw.gov.pl>, visited: 01.02.2014)

Tab. 2: Presidential elections in Poland, Pomorskie and Wielkopolskie Regions

	2005(1)		2005(2)		2010(1)		2010(2)	
	Winner	Turnout	Winner	Turnout	Winner	Turnout	Winner	Turnout
<b>Poland</b>	Tusk 36%	50%	Kacz 54%	51%	Kom 41%	55%	Kom 53%	55%
<b>Pomorskie</b>	Tusk 49%	54%	Tusk 57%	55%	Kom 52%	58%	Kom 65%	59%
<b>Wielkopolskie</b>	Tusk 41%	51%	Tusk 52%	51%	Kom 47%	56%	Kom 61%	54%

Source: The author (following National Electoral Commission, Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza, <http://pkw.gov.pl>, visited: 01.02.2014)

the biggest share of votes. Similarly, in the following elections, the east of the region revealed much higher support for PiS than the rest of the province, where it was very rarely chosen. In Pomorze the support for Tusk and Komorowski in the presidential elections was lowest in the central strip of the region. In Wielkopolska, Kaczyński won in the eastern counties, Komorowski in the rest of the region.

The picture that can be drawn when investigating the regions is that in the case of state-level voting (parliamentary and presidential), *phantom borders* mark historical divisions. *Prussian/German* Poland (the central strip of Pomorze and most of Wielkopolska) seems to represent a participative political culture, visible in the high turnout, whereas Russian and re-settlement Poland (eastern Wielkopolska and western and eastern parts of Pomorze) is dominated by more passive attitudes. At the same time, political preferences vary.

## 5.2 Step two: electoral downscaling

The question is, then, if the described phenomenon is also confirmed by other types of voting, such as local elections. If a political culture based on historical legacies determines participation levels and political preferences, they should be similarly visible also when testing other types of elections. This would mean at the same time a second de-scaling of the analyses. Not only does the scale of terri-

torial units need to be reduced (from the regional to sub-regional level), but also the election type is downgraded by checking non-central voting.

This methodological shift is based on the rich “scale research” literature, which, due to the form of this text, cannot be elaborated on further, (however it is widely debated by KAISER and NIKIFOROWA 2008, 538–541). The opinion seems to dominate in the literature recently that “the scale of analysis is not naturally determined, but represents a social construct” (KOLOSSOV 2005, 628). It is, however, important to notice that the state of art recognizes “scale [as] an active progenitor of specific social processes” (SMITH 1992) and assumes scales to be “arenas around which sociospatial power choreographies are enacted and performed” (SWYNGEDOUW 2004). Research into scale in recent years has additionally brought a shift in analytical focus. Initially, they were “socially constructed as the actors that matter,” now it is usually considered “a category of practice performed by actors/actants” (KAISER and NIKIFOROWA 2008, 541).

In the further investigation, the county-level local government elections were employed as a test of the presented phenomenon, and the elections in 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014 were compared (National Electoral Commission).

Both turnout and winning political options were investigated, as reflecting participation levels and political preferences. To meet the methodological postulate of comparability, only similar territo-

rial units were compared. It was thus decided to eliminate the metropolises and leave the town-rural counties in the sample.

With regard to the turnout, *phantom borders* were again noticeable. In 2002 turnout nationally reached a level of 49%, while in Pomorskie it was 50%, in Wielkopolskie - 49%. In Pomorze the highest participation was noted in Kartuski and Kościerski counties (59% and 58%) in the very core of the central strip. In Kwidzyński and Malborski in the east, it was about 15% lower (46% and 43%), in Słupski and Chojnicki in the west, about 10% lower (49% in both). In the central and northern parts of Wielkopolska, the turnout was about 48%. In the eastern counties however it was on average 6% higher – in Koniński 57%, in Kolski 53%! Consequently in Pomorze, the Prussian/German participative legacies were visible in the central strip, while the resettlement eastern and western outskirts were more passive. In Wielkopolska, the Russian legacies in the eastern counties represented – surprisingly – more participative attitudes than the central part with Prussian/German traditions. This contradicts the previous interpretation based on elements of participative and parochial political culture on both sides of the former border.

In 2006 the national turnout was at the level of 46%, while in both Pomorskie and Wielkopolskie it was 47%. In the former, again, in the central counties participation was about 10% higher, in the western and eastern ones about 5% lower. In the latter – also similarly to the previous election – the eastern counties represented on average 7% higher involvement, than the rest of the province (Fig. 3). In 2010 the national turnout reached the level of 50% and 49% in both investigated regions. Local differences again revealed similar patterns. Similarly to the elections in 2014.

Political preferences also reflected *phantom borders'* existence. In 2002 in Pomorskie, the majority of the competing committees pretended to have a local character, however many had, in fact, *central* affiliation, being linked to national political parties and organizations. In the central strip, however, local Kashubian organizations received strong support (*Kaszubskie Zrzeszenie Wyborcze* or *Samorządne Kaszuby – Nasze Sprawy*). SLD (ruling at that time in Poland) won the support of 20%–37% of voters in the western and eastern parts of the region and only about 15% in the central strip. In Wielkopolska, SLD gained roughly equal support of about one third of voters in all parts of the region and won the elections.

In 2006 the central authorities were dominated by PiS – it was the main component of the parliamentary majority and of the central government. In Pomorze again the western and eastern parts supported SLD and additionally Samoobrona (a radical rural party). In the central strip PiS, PO and local committees dominated the scene. In Wielkopolska, again left wing and liberal committees dominated, regardless of the part of the region. At the same time, only in the east did Samoobrona gain significant support (about 15%) and PiS collected almost no support (4% in comparison to 15%–20% in the other counties of the region).

In 2010 PO was in power at the central level. In Pomorskie, PO dominated in the central strip, in two counties winning an absolute majority of seats in the councils, local committees were also still strongly supported. In the west and east of the region the SLD achieved a relatively good result. In Wielkopolska, PO dominated in the central part of the region, the SLD and peasant parties in the eastern parts, where – by contrast – the liberals achieved a relatively weak result.

In 2014, it was still PO who ruled at the central level, however, its position was weakening. In Pomorskie, the tendency from previous years was visible, especially with regard to the local committees in the central strip and the significant position of PO, but also PiS being much stronger (often the winning power) in the eastern and western outskirts, replacing SLD's domination. In Wielkopolskie, PSL won the elections in almost all the counties, but in the east PiS was visibly the second power.

## 6 Interpretation

The above presented quantitative evidence demonstrates the existence of *phantom borders* in Poland. A double de-scaling investigation, however, revealed that, despite the relatively stable location of the lines separating the historical legacies and political cultures, electoral behavior (especially the participation level) is manifested differently at various levels of political life. Participative and parochial types seem to explain well the regional differences in central elections. But in the local level elections, different patterns can be also detected, which calls for further interpretation.

With regard to participation levels, the case of *phantom borders* in Pomorze seems to be similarly constructed in both scales. But the reason why the eastern (representing *Russian* Poland legacies) outskirts

of Wielkopolska are more passive than the rest in parliamentary or presidential elections and more active in local elections requires explaining.

Interviews conducted in the eastern counties suggest an interesting explanation. Local leaders stress feelings of subordination and worseness in relation to Wielkopolska *proper*. It is considered to be dynamic, well organized, representing *German order*. Consequently, it is admired and copied in the eastern counties. Local territorial units and populations tend to confirm their belonging to the province and desire to overcome, in their own eyes, the economic and political handicaps in this way. They try to deconstruct the old border and overcome *otherization* from the main part of Wielkopolska. This can be achieved by shifting the *phantom border* to the eastern boundary of the current Wielkopolskie Region. This also reveals the basic function of the border – to separate – in this case, from the other *Russian Poland* provinces. One of the tools to achieve this aim is to exercise the rules and norms that are assigned to Wielkopolska and adopt the German political traditions. This recalls the *neophyte syndrome*, understood as being new to the environment and consequently experiencing the necessity of never-ending confirmation of one's own belonging and loyalty to be *entirely and finally* accepted.<sup>4)</sup> Participation in elections is one of the indicators of being a part of participative culture. However, central elections are differently perceived than local ones. The former belong to national political realities and are considered to be of exogenic nature. Local elections are reported to be something with a regional, endogenic character.

Why, then, is the same mechanism not visible in the case of the western and eastern counties of Pomorze? As narrated by local elites, the central strip is also positively regarded, but as something alien, and at the same time unachievable. First, due to the resettlement tradition (contrary to the situation in Wielkopolska), second due to the ethnic situation and the Kashubian character of the territory. Borders – also *phantom borders* – are “self-perpetuating and resistant to change” (NEWMAN 2003) in this case. Regional unity is realistic when based on a common national standard and only political norms and val-

ues need to be adjusted across *phantom borders*. This cannot be the aim if historical legacies correspond with linguistic and ethnic peculiarities. The location, manifestation and re-construction of *phantom borders* remains an empirical reality.

Electoral preferences show fewer scale-related features. When – at the county level polls – *Prussian/German Poland* opts mainly for liberals (similarly to the central elections), *Russian Poland* and post-German Poland are much more open to socially oriented parties, sometimes of populist character. This can be the conservative PiS but also the social democratic SLD or even the radical rural Samoobrona party. Political culture can serve again as a convincing explanation, revealing a less mature type of political orientation. More cohesive attitudes in inter-scale comparison suggest, however, the necessity of further research. They should also include structurally oriented elements.

## 7 Conclusions

The presented investigation reveals several peculiarities of *phantom borders* in Wielkopolska and Pomorze but also of the *phantom borders* themselves. Electoral borders resulting from historical legacies have consequences for actual political and social divisions. Historical spaces are reproduced in various ways in current electoral behavior. It is visible both on the macro and micro scale, however the pattern of political behavior does not remain exactly the same. *Phantom borders* are located in the same place in both scales. But double de-scaling (territorial and electoral) shows that political participation is variously constructed on both scales. In the macro perspective elements of parochial political culture in *Russian* and post-German (re-settlement) Poland result in lower turnout, compared to the *Prussian/German Poland's* participative political culture (revealed in higher participation). In the doubly reduced scale in Wielkopolska this rule is reversed as an element of relict border deconstruction and an attempt to shift it to the eastern outskirts of the region. It serves to find similarities on one side and differences on the other. Consequently, the inhabitants of the *Russian* part of Wielkopolska use *phantom borders* as tools for self-inclusion to the region *proper* and marking the more easterly territories as *others*, enclosing the region with a sharp historical-political legacy. In Pomorze this is impossible, so the line is maintained. The ethnic peculiarity of the Kashubian population makes any changes impossible, so scale change re-

<sup>4)</sup> This explanation requires, however, further research, this time by upscaling the perspective and applying the comparative approach to the other territorial units located further in the east. A high level of participation in local elections is observable there as well, which cannot be explained with the same argumentation.

sults in confirming not only the relict border's location, but also the stable character of political behavior it separates. Those findings on political behavior on respective sides of a former border are not only an empirical discovery, but also bring consequences for the concept of *phantom borders*. They reveal that scale manipulation can serve as a methodological tool to better explain the nature of *phantom borders*.

Finally, the presented considerations open up space for further investigation at the same time. Among other things, there are questions of whether the aforementioned *phantomization* is conducted consciously or not by the actors involved, how present it is in the political discourse of politicians, and to what extent the historical interpretations of spatial factors shape their electoral strategies. And finally, whether the two investigated cases reflect processes that can be generalized and applicable to the other regions in Poland.

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## MEASURING PHANTOM BORDERS: THE CASE OF CZECH/CZECHOSLOVAKIAN ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY

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With 3 figures

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**Summary:** The article focuses on Czech/German ethnic boundary from former interwar Czechoslovakia and its persistence (or transience) in electoral behaviour in selected post-1989 elections. In the analytical part of the article links between populations in regions and electoral results is discussed in order ‘extract’ phantom borders. The analysis draws on both recent GIS data on historical spatial units and historical electoral data to explore the concept of phantom borders. The focus is on phantom borders that can be observed in electoral data and cannot be identified in contemporary socio-economic data or structures and thus reflect institutional (in)stabilities of regional institutions as reflected in electoral behaviour. In conclusion, the article notes some methodological problems connected with the delimitation and visualisation of phantom borders in electoral maps.

**Zusammenfassung:** Der Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit der ethnischen Grenze zwischen Tschechen und Deutschen innerhalb der Tschechoslowakei in der Zwischenkriegszeit und geht der Frage nach, ob bzw. wie sich diese Grenze in (exemplarischen) Wahlen nach 1989 widerspiegelt. Die Analyse von Zusammenhängen zwischen Region, Bevölkerung und Wahlergebnis zielt letztlich darauf ab, mögliche Phantomgrenzen innerhalb Tschechiens herauszuarbeiten. Der Fokus liegt auf den Phantomgrenzen, welche anhand des Wahlverhaltens aufgezeigt werden können, die allerdings keinen Zusammenhang mit gegenwärtigen sozio-ökonomische Strukturen erkennen lassen. Insofern können die Phantomgrenzen als Indiz persistierender institutioneller Strukturen gelten. Darüber hinaus werden in dem Beitrag einige methodologische Aspekte und Probleme bei Abgrenzung und Visualisierung von Phantomgrenzen auf der Basis von Wahlergebnissen verdeutlicht und diskutiert.

**Keywords:** Phantom borders, electoral geography, political behaviour, border studies, Czechia, Czechoslovakia

### 1 Introduction

Research on borders and bordering has been a perennial topic in geography. Traditionally, geographers have been interested in the spatial distribution of various phenomena and necessarily also in forms of spatial demarcation and methods for delimiting spatial thresholds. The concept of border/bordering may be viewed as analogous to the concept of other/othing in the social sciences, which, for example, is also expressed as a conflict between the principles of *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli*. The multiplicity of ways in which borders can be defined and approached is illustrated in an article by JONES (1959), which was originally delivered as a presidential address at an AAG conference. JONES reviewed different border concepts from several disciplinary points of view and in a long historical perspective. Borders can be seen, for example, as natural or artificial, contractual, geometrical, power-political, etc. It should also

be noted that most studies on borders have focused on national borders. In more recent literature, PAASI (1998) describes a shift from viewing a border as a fixed line to viewing it as a constructed boundary. Developments such as globalisation pressures and cross-border co-operation can alter the meaning that is ascribed to a given border. Constructed boundaries can be regarded as institutions and symbols that exist in various practices and discourses and that can be conceptualised as processes instead of fixed realities. According to NEWMAN (2003), the focus of research should not be on borders per se, but on the bordering process. Boundary demarcation, boundary management, boundary transition zones, perception of borders, the opening or elimination of borders, and borders and power relations are all examples of how the bordering process can be framed in geographical research (NEWMAN 2003). The phantom border concept acknowledges theoretical shifts in the way borders are researched and also actual changes in the

way borders and bordering are defined. In Czechia, like other CEE countries, the nature and perception of borders have changed significantly in the past 25 years: firstly in connection with the fall of the Iron Curtain from 1989 to 1991, where a once impassable barrier suddenly became permeable, and secondly in connection with EU accession and membership in the Schengen area of free movement, where borders have become not just permeable but often almost invisible. The collapse of the state-socialist systems in the early 1990s led to a re-opening of borders and restored the importance of regional electoral behaviour. As a post-communist electoral geography established itself, the re-emergence of pre-socialist socio-cultural patterns in electoral behaviour was observed (HIRSCHHAUSEN et al. 2015). After several decades of no free democratic elections new political parties often tried to draw on a historical tradition of a party in a region to mobilise their electorate.

To frame the concept of phantom borders within the wider strands of political geography there are a few points that first need noting. Firstly, electoral geography is still one of the main research trends in political geography, though it is not the most progressive one. The amount of work in this field focusing on the analysis of electoral patterns per se has slightly decreased, while the amount focusing on interlinkages between democracy and representation has increased (BUČEK 2006). And this is directly related to the second point, which is that there has been a shift away from the (empirical) analysis of election results towards the analyses of public participation in democracy, issues of citizenship, and the right to vote (Ó TUATHAIL 1998). In this context phantom borders can be seen as a unifying concept that brings the two sides of electoral geography together (patterns and practices) and also links them to other neighbouring disciplines. Phantom border in electoral geography is thus seen as an institution which is expressed and perpetuated in practice – electoral behaviour.

The very concept of phantom borders is a new conceptualisation that attempts to understand space and agency in time. It considers the re-production of regional differences in territories where a political border was abolished and lost its legal value (HIRSCHHAUSEN et al. 2015). In connection with such a change the significance a former border holds for the populations and institutions in a place tends to diminish in the borderless situation, but sometimes certain aspects of the previous spatial division show themselves to be remarkably persistent in the long term and *re-appear* as a phantom border. This implies that there are probably certain mechanisms, such as

norms, values, and cultural codes, valid at a local level that guide social interactions and reproduce differences previously generated by the existence of a border (see ZARYCKI 2015). Such differences might thus affect social, cultural and economic development of related regions. In general the concept of phantom borders provides a support for grasping previously innominate type of border and shows a potential for further theoretical advancement and clarification. The novelty of the phantom borders concept has given rise to a number of new issues, and some of these were described in papers presented at the first phantom border conference,<sup>1)</sup> which focused on political behaviour. First, not all languages have a word for ‘phantom’ and researchers in language environments other than English are faced with the conundrum of translation and finding a name for the phenomenon they are dealing with. Second, the reflection of phantom borders in political behaviour should be observed and re-observed in multiple instances in order to achieve better validity.<sup>2)</sup> Unfortunately for this objective, not all electoral events such as EU accession elections are periodic and allow this kind of approach. Third, phantom borders should be clearly distinguished from related concepts such as invisible borders or relic borders. Invisible borders are not necessarily past borders and relic borders are by definition remnants of the past which continue to exist but are not necessarily reflected in modes of behaviour today. Fourth, phantom borders should not be identifiable in contemporary socio-economic data and therefore easily explained by conventional models. This non-identification is a limiting factor which cannot be dealt with simply because of intrinsic features of spatial data analysis (see below) and data limits per se (see Data and methods).

It is necessary to acknowledge the peculiar nature of electoral data in a geographical perspective. Firstly, we know the electoral results (how people voted), but we don’t know why certain people voted for certain parties or politicians. Since we are working with aggregated data for selected spatial levels there is a risk of an ecological fallacy occurring when we analyse spatial patterns (ROBINSON 1950). Secondly, in order to compare electoral data for two different time periods the data we work with need to be for the same spatial units. Often they are not, and the

<sup>1)</sup> “Phantom Borders in the Political Behaviour and Electoral Geography in East Central Europe”, Frankfurt (Oder) /Slubice, November 14–15, 2013.

<sup>2)</sup> I would like to thank one anonymous reviewer for kindly pointing out this issue.



original data have to be aggregated into bigger spatial units. When selecting the spatial units into which data will be aggregated (MAUP; OPENSHAW 1984) it is possible for certain electoral patterns or boundaries to end up either underlined or suppressed (gerrymandering, malapportionment; JOHNSTON 2002).

The aim of this article is to detect measurable phantom borders in Czechia and to understand how phantom borders influence contemporary electoral behaviour. As Czechia is a country with relatively stable borders and one that during the state-socialist period experienced several decades of no free democratic elections, it is expected that phantom borders will be difficult to identify and their role in contemporary electoral behaviour will be small. The article focuses on the Czech/German ethnic boundary and the Catholic religion population boundary that existed in interwar Czechoslovakia and how these boundaries have manifested themselves in post-1989 electoral behaviour, based on the observation of selected elections in that period. Both recent GIS data on historical spatial units and historical electoral data are used in this analysis. The analytical part of the article presents a discussion of two case studies of possible phantom borders. Special attention is devoted to phantom borders observed in electoral data that cannot be identified in contemporary socio-economic data or structures and thus point to the institutional stabilities of regional institutions. In conclusion, the article looks at the methodological problems attached to with delimitation and visualisation of phantom borders in electoral maps.

## 2 Data and methods

Because the phantom border concept is not just a search for cases of phantom borders in different countries that is required (BOROWCZAK and DOLATA 2013; JANCZAK 2013; PUTRENKO 2013; ZAMFIRA 2015) but also a methodological discussion of how phantom borders should be searched for, delimited, and measured (ZARYCKI 2015). Current borders are usually clearly drawn somewhere on a map and this type of representation determines how phantom borders are researched. The search for phantom border should also however in some way deal with the issue of the nature of borders/boundaries. There are several ways in which to conceptualise a border and approach borders in research. A political boundary is often represented as a line between spatial units, but data on political behaviour (electoral data) are usually available for statistical units – regions. A political

border from the past might cut across contemporary statistical units, thereby concealing the possible existence of a phantom border. Another point that has yet to be defined clearly is which contemporary social action or practices today a phantom border should be observed in reference to. In the case of voting, the action or practice could be votes for a certain party, electoral turnout, or votes for more parties on the same side of a political cleavage.

This article uses aggregated data from an electoral research project that is focused on analysing data on voting in parliamentary elections between 1920 and 1935<sup>3)</sup> (available at the juridical district level; n=320+), in 1946<sup>4)</sup> (available for administrative districts; n=160+), between 1992 and 2010 (available at the municipal level; n=6000+), and in the presidential election in 2013 (n=6000+). The data for period 1992–2013, which refer to municipalities (n=6000+), were converted to refer to so-called juridical districts, which were used as units of electoral analysis in the 1920s and 1930s. The electoral data for the interwar and post-1989 time periods were supplemented with additional statistical data from relevant censuses and were recalculated to refer to juridical districts using GIS software. The result is a database of electoral and census data for the periods 1920–1935 and 1992–2010 that refer to identical spatial units, in which it is thus possible to search for phantom borders.

From these data, two case studies that best fit the provisional definition of phantom borders were selected. The first case study focuses on the Sudety Region<sup>5)</sup> and its relevance for electoral behaviour today. How is the past occurrence of two population resettlements, first the expulsion of the ethnic Czech population before WW2 and then the expulsion of the ethnic German population after WW2, in the Sudety Region reflected in contemporary voting patterns? Does this resettlement history matter after three generations of development? The second

<sup>3)</sup> Voting in the parliamentary elections was compulsory in period 1920–1935.

<sup>4)</sup> In first elections after WW2 only four parties were allowed to draw up an election candidate list and the right to vote was limited to only Slavic nationalities. A broader and more detailed explanation and examination of regional electoral results in the aftermath of these changes and after the uprooting of the population and political structures is beyond the scope of this article.

<sup>5)</sup> This includes the geographical area called Sudety Region and other border regions that were inhabited by the Czech German population in the 1930s.

case study focuses on a Catholic political party (ČSL/KDU-ČSL) and its electoral support in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, during which Czech society underwent a major shift from being a ‘country of religious believers’ to a ‘country of non-believers’. How has the decrease in the number of Roman Catholics shaped electoral support for the Catholic party?

### 2.1 Measuring phantom borders?

In principle, there are three ways of visualising phantom borders. Phantom borders can be described in writing using spatial references, visually using various cartographic techniques, and statistically using selected measures of similarity/difference. This article focuses primarily on the last two. It should be noted that borders are in principle part of a spatial pattern, which draws a set of borders between regions with different concentrations of phenomena. From a cartographic perspective transferring a spatial pattern of data to set of borders is a user-defined task. The opening question in the search for phantom borders is whether we are looking for a border that has never been defined before (a previously undefined boundary) or whether we know beforehand that there was a border in a place (previously defined boundary). This article focuses on a clearly defined and named border in the first case study (which is more consistent with the phantom border definition) and an empirically identified and defined border in the second case study (which is less consistent with phantom border definition, but corresponds in principle to the idea of a phantom border). The second question after a border is ‘found’ is whether it makes a difference to any particular spatial pattern. Measuring the difference a border makes is not a straightforward task and there are several ways to go about it. Viewed from a statistical perspective, the border spatial pattern can be measured by various statistical measures. Simple correlation coefficients are a useful tool for measuring persistence and similarity in voting patterns, and elementary or grouping statistics on next-to-border spatial units allows the difference to be expressed numerically. Viewed from a cartographic perspective, there is a broad range of techniques which may be applied. The principal questions concern the spatial units measured and the scaling methods – in particular, how to set a scale and the number of units on it. Using inappropriate cartographic techniques could result in a misinterpretation of spatial (in)stability.

The main phantom border maps in this article are shown in pairs using different cartographic techniques (maps A1, A3 and A2, A4 in Fig. 1; maps B1, B3, B5, B7 and B2, B4, B6, B8 in Fig. 2). The reason for this approach is to show how the use of different cartographic techniques could result in certain trends in the data being underlined or suppressed. The natural breaks method looks for breaks in data distribution and creates a defined number of scale groups based on internal coherence within groups and external difference between groups. The sizes of such groups may of course differ. Conversely, the quantile method ignores breaks in the data and creates defined scale groups based on the number of units within a group. If the data are normally distributed this analytical approach does not need to be applied. But the data on Czech/German ethnic composition are U-shaped and therefore the display of maps A1 and A3 differ visually. On the other hand the data on the electoral turnout in the presidential election in 2013 are more or less normally distributed; consequently, maps A2 and A4 are more similar. In the second case study the maps of the phantom borders of the ČSL party are also shown using two different cartographic techniques. First, a fixed scale maintaining the same break values is used in order to show the general and long-term decline of electoral support for the ČSL party. Second, the natural breaks scale is used to show that despite an overall decline of electoral support for the party the regional patterns of low and high support remained almost unchanged throughout the entire last century. By comparing the maps produced using the fixed-scale method and the maps produced using the natural-brakes method it is possible to illustrate the different meanings of the persistence of different forms and modes of social practices that reflect specific historical spaces. This approach may also be relevant for the discussion of phantom borders in general.

### 3 Measuring phantom borders: two case studies

In order to explore the existence of phantom borders in Czech electoral data two case studies will be presented. These case studies represent two different types of border that have the potential to be considered phantom borders under the current definition (HIRSCHHAUSEN et al. 2015). First, we shall search for the phantom border of the Sudety Region for in contemporary electoral patterns. This border will reflect what aspects of population/electoral

behaviour persist after several decades of development. Second, a phantom border of religion based voting reflecting the north-west (industrial) versus south-east (agricultural) division of Czechoslovakia in the 1920s – 1930s will be contrasted with electoral patterns today and their underlying features. The study of these borders will demonstrate the extraordinary stability of voting behaviours despite decades of social, spatial, and institutional changes. The case studies are structured as follows. First, the case study and the nature of the particular phantom border(s) are described. Second, a series of maps showing phantom borders in time are presented. Third, a discussion and examination of phantom borders based on findings from this electoral geography research project is presented. To conclude, the phantom borders identified in the Czech context are summed up and related to the overall phantom borders concept.

### 3.1 Case study 1: the Sudety ‘border’ region

The first case study of phantom borders in Czechia focuses on the so-called Sudety Region. The population of the Czech borderland was totally transformed between 1939 and 1946. Changes included the expulsion of the ethnic Czech population before WW2 and the expulsion of the ethnic German population after WW2. The Sudety Region was subsequently only partially resettled and, more importantly, in a socially selective way (Daněk 1995). It is generally claimed that population changes in the Sudety Region led to a break in historical continuity and the decline of local communities. In most cases the people who moved to the region had no roots in the area and no attachment to the land. Broadly speaking, those who moved there were relatively poor, lower classes, as it was an area where they could more easily become home and land owners. A significant share of the new settlers also had ties to the Communist Party or to military structures and moved to the region to establish new agricultural co-operatives or to secure national borders.

The effect of resettlement on the demographic structure of the population (e.g. a younger age structure, lower education levels) was visible in census maps for several decades, but it gradually disappeared and now cannot be traced at all. Throughout the state-socialist period the effect of resettlement on political behaviour was invisible; everyone voted for one party and it made no sense to analyse such


data. This changed after 1989 when free democratic elections were re-established. A few studies have focused on patterns of electoral continuity with pre-socialist times (JEHLIČKA and SÝKORA 1991). Some similarities to pre-socialist parliamentary elections were found, but most of them disappeared in the 1990s when the Czech Republic’s current political system was constituted (KOSTELECKÝ et al. 2013). An exception to this is voting patterns in the ČSL/KDU-ČSL party, which is the second case study in this article (see also BERNARD et al. 2014).

The phantom border of the Sudety Region is not visible in patterns of electoral support for parties or for presidential candidates, but it is apparent in electoral turnout. Maps A1 and A2 (Fig. 1) show the distribution of the ethnic German population in 1930 (the darker the colour the more Czechoslovakian Germans; the shaded areas approximately correspond to the Sudety Region. Districts with an ethnic German population of more than 50 per cent are outlined by a red line. Maps A3 and A4 show the electoral turnout in the first ever presidential election in the Czechia in 2013 (first round<sup>6</sup>) with an inverted scale (the darker the colour the lower the level of participation in the election). The two pairs of maps are surprisingly similar, especially when quantiles are used as the method of scale definition. It is possible to identify the phantom border of the Sudety Region in contemporary election turnout in both the presidential and the parliamentary elections. A half century after the resettlement of the Sudety Region the population currently residing there still exhibits a form of electoral behaviour that differs from inland areas that experienced no population resettlement or break in historical development. To express this in one sentence: people in ‘disrupted regions’ vote less than people in regions with ‘historical continuity’, although not necessarily for different political subjects. In some studies participation in different types of election is taken as an indicator of the level of civic society, because it reflects the degree of interest and participation in issues of general concern. In this respect, the phantom border of the


<sup>6</sup> In the first round of the presidential election nine candidates met the eligibility requirements to run for president, which resulted in a considerable range of choices in the first round and, more importantly, diminished the ‘candidate effects’ in spatial perspective. In the second round of the election there were only two candidates; therefore, the role of ‘candidate effect’ as a contextual effect overwrote other contextual effects that applied in the first round of the election.




A1) Share of the German population 1930 (natural breaks)




A2) Share of the German population 1930 (quantile)




A3) Electoral non-turnout in the presidential election 2013 (natural breaks)




A4) Electoral non-turnout in the presidential election 2013 (quantile)



A5) Electoral non-turnout in the parliamentary election 1992 (natural breaks)



A6) Electoral non-turnout in the parliamentary election 2010 (natural breaks)



□ Juridical districts valid in 1930

□ Regions with German majority in 1930

□ Czechia

50 km

Note: The spatial units of analysis are juridical districts, which were used as administrative units in the 1920s and 1930s. All newer data (after 1990) were recalculated and aggregated using GIS into historical juridical districts to enable a direct territorial comparison of electoral or population data between different time periods.

**Fig.1: Does WW2 resettlement influence electoral behaviour three generations later?**

Sudety Region could be viewed as a border between a stable and more developed civil society in areas of settlement continuity and a disrupted and the less stable civil society in resettled areas which has profound consequences for socio-economic development in both types of regions.

There are two almost anecdotal exceptions where the phantom border of the Sudety Region is disrupted based on data showing electoral turn-

out in the presidential election in 2013. The border regions of the Krkonoše Mountains and the Šumava Mountains do not fit the phantom border delimitation. The reason for these exceptions is a trivial one. The first round of presidential elections took place in the middle of the winter ski season and a significant share of people who voted in these two low-density areas were there on holiday. Consequently, the electoral turnout in these regions



is much higher than would be expected and phantom border does not fit as well as it probably would without this particular effect.

It is interesting to note that phantom border of the Sudety Region is more pronounced in the case of electoral turnout in the presidential election than in the case of the parliamentary election. Examples of the latter are the parliamentary elections in 1992 and 2010; see maps A5, A6. This difference is difficult to explain. Voting for a party might have a different meaning for voters than voting for a president. For example, in the Czech parliamentary democracy the president is relatively weak and has no influence on economic conditions in the country. Therefore, voting for a president is more about the norms, values, and beliefs the candidates represent than about it is about the economic issues (taxes, investments and social benefits) that tend to dominate parliamentary elections. There may be a different mechanism in effect. For example, there are limits imposed on presidential campaign spending but not on the campaign spending of parties in parliament; a core-periphery position may selectively influence electoral participation and thus diminish the difference between the in many cases peripheral areas of the Sudety Region and other regions. It should be noted that the presidential election in 2013 was the first presidential election in Czechia where the president was directly elected by the public. Voters were therefore unable to draw on previous voting experience, unlike in other types of periodic elections.

### 3.2 Case study 2: religion and the Catholic party


The second case study of phantom borders in Czechia deals with the Czechoslovak People's Party (ČSL/KDU-ČSL). The party was established in 1919 after several small Czech Catholic parties merged. Politically the party tended to focus on rural issues, agriculture, and issues of relevance for Roman Catholics. In the 1920s election the party was successful in the southern and the eastern parts of Czech lands, in areas that were more agricultural and more religious than the more industrial and less religious northern and western regions. Since that period, the spatial pattern of electoral support for ČSL in elections before the state-socialist period, the elections in 1925, 1929, 1935 (see the selected years in maps B1–B4 in Fig. 2) and after the state-socialist period, in 1992, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2006, and 2010 (see the selected years

in maps B5–B8 in Fig. 2), has remained extremely stable. The Sudety Region is not included in this delimitation in the 1920s and the 1930s because the ethnic German population residing in the region voted for a German Catholic party with a similar political focus. It should be noted that this case study fits less well with the definition of a phantom border as a political border, but it helps us to understand how certain modes of social interaction may endure over time.


The stability of electoral support for the ČSL party is even more striking if we take into account the differences between former Czechoslovakia in the 1920s and 1930s and modern-day Czechia and all the changes that have occurred in the past 80 years. In the 1920s and 1930s the political system of Czechoslovakia was not only highly fragmented along ethnic lines but also along several cleavages representing differences between agriculture and industry, the state and religion, and urban and rural and national and international interests, etc. There were also highly differentiated spatial patterns of support for political parties between regions. In contemporary Czechia the political system is far less fragmented, and the main cleavage is an economic one, while regional differences of electoral support are low. Despite the change from a regionally and ethnically heterogeneous Czechoslovakia to a much more homogenous Czechia and an overall decline in the importance of religion for the Czech population, the pattern of electoral support for the ČSL party has remained stable. The values of the correlation coefficients between subsequent elections in the past 25 years and also between the 1920s, the 1930s, and contemporary elections are around 0.9.

As well as looking at electoral support for the ČSL party, to complete the picture the figures below show the distribution of Roman Catholics in the population over time based on census data. The distribution of the Catholic population over time shown in maps C1–6 (Fig. 3) matches the pattern of electoral support for ČSL party. Both change slowly and decline steadily in total, but the spatial pattern of regional differences is stable. A reason for this stability could be labelled the 'lack of change'. The existence of strongly rooted local institutions related to religion and the fact that the Catholic religion did not expand spatially in Czechia during the last century limited the possible ways in which a spatial pattern might change. It should be noted that no other party that existed in Czechoslovakia in the 1920s and 1930s had a similar degree of stability; usually only minor relics of electoral behav-


B1) Share of votes, ČSL party 1920 (fixed scale)




B2) Share of votes, ČSL party 1920 (natural breaks)




B3) Share of votes, ČSL party 1935 (fixed scale)




B4) Share of votes, ČSL party 1935 (natural breaks)




B5) Share of votes, KDU-ČSL party 1992 (fixed scale)




B6) Share of votes, KDU-ČSL party 1992 (natural breaks)



B7) Share of votes, KDU-ČSL party 2010 (fixed scale)



B8) Share of votes, KDU-ČSL party 2010 (natural breaks)



□ Juridical districts valid in 1930    □ Regions with German majority in 1930    □ Czechia    50 km

Fig. 2: Highly stable electoral behaviour – the case of ČSL. Data Source: Czech Statistical Office

our from the 1920's and 1930s have been found in modern-day electoral data,<sup>7)</sup> and some pre-war parties were never re-established. It may sound like a bit of a paradox, but voting for a Catholic party is the most stable element in elections in the most atheist country in Central Europe.

#### 4 Issues in search of phantom borders

The search for phantom borders based on a large set of electoral data from Czechia/Czechoslovakia produced the two provisional case studies presented above, but a number of issues also arose in the data analysis. In the case of the Sudety Region there was no political border in that area before the political border of the Sudety Region was established. Prior to that, there was only a somewhat sharp difference in the ethnic composition of the population in this region compared to other regions, which was also reflected in electoral behaviour. But it was often the case that a Czechoslovak party with a certain thematic focus bordered directly with a German party with the same thematic focus; consequently, the border was still mainly ethnically based. In the next step the ethnically mixed areas were cut into two parts when an ideological border called the Sudety Region was created. The meaning of Sudety border, which we search for as a phantom border, is related to changes after this political border was established. The two population expulsions around WW2 created a new population pattern in the Sudety Region that could be differentiated not along ethnic Czech/ethnic German lines but along the lines of stable versus resettled areas. After three generations of development during which the border was eliminated (effaced borders) this historical change is still visible in one characteristic of a civil society – election participation (a phantom border?).

<sup>7)</sup> Several other historical parties were re-established after 1989 (social democrats, national socialists, the agrarian party, etc.), but they were either unsuccessful and quickly became insignificant, or they were successful, but their territorial support quickly changed to reflect contemporary socio-economic circumstances. An example of an unsuccessful party is the agrarian party, which lost all its electorate during the state-socialist period and the agricultural/industrial cleavage became obsolete. An example of a successful party is the social democrats, who regained electoral support in areas that traditionally supported the part in the 1920s and 1930s, but who also quickly acquired new areas of support and became successful across the country.

The case of the ČSL party, the second case study, is unique in that it is an example of the persistence of electoral behaviour in time. The areas where the ČSL party took hold in 1919 and the regional pattern of its electoral support reflected the differences that existed between the more industrial north-west and the more agricultural south-east at that time. This socio-economic pattern is no longer visible in Czechia. In terms of religion, the country has since shifted from being a place where, in the 1920s and 1930s, the majority of people were Roman Catholic to a place where almost no-one is Roman Catholic in contemporary Czechia. Under these circumstances the regional distribution of Roman Catholics and voters of the ČSL party has remained surprisingly stable. A possible explanation for this is that the decline in religion has been slow and it has prevented the original inherited pattern from changing.

This first attempt to find phantom borders on the basis of Czechoslovakian/Czech electoral data produced a few answers and many new questions for this type of research. The key points are summarised here:

For the purpose of this kind of research on Czech data it proved useful to use historical spatial units and convert contemporary electoral and population data into those units. Historical spatial units tend to follow historical borders more, and therefore may be more useful in the search for phantom borders. Nevertheless, in some case studies it may be possible to compare and evaluate historical and contemporary spatial units in particular case studies.

Different cartographic techniques may suppress or underline certain features of data that might then reveal the existence or non-existence of phantom borders when the data are converted into maps. The use of any particular cartographic methodology needs to be explained and justified.

Regional participation in elections is more stable over time than electoral support for a party, with exception of the ČSL party. Parliamentary elections are significantly influenced by changing economic conditions in regions, and therefore the territorial electoral pattern of parliamentary elections is less stable during periods of economic transformation. Presidential elections in a parliamentary system have less to do with economic conditions; therefore, other institutional conditions such as regionally specific social practices are probably more significant.






Fig. 3: Extraordinary stability of electoral behaviour – a case of ČSL. Data source: Czech Statistical Office

The spatial units for analysis should be selected in relation to the particular phantom border under scrutiny. In the case of Sudety Region, the municipal level ( $n=6000+$ ) is too 'granular' for an analysis at a country level, but it could be useful for case studies of smaller regions.

When we use aggregated electoral and statistical data for spatial units, we face the risk of making a false conclusion based on an ecological fallacy. Therefore, it is probably better to seek historical explanations instead of statistical explanations.

## 5 Conclusion

The Czech political party system is often described as nationalised<sup>8)</sup> and patterns of regional support for political parties are mild (KOUBA 2007). Despite this, the search of phantom borders in Czech electoral data produced two case studies that have distinct spatial regimes and can be considered

<sup>8)</sup> This is measured by the level of spatial heterogeneity in regional voting results.



examples of so-called phantom borders. Markers denoting differences determined by past political borders can be observed over the long term, having endured almost eight decades in the Czechoslovak/Czech case. The case study of the Sudety Region showed that phantom borders are less visible in relation to parliamentary elections than to presidential elections, which are driven less by economic considerations and more by norms, values, and cultural codes, although, owing to data limitations, these two strands cannot be clearly separated. Voter participation in presidential elections and less clearly also in parliamentary elections shows a clear pattern reflecting population changes in the 1930s. Regions that experienced two waves of population resettlement as a result of WW2 have a significantly lower electoral turnout than regions that experience no population resettlement. This phantom border is not visible in party-related voting where the effects of population resettlement cannot be separated from the effects of economic centrality and peripherality, which significantly shape party-related voting. The second case study revealed the extraordinarily stable pattern of electoral support for the ČSL/KDU-ČSL party since the 1920s. As a Catholic party, its support has been based primarily on a church – state cleavage. Although this cleavage lost much of its significance over the last century, it simultaneously prevented changes from occurring in the spatial pattern of party electoral support. Such extreme stability is seen as a resistance to external changes; namely, to the systematic oppression of faith under socialism and the decline in faith and the diversification of belief in the last 25 years.

The two phantom borders identified in this analysis have a limited influence on political behaviour in Czechia. The overall effect on electoral results is rather weak, but understanding the specific patterns of phantom borders provides insight into contemporary political behaviour. For example, the case study of the first Czech presidential election highlighted the persistence of the effect of population resettlement. Even half a century later, and even after the generations have changed, the population in the Sudety Region is weaker as a civil society when measured by electoral turnout. This finding might help us to understand the differences and similarities in local politics and local governance between resettled and stable territories, possibly influencing also social and economic performance in regions.

In general the concept of phantom borders allows us to understand and study a previously in-nominate type of border. According to the author

perspective, the concept of phantom borders can be successfully framed within the contemporary discussion in political geography because it has the potential to be an intermediary concept between two strands of political geography: classical empirical analysis focusing on electoral patterns and more recent analysis focusing on political practices and the functioning of democracy. Although the concept itself is very new and is accompanied by an array of issues that need to be addressed, it provides a fresh opportunity for theorising borders per se (BRUNET-JAILLY 2005) and border studies and political geography in general (KOLOSSOV 2005).

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## SHADOWS OF THE PAST: COMMON EFFECTS OF COMMUNISM OR DIFFERENT PRE-COMMUNIST LEGACIES? AN ANALYSIS OF DISCREPANCIES IN SOCIAL MOBILIZATION THROUGHOUT ROMANIAN REGIONS

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With 3 figures and 2 tables

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**Summary:** An increasing number of studies dealing with democratic transitions in Eastern Europe, especially those dedicated to aspects of social capital and political culture, stress their comparative component. The newly democratic countries in this region, used as unit of analysis, are often treated as being monolithic blocks. Even though they are not as homogeneous as they appear, their regional diversity does not pass through the lenses of the majority of those comparative studies. Furthermore, the studies usually do not include considerations on social mobilization or social movements and their relationship to the regime change. The purpose of this article is, therefore, to analyze the impact of historical legacies on differences of social mobilization in post-communist Romania. Following reports on regional discrepancies – mainly concerning ethnic composition, distribution of indicators of social capital and political participation – this paper focuses on patterns of social mobilization in two regions, with a common communist, but a divergent pre-communist history – Transylvania, part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the rest of the country, part of the Ottoman Empire. Using two different time-series, monitoring protest activities throughout the two regions, we found relevant proof of dissimilar protest behavior within Romania.

**Zusammenfassung:** Ein Großteil der wissenschaftlichen Beiträge über demokratische Transitionen in Osteuropa hat einen komparatistischen Charakter, handelt aber die einzelnen Staaten und die Region immer wieder als monolithische Blöcke ab. Eine Differenzierung mit Blick auf den Raum als auch auf die jeweiligen Staaten findet insbesondere bei Studien, die Aspekte politischer Kultur und sozialen Kapitals untersuchen, nur bedingt statt. Darüber hinaus fehlt es oftmals an einer disziplinübergreifenden Debatte über die Beziehung zwischen Regimewechsel und sozialer Mobilisierung. Die Absicht dieser Studie liegt darin, den Einfluss des historischen Erbes ('historical legacy') auf soziale Mobilisierung im post-kommunistischen Rumänien zu prüfen. Während regionale Unterschiede in Rumänien in zahlreichen Arbeiten untersucht wurden, hauptsächlich mit einem Fokus auf Aspekte sozialen Kapitals, ethnischer Zusammensetzung und/oder politischer Partizipation, bleibt soziale Mobilisierung unterbeleuchtet. Im vorliegenden Artikel werden, unter Zuhilfenahme zweier verschiedener post-1989 Zeitserien, zwei Regionen Rumäniens, mit unterschiedlicher prä-kommunistischer/imperialer Geschichte untersucht und regionale Differenzen, Muster sozialer Mobilisierung betreffend, sichtbar gemacht.

**Keywords:** Social mobilization, social capital, historical legacies, democratic transition, post-communist Romania, Eastern Europe

### 1 Introduction

The analysis of political transitions, focused on the “movement from something to something else” as O'DONNELL and SCHMITTER (1986, 65) put it, has for a long time had its focus on transitions to democracy. For legions of authors, working on the newly democratic nations in the former communist bloc, it constituted the dominant analytic pattern for the political, economic and socio-cultural transformations in Eastern Europe. Even though some scholars have argued, in the early years after the fall of communism, that democratic experiences before the autocratic regime might have a positive effect on the chances for a successful de-

mocratization (e.g., MERKEL and PUHLE 1999), the main focus was on the pre-democratic configurations of the respective political system or on the influence of the “prior regime type for transition paths” (LINZ and STEPAN 1996, 55). Apart from perspectives aiming at analyzing the institutional change, proponents of a cultural approach to democratic transitions, like DIAMOND (1999, 173; 1994, 239) argued that civic attitudes become more and more influential in the long run. In time, analysts have taken a more critical stance towards the transition paradigm, underlining the lack of democratic achievements in the countries concerned, and pointing to the development of a defective form of democracy (cf. MERKEL and CROISSANT 2004;

MERKEL and CROISSANT 2000) or even proclaiming “the end of the transition paradigm” (CAROTHERS 2002).

Subsequent to PUTNAM’s (1993, 664) conception of social capital, understood as “features of social life – networks, norms and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared goals” an additional theoretic lens gained popularity in the field of analysis of regime change in Eastern Europe. Starting from this perspective, numerous analysts have turned towards the study of the relationship between dictatorship and indicators of social capital. Countries with recent history of non-democratic regimes seem to have lower indicators of social capital, especially social trust and voluntary associations, culminating in PALDAM and SVENDSEN’S (2001) statistical account that dictatorship, including communist regimes, destroys social capital. Even though DEKKER et al. (1997) have found no significant relationship between social trust and political participation in western nations, most of the studies dedicated to social capital in Eastern Europe argue that newly democratic countries have lower rates of civic engagement, volunteering and associational membership, somewhat mixing up ‘social capital’ and ‘civil society’ (cf. HOWARD 2003, 41f.). Concerning political participation MANSFELDOVA and SZABO (2000) report a decline in social mobilization in several former communist countries after 1989. Factors often evoked in support of the argument regarding a link between low engagement/low rates of social capital and the communist past are, amongst others, the effect of the economy of scarcity and the black market producing what ROSE (1998) calls ‘negative social capital’. Strongly related to the black market we find accounts of citizens’ lack of time in the pre-democratic regime, keeping them from social and political involvement (DI PALMA 1991). A second argumentation is mainly focused on the experience with communist mass-organizations, and the resulting mistrust in associations (HOWARD 2003, 105ff.). Contrariwise, LETKI (2003) finds that communist party membership increased conventional political participation. Due to the fact that the conception of social capital combines both structural and cultural components (cf. KUNZ 2006, 335), and that it takes into account historical developments, analysts of social capital in Eastern Europe argue that the past (strongly) impacts on features of today’s societies, resulting in low participation in mass-protests, low civic engagement and low social trust. While both institutional changes and elements of social capital,

including aspects of civic involvement and (explicitly) volunteering, have a prominent place in the analysis of regime change in Eastern Europe, only a few works have been dedicated to its relationship with social mobilization or social movements (cf. EKIERT and KUBIK 1998, 550f.; MERCEA 2014). ROSSI and DELLA PORTA (2009, 172f.) even find a lack of interest for the waves of democratization by analysts of social movements, or for social movements by scholars of the transition processes. This seems to be reason enough to study one post-communist country and to focus on the effects of historical legacies – both communist and pre-communist experiences – in what concerns social mobilization. Following reports of several distinguishing features (mainly social capital and civic involvement) in two main regions of post-communist Romania – Transylvania and the rest of the country – this study focuses on regional differences in patterns of social mobilization.

## 2 Regional differences

Arguing with both institutional configurations of the pre-democratic regime and aspects included in the social capital conceptions, analysts underline the lasting influence of communism in Eastern European countries, distinguishing them from their Western counterparts. What is common to most of the approaches is the analytic unit of the research: in a considerable number of works the analysis focuses on the country level. Especially in terms of cultural transformations, scholars mainly study the ‘national political culture’, focusing on the political system as a whole. Various studies, dealing with questions surrounding the political culture of nations, have shown, in recent years, that there is “significant cultural diversity within some countries [...] compromising the concept of national culture (MINKOV and HOFSTEDE 2012, 133). Eastern Europe’s historical legacies, dating back longer than the communist rule, have been approached from different angles, including ethnicity, former imperial influences and the importance of “historical experiences that shaped regional political cultures” (BADESCU and SUM 2005, 118). BADESCU and colleagues (in several studies) are puzzled by the fact that, even though the communist regime influenced the society in the whole country – notably via social engineering efforts aimed at the destruction of collective memories and the erosion of cultural norms – there are noticeable differences



within post-communist Romania (BADESCU and SUM 2005). Concerning this case, studies report, in the last decade, lower indicators of *social capital* than in other former communist countries regarding volunteering, associational membership, trust and bridging ties (MONDAK and GEARING 1998; MUNGIU-PIPPIDI 2005; BADESCU et al. 2004; VOICU 2008), as well as lower rates of ‘unconventional *political participation*’ such as signing petitions, contacting politicians or participating in rallies (GABRIEL 2004). In regard to *social mobilization*, analysts attest lower levels of political involvement, arguing with a negative influence of a ‘non-participatory culture’ (VOICU and BASINA 2005), or with the backwardness of the Romanian civil society hampering democratic claim-making (ROISSARD DE BELLET 2001).

Taking a closer look at this case, the interested observer will find several regional differences within Romania, distinguishing Transylvania from the rest of the country. Apart from distinct voting patterns in Transylvania (cf. ROPER and FESNIC 2003), analysts find many distinguishing features of this part of the country, including aspects of social capital, of ethnic composition and of socio-economic modernity.

### 2.1 Regional differences regarding features of social capital

BADESCU et al. demonstrate that Transylvania holds unique characteristics in what concerns social capital, arguing with a higher awareness towards NGOs, higher propensities for donating (BADESCU and SUM 2005, 118ff.), more voluntary associations (BADESCU 2006), as well as slightly higher indicators of aggregated trust (BADESCU and SUM 2003). They argue that Transylvania might “benefit from denser social networks facilitating greater communication and mobilization” (ibid. 19). A similar explanation stems from MARINO (2005, 18ff.), who underlines a “backwardness of critical spirit and social solidarity in Walachia and Moldavia” – regions under the influence of the Ottoman Empire, until 1877 – compared to Transylvania – part of the Habsburg Empire until 1918.

### 2.2 Regional differences regarding ethnic composition and religion

A more apparent difference consists of features related to ethnic composition and religion, Transylvania being ethnically more diverse than

the rest of the country: according to the national census of 2011, a Hungarian minority accounted for 1,227,623 of the Romanian population of 20,121,641, most of which (1,216,666) living in Transylvania (1,125,965 in Macroregion 1 [North-West and Center] and 90,701 in the region ‘West’). Also a small German minority (36,042 on a national level) is present in Transylvania (32,825 on a regional level). Going several steps back in history, ROPER and FESNIC (2003, 121) point to the fact that during the two world wars, ethnic minorities constituted around 40% of Transylvania’s population. This ethnic diversity translated into a bigger religious pluralism, leaving the Greek Catholic Church to be an influential player in Transylvania (STAN and TURCESCU 2000), in an otherwise Orthodox country. During communism a policy of “induced ethnic assimilation”, consisting of nationalist (unifying) messages and measures of ethnic mixing (influx of ethnic Romanians to Transylvania, sending Hungarians in ethnic Romanian regions) aimed at leveling these regional differences (cf. BADESCU and SUM 2005, 122).

### 2.3 Socio-economic modernity and additional distinguishing features

An additional distinguishing aspect concerning Transylvania’s historical development, according to BADESCU and SUM (2005, 119), is related to its higher socio-economic development at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, including decreasing birth rates and higher literacy rates. LIVEZEANU (1995, 48) reports a 51.1% percent literacy rate for Transylvania and 39.3% in the rest of the country in the period of 1897–1912 and 67% compared to 55.8% in 1930.

In a more ‘organizational sociology’ oriented study, NECULAESEI and TATARUSANU (2008, 202f.) find a higher degree of uncertainty avoidance, on the micro level, which translates into risk taking, tolerance and achievement-based motivation, and an unique medium-term focus in Transylvania, leading to more perseverance and concern for long-term investment in this region.

Different legal traditions and socio-political configurations during the imperial period have led to different manifestations of political power, with accountable authorities (Administrative apparatus) in Transylvania and arbitrary power (sultanic) in the other part, leading to no centralized order in the South and East, where “law was often mixed up with the ruler’s will” (MARINO 2005, 164).

### 3 Argument

As all other forms of strong in-group solidarity, ethnicity, as a “constructed claim to common origin, shared culture and linked fate” (MCADAM et al. 2001, 231), or “family resemblance” (HOROWITZ 1985, 57) is a considerable factor concerning social mobilization and conflict. VANHANEN (1999) considers ethnic heterogeneity as being a source of conflict in itself. GURR and HARFF (1994) identify an ethnic cultural identity together with existing grievances as a major source of group mobilization, even though he reports a decline in ethnic violence since the 1990s (GURR 2000). The reconfiguration of the political space after World War I, and the emerging question of ethnic minorities, has been reported as being a source of conflict due to a mismatch between cultural and political boundaries (BRUBAKER 1996, 55). Conflicts often arise via secessionist movements mobilizing on ethnic grounds and religious differences. Furthermore, the aforementioned aspects of socio-economic modernity may be considered a source of contention for, at least, two reasons: modernity leads to structural inequality (and the awareness of it) and to the appearance of social movements and social conflict (cf. EYERMAN 1992, 37ff.)

Coming back to the arguments on the weakness of social capital and civil society in countries with recent regime change, one might expect that the same mechanisms affect social mobilization, protests, etc. The question whether social capital impacts on all other forms of political participation as well is raised by LETKI (2003, 23), even though she reports “limited usefulness of the concept of social capital in explaining political activism”. On the other hand, VOICU (2005) reasons that participation in mass protests might be an indicator of social capital. DIANI’S (1997) considerations on the relationship between social capital and social mobilization are mainly oriented towards the understanding that the former is an outcome of movement activity.

Nevertheless, social capital analysts are postulating a connection between social and political participation, stating that social activity creates the context where participants get the resources and competences necessary for political activity, through the internalization of common values and norms, and by providing an opportunity to become acquaintance with political active persons, eventually stimulating political participation (cf. KUNZ 2006, 339f.). LA DUE LAKE and HUCKFELDT (1998) report that ‘politically relevant social capital’, which increases a citizen’s propensity to political participa-

tion, is generated in personal networks. Also, VERBA et al. (1995, 41) argue that the reasons for political involvement often lie within the personal context of individuals, especially in their circle of friends, without talking about social embeddedness or social capital, though. Aspects close to key-features in social capital conceptions, notably norms, networks (especially pre-existing networks), group solidarity and collective identity are extensively discussed in the literature dedicated to social movements (cf. PASSY and GIUGNI 2001; KLANDERMANS and OEGEMA 1987), but until very recently those aspects were not described as ‘social capital’ (cf. EDWARDS 2013). The importance of the existence of networks for collective action – including here informal organizations or informal networks and/or pre-existing collective ties – was underlined by ‘networking approaches to social movements’ (DIANI and MCADAM 2003), even though they could not demonstrate an *universal* link between networks and collective action (DIANI 2003, 2). This aspect is systematically discussed under the umbrella of social embeddedness: KLANDERMANS et al. (2008) indicate that participation in civil society networks positively impacts on collective action; MAYER et al. (1997) demonstrate that integration in friendship networks influences the decision to participate in social mobilization; finally, VAN STEKELENBURG and KLANDERMANS (2013) assert that ‘structural social capital’ (as distinct from ‘social capital as a relational resource’) encourages social cooperation and, therefore, facilitates social mobilization. Hence, social capital appears to ease social mobilization on an individual level, as well as on a macro-level. One has to take into consideration its impact on aspects included in the resource mobilization approach to social movements. Since one of the main effects of social capital is to facilitate cooperation and is often described as a means to overcome the problem of collective action in the sense of OLSON (cf. PETERS 2002, 164; VOICU 2005), it appears reasonable to hypothesize about a relationship between social mobilization and social capital. The latter diminishes transaction costs and facilitates the cooperation social mobilization might benefit from, in the first place by increasing the chances of organizing claims and, in the second, by enhancing cooperation between a social movement and its environment. Furthermore, our presumption is that more bridging ties and/or denser networks ease a movement’s access to resources (mainly participants and their time). Trust appears to be not merely a result of voluntary activity, but also a prerequisite for participation, and not just in

voluntary associations, but in social mobilization as well. Mobilization, aiming at common goods, seems to be less likely, if either little generalized trust or a strong *Binnenmoral* stemming from negative social capital is existent. Norms of reciprocity might ease resource mobilization as well, by diminishing expected costs for potential participants in collective action and social mobilization. Even though the resource mobilization and the social capital approach have different temporal localizations, one focused on a given situation in time, the other one taking into consideration historically more distant developments, we believe that there is a relationship between the two. In countries with a recent transition background, social mobilization might not only be an indicator of social capital, but social capital might also be an influential factor for social mobilization. Generalized trust influences an individual's decision to join associations as well as to participate in social mobilization and networks; cross-cutting horizontal/bridging ties strongly influence resource mobilization and a movement's positioning within the movement field.

Taking into account the factors presented, distinguishing Transylvania from the rest of the country, including the above mentioned ethnic/religious diversity (as potential sources of social conflict), as well as reports of higher indicators of social capital and higher rates of voluntary association (as potential sources of higher political participation), we hypothesize that one will find higher rates of social mobilization in this region as well.

#### 4 Empirical analysis

In order to test whether there are higher rates of social mobilization in Transylvania than in the rest of the country, we used data from the 'European Protest and Coercion Data' (EPCD) project. The data can be considered as a 'protest event analysis' (PEA), defined as a method to map occurrences of protests by means of content analysis (KOOPMANS and RUCHT 2002). The advantage of this data source is that it provides comprehensive accounts of protest in Romania by allocating protest to localities (cities mainly, but also regions). In our analysis we use the data with a timeframe from January 15 1992 to December 15 1995 adding a variable 'region' we derived from the city (if mentioned). Protests that occurred all over Romania or without exact localization were ignored. Table 1 shows the distribution of protest in Romania based on the 'EPCD' by regions.

Protests in the Bucharest region, which is the administrative and political center of a medium-centralized country, outnumber by far occurrences of protests in other regions. North-East and South have low frequencies of protest. Since we were interested in regional differences between Transylvania and the rest of the country we aggregated the regional data, receiving three main regions 'Transylvania' (North-West, Center and West), 'Bucharest' and the rest. Before turning to the aggregated data, it is important to understand the demographic structure of Romania at the time of the analysis. According to the Romanian Institute of Statistics, Romania had in

**Tab. 1: Distribution of protest in Romania by region 15.01.1992–15.12.1995 based on 'EPCD' data**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
<b>Valid</b>	1193	77.2	77.2	77.2
<b>Bucharest</b>	160	10.3	10.3	87.5
<b>Centre</b>	86	5.6	5.6	93.1
<b>North-East</b>	4	0.3	0.3	93.3
<b>North-West</b>	14	0.9	0.9	94.2
<b>South</b>	2	0.1	0.1	94.4
<b>South-East</b>	13	0.8	0.8	95.2
<b>South-West</b>	10	0.6	0.6	95.9
<b>West</b>	64	4.1	4.1	100
<b>Total</b>	1546	100	100	

1992 an overall population of about 22,811,392. By region, the Institute reports 7,723,732 for Transylvania (Macroregion 1 [North-West and Center] and West) or 34% of the population, for Bucharest region 2,354,721 or 10% and 12,732,929 or 56% for the rest of the country. As seen above, the region with 10% of the population (Bucharest) accounts for an overall preponderance of protest. Figure 1 shows the aggregated figures on the three regions.

By using the numbers of the aggregated regions, we can observe that the superiority in weight of the Bucharest region disappeared, leaving protest now equally distributed between Transylvania and the Romanian capital. Very few occurrences of protest were reported in the rest of the country. The two regions (Bucharest and Transylvania) with 44% of the Romanian population account for over 90% of the reported protests. Once more, one should underline that Bucharest is the political center and plausibly the majority of protests with national demands took place in the capital. In a second step, we will use newer data (August 2012) on the regional distribution of attempts to register protest-events (demonstrations, rallies, meetings), provided by the Romanian NGO Apador-CH. Apart from the statistics the report provides, it also gives an account of the difficulty of collecting such data in Romania, since there are no centralized figures available. The data was collected by sending inquiries to all Romanian municipalities. According to Apador-CH, the collected data was not complete, since several municipalities refused to provide such information, but it is overall representative since the non-respondents were distributed equally




Fig. 1: Distribution of protest in Romania by aggregated region 15.01.1992–15.12.1995 based on 'EPCD' data

over the regions. Table 2 shows reported attempts to register protest-events by region for 2011 and 2012.

For 2011 and 2012, the table indicates once more high figures of attempted protest events in the Bucharest region. As in table 1, records of protest attempts have a significantly smaller frequency in the southern districts. For the other regions, the figures display a more or less similar distribution of attempts. Once more, we will concentrate on the results for the aggregated regions, included in figure 2.

Tab. 2: Frequency of attempts to register public gatherings in Romania by region based on 'Apador-CH' data

	2011		2012	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
<b>Bucharest</b>	2226	54	1260	44
<b>Centre</b>	328	8	233	8
<b>North-East</b>	165	4	249	9
<b>North-West</b>	542	13	475	17
<b>South</b>	453	11	295	11
<b>South-East</b>	90	2	93	3
<b>South-West</b>	43	1	60	2
<b>West</b>	305	7	178	6
<b>Total</b>	4152	100	2843	100






Fig. 2: Frequency of attempts to register public gatherings in Romania by region based on 'Apador-CH' data

The figures clearly indicate a higher rate of attempts in Transylvania than in the rest of the country (Bucharest excluded), even though this difference decreased somewhat in 2012. The Bucharest region, especially in 2011, had an immense share of attempted protests, while the difference between Transylvania and the rest shrunk, compared to the 'EPCD' data from 1992–1995. A statistical reason for the enormous preponderance of protest in Bucharest compared to the rest of the country might be the weight of one valid response of the whole region (Bucharest municipality) in the absence of complete data from other regions. On the other hand, Romania was struck by protest over austerity measures in both years, taking place in October 2011 as well as in the winter 2011/2012, concentrated in Bucharest. It appears plausible, that protest against the national government, located in Bucharest, also attracted protesters from other parts of the country, diminishing the number of potential participants in these parts. The decline of attempts in 2012 might be partially explained either by the fact that the attempt to register protest events took place in late 2011 for early 2012, or by a change of the predominant protest culture. Regarding the latter, it appears possible that the protests emancipated themselves from following the administrative rules of the game (e.g. by not attempting to register planned protests), culminating in violent street protest in January and February 2012. Even though the extreme disparities in the 'EPCD' data between Transylvania and the rest of Romania diminished, what might be related

to the fact that, after the 'ECPD' series ended, the Hungarian minority party (UMDR) was included in almost every national government coalition, eventually channeling political grievances in the more intermediary directions of party politics and political partisanship. Despite the fact that the difference between Transylvania and the rest of the country (Bucharest excluded) decreased in 2012, there is still a three percent difference in protest attempts compared to a 23% difference in population (Transylvania about 7.1 million or 33%, the rest of the country [Bucharest excluded] about 11.9 million or 56%). Individual figures for Cluj (included in Transylvania) and Ploiești (included in Non-Transylvania) are extremely high. They both account for almost one third of protest attempts in their respective aggregated regions. In the following graph, we will consider them as statistical outliers and exclude them, regardless whether it is related to reporting errors or a different manner of counting, or to confounding variables, such as the fact that Cluj and Ploiești are big industrial poles in their region or Ploiești's geographic proximity to Bucharest.

Having excluded the two outliers, the difference in the amount of attempts to register protest-events between the two regions becomes more obvious, especially in 2011, displaying figures almost three times higher. While witnessing an overall decline of attempts in the aggregated regions with the two outliers included, figure 3 shows an increase in the Non-Transylvania region, due to slightly higher figures in 12 out of 18 municipalities.




Fig. 3: Distribution of attempts to register public gatherings in Romania by aggregated region based on 'Apador-CH' data (Cluj and Ploiești excluded)

## 5 Findings

Considering arguments about Transylvania's distinct character, we hypothesized that we would find higher rates of social mobilization there than in the rest of Romania. Using two independent data-sources, we found similarities between the distribution of (attempted) protests and reports on the distribution of indicators of social capital. What might be 'circumstantial evidence', as a result of coincidences, might also be a hint regarding the connection between social capital and social mobilization. Continuously higher reports of occurrences or attempts of social mobilization, in both time series, in the aggregated region 'Transylvania' compared to the rest of the country (Bucharest excluded) persists as the main finding. Even though the impacts of the economy of scarcity and the effects of the communist claim to shape society were experienced in the whole country, the pre-democratic regime in Romania did not equalize the levels of social contention across the country. This coincides with BADESCU's reports that "the communist legacy cannot explain the difference for Romania in simple terms if we assume that all regions of Romania had a similar experience under the communist regime" (BADESCU and SUM 2003, 9) in what concerns indicators of social capital. Social capital might not just help to create a "vibrant and virtuous community where people know their neighbors, join together in voluntary associations, give of themselves, and commit themselves to moral codes",

as USLANER (1999, 121) emphasizes, but it might also favor social mobilization. Further research is needed to explain whether such findings are related to Transylvania's ethnic/religious diversity, as a source of social conflict or to a link between social capital and social mobilization.

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## METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS IN STUDYING THE EFFECT OF (INTER)ETHNICITY ON VOTING BEHAVIOUR, WITH EXAMPLES FROM BULGARIA, ROMANIA, AND SLOVAKIA

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With 4 figures

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**Summary:** This article is based on an empirical multi-country analysis and on a systemic theoretical research on how the (inter)ethnic factor influences voting behaviour. The multi-ethnic regions from Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia included in this study differ significantly across a spectrum of political, social, and economic characteristics. However, they are similar with respect to one particular aspect – the historic cohabitation of two or more distinct cultures. Examining the diverse backgrounds and traditions of political science and sociology, this paper attempts to show how ethnicity and, implicitly, interethnicity, both objectively and subjectively constructed, influence political behaviour in the given regions. Despite the obvious complexity of determination systems specific to multi-ethnic communities, so far little research has focused on the impact of ethnicity and interethnicity on political behaviours in general and on voting behaviour in particular. Electoral studies continue to focus on traditional “ethnic solidarities”, a thesis that is often contradicted by empirical findings and, as a matter of fact, by the present research. The article concludes by reflecting critically on the current mechanical models of analysis, which are based on a simplistic understanding of ethnicity and ethnic minorities’ identities. At the same time, it questions the methodological limitations in explaining the atypical cases of non-ethnic voting.

**Zusammenfassung:** Dieser Artikel beruht auf einer empirischen Analyse mehrerer Länder sowie auf einer systemisch-theoretischen Forschungsarbeit darüber, wie (inter)ethnische Einflüsse das Wahlverhalten beeinflussen. Die multi-ethnischen Regionen Bulgariens, Rumäniens und Slowakei, die diese Studie umfasst, unterscheiden sich signifikant hinsichtlich breit gefächertem politischem, sozialem und wirtschaftlichem Charakteristika, aber sie gleichen sich dennoch bezüglich eines bestimmten Aspekts – des historisch bedingten Zusammenlebens zweier oder mehr unterschiedlicher Kulturen. Bei der Untersuchung der verschiedenen politikwissenschaftlichen und soziologischen Hintergründe und Traditionen haben wir versucht zu beobachten, wie Ethnizität und auf implizierte Weise, Interethnizität, sowohl objektiv als auch subjektiv konstruiert, das politische Verhalten in den gegebenen Regionen beeinflussen. Trotz der eindeutigen Komplexität der Bestimmungssysteme, die bezeichnend sind für Gemeinschaften, die sich aus mehreren Kulturen zusammensetzen, sind bisher nur wenige Forschungsprojekte dem Einfluss von Ethnizität und Interethnizität auf politisches Verhalten im Allgemeinen und Wahlverhalten im Speziellen gewidmet. Die Wahlstudien konzentrieren sich weiterhin auf tradierte „ethnische Solidaritäten“, eine These, die oft durch empirische Studien widerlegt wird, und im Übrigen auch von unserer Studie. Der Artikel endet mit einer kritischen Reflexion über derzeitige methodologische Analysenmodelle, die auf einem vereinfachten Verständnis von Ethnizität und Identitäten ethnischer Minderheiten beruhen, sowie der Frage der methodologischen Begrenztheit bei der Erklärung atypischer Fälle des trans-ethnischen Wählens.

**Keywords:** Minorities, multi-ethnic regions, (inter)ethnicity, voting behaviour, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia

### 1 Introduction

A unidisciplinary study on the effect of ethnicity and interethnicity on political behaviours could hardly establish what the weight of historical and cultural contexts is. History might open the research field, indicating the directions that are worthy of investigation, and it might contribute significantly to the understanding of the general picture of the investigated phenomena (the heritage left by the past in terms of social representations, mentalities, or

cultural values; the collective memories involved in the formation of political preferences, behaviours, and attitudes, etc.): “The souvenir is stronger than the reality of the present [...]. The memory, even at the time of migrations and of mass culture, founded those political climates [...] orienting the individual’s vote” (YSMAL 1990, 59). Political geography and human geography might ascertain important regional delimitations for the analysis of the major pattern differences; their main contributions to the electoral field were actually already encapsulated in the

ecological approach that was launched by Siegfried, with his well-known study from 1913, *i.e. Tableau politique de la France de l'Ouest sous la Troisième République* (MAYER and PERRINEAU 1992, 39–55). Sociology and political science can foreground the role that specific social, economic, and political factors play in structuring political behaviours; and these factors will be examined further on. But none of these perspectives can explain the mechanisms of ethno-cultural interactions, the way they influence (regional) identities, solidarities and, afterwards, social and political opinions and behaviours. For answering such a question, the theoretical and methodological instruments offered by political psychology and social psychology are to be taken into consideration as well. I refer especially to those clarifying the psychological processes behind the formation of ethnic stereotypes and the intercultural relations – two categories of determiners which are particular to multi-ethnic regions (DRAGOMAN and ZAMFIRA 2008).

Despite the extremely complex and interesting reasons for ethnic and non-ethnic votes, no systematic research has been carried out so far in this field. Only weak connections exist between the works dealing with voting behaviour in multi-ethnic regions. Therefore, defining and assessing the effect of (inter)ethnic context on the formation of political/electoral preferences and attachments remains an unfulfilled goal. The main two causes of this state of affairs are probably the almost complete absence of an inter-paradigmatic dialogue, on the basis of which one may set up an integrated methodological framework, and the missing statistical data needed to calculate the size of the (non-)ethnic votes.

Aiming to contribute to the advancement of this research field, this paper sets out to broadly state and interrogate the methodological limitations in studying the effect of (inter)ethnicity on voting behaviour at the local level (where interethnicity is supposed to have a stronger impact upon traditional allegiances). At the same time, this paper also seeks to envisage possible forthcoming solutions for overcoming these limitations. The main research question to be answered here (What are the methodological limitations in studying the effect of (inter)ethnicity on voting behaviour?) is supported by two complementary sub-questions: What can and cannot be known about (non-)ethnic voting by means of theoretical and methodological findings from previous related works? In order to answer these clustered questions, the article is written in the form of a discussion of three empirical cases: Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia. The minorities

included in this study – Turks in Bulgaria (Fig. 1), Germans (Fig. 2) and Hungarians in Romania (Fig. 3), and Hungarians in Slovakia (Fig. 4) – are politically the most visible. These three countries have been selected according to two main criteria. The first is the similarity of their ethnic geographies, ethnic past, and former political regimes. Second, the ethno-linguistic factor should play an important everyday role in the political life of each country. Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia do share a long history of interethnic relations and did experience similar political regimes throughout history until the present day. Though the central scope of this paper is rather methodological, the comparability of cases represents an important prerequisite for broadly approaching the aforesaid limitations and, also, for formulating some generalizable conclusions about (non-)ethnic voting and its study.

The main objective situates this research on the common ground that sociology and political science share: *i.e.* political sociology, or, to be more precise, within a particular branch of this field – electoral geography. Due to the above-mentioned methodological limitations and to implicit theoretical voids, the present study does not stand for an interdisciplinary approach, but for a multidisciplinary one. Several series of factors of great importance in the aforesaid disciplines (and their effects) are discussed in order to prove their relevance or, perhaps, their irrelevance within the process of political behaviour formation in the three post-communist countries. For this purpose, descriptive statistics are preferred; the employment of inferential methods and comparative analysis would not be appropriate in the absence of symmetric demographic and electoral data.

## 2 Theoretical framework and methodological discussion

Though focused on the methodological limitations in studying the effect of (inter)ethnicity on voting, and not on a particular theoretical issue, this article uses available demographic and electoral data in the same way as one that would eventually attempt to diagnose the electoral behaviour in ethnically mixed regions. The three selected empirical cases are supposed to demonstrate the methodological limitations in studying this topic clearer than an abstract argumentative text. Thus, up to a certain point, this article is designed similarly to a theoretically grounded, multi-case analysis. Its limits



Fig. 1: Bulgarian residents identifying as Turkish as a percentage of county populations




Fig. 2: Romanian residents identifying as German as a percentage of county populations

are symptomatic of the difficulties that researchers encounter in this specific area. These things having been said, this paper continues by developing the conceptual and theoretical framework.

When discussing ethnicity and politics in post-communist countries, many scholars invariably introduce concepts like (national) minorities, ethnic (minority) parties, etc. Such discursive notions, with clear correspondences in the legal documents, constitute evidence of the way in which the states in question approach ethnic diversity.

How can one define the concept of (national) minority? Extracting the core elements of the definition from the academic literature, one can define national minorities as non-dominant groups with a common language, a common culture, a common social memory (PLASSERAUD 1998, 42–51) – a group that is found in a historical relation with an external kin-state, aware of its distinctiveness, that publicly claims to be recognized as a distinct nation(al)ity with specific cultural and political rights (BRUBAKER 1996). National minorities differ depending on

their genesis – voluntary migration versus frontiers changing (PLASSERAUD 1998) – and, also, depending on a series of characteristics related to intra- and interethnicity. With respect to ethnic solidarities, for instance, which are largely determined by both types of interaction, they tend to be traditional, mechanical, even reactive, when interethnic relations are tense and there is a strong feeling of ethnic belongingness; in the opposite case, ethnic solidarities are competitive and concur to create a climate dominated by tolerance and reciprocity. These different situations are mainly explained by the theories of modernisation (GRAUBARD 1964; LIJPHART 1977a; HANNAN 1979). The interrelations within a given multi-cultural community are largely responsible for ethnocentric attitudes. Ethnocentrism, the tendency to consider that the in-group is “better” than the out-group, stands for a general prerequisite in the psychological research devoted to interculturality (SUMMER 1907 apud GAVRELIUC 2011). The levels of ethnocentrism depend, as one could easily suspect, on the way the in-group and the out-group interact but also on national politics (and policies) affecting the local and regional groups. All this discussion about intra- and interethnicity is meant to emphasize their inner interdependencies and their dynamic character, as well. Traditional loyalties or allegiances, ethnic solidarities, ethnocentric views, and attitudes are likely to change under certain conditions and, subsequently, to enable new individual and collective identifications, new forms of political participation, and new patterns of voting behaviour.

In a recent article explaining ethnic mobilisation in post-communist countries, GHERGHINA and JIGLĂU, relying mainly on a political science approach, advanced several hypotheses that might be enlightening for the phenomenon of ethnic voting, as well. The territorial concentration of the ethnic minority, past conflict relations between the dominant group and the ethnic minority, the success of anti-minority parties, the legislative support of the kin-state, and formal and informal discrimination are some of the most important hypothetical conditions for ethnic (political) mobilization (GHERGHINA and JIGLĂU 2011). Discrimination, for instance, constitutes one of the most relevant factors for both ethnic and nationalist voting (BIRNIR 2007). Ethnic mobilization, as well as ethnic voting, largely expresses the feeling of collective insecurity. Widely generalizing, one can argue that the more culturally or politically insecure minorities feel, the more they become nationalist. Therefore, in order to figure out the logic or the motivations behind ethnic (political) mobilization and

voting, one should first understand how this feeling of collective insecurity emerges and evolves, and what are those factors undermining interethnic relations and, implicitly, the overall situation.

Notwithstanding the important advances in understanding the dynamics behind transcultural identities in general, competitive ethnic solidarities, and non-ethnic voting, electoral studies continue to focus on traditional ethnic solidarities, identities, and behaviours. The reason is easy to account for. In electoral sociology, four main theoretical approaches are typically used to explain voters' motivations but all four are crystalized through research done in culturally homogeneous regions: the ecological perspective (founded by André Siegfried) – insisting on the influence of morphological characteristics (of the territorial units); the sociological approach (proposed by the Columbia School) – focusing on socio-demographic factors; the psychological thesis (advanced by the Michigan School) – of partisan attachment/identification; and the one of economic inspiration (Rational Choice).

For addressing the case of multi-ethnic communities, several particular factors are to be taken into consideration. These factors are generally used in the analysis of (inter)ethnicity and of its political consequences (ZAMFIRA 2012, 207–227). Among the historical factors that play a key role in structuring political attitudes in multi-ethnic communities are: ethnic identity formation (PLASSERAUD 1998), the evolution of interethnic relations (BIRNIR 2007), and of the relations between the “kin-state” and the “host-state” (BRUBAKER 1996; ROGER 2002). The compatibility or the affinity between the co-existing cultures (EASTON 1965; CONNOR 1967; BARTH 1984) and ethnic stereotypes (DRAGOMAN and ZAMFIRA 2008) are to be mentioned among the most relevant cultural factors. The psychological factors and those related to identity include the type of solidarities (HECHTER 1975; HANNAN 1979) and the type of identifications in relation to the in-group and the out-group (GAVRELIUC 2011). The category of socio-demographic and economic factors encompasses the ethno-linguistic fragmentation of the population (RAE and TAYLOR 1970), the size of the minority group (LIJPHART 1977b), and the configuration of structural cleavages (LIJPHART 1977b; BIRNIR 2007). The administrative and political organisation of the territory (LIJPHART 1977b), the electoral issue and level of electoral constituency, the electoral offer (ZAMFIRA 2011), and the success of anti-minority parties (GHERGHINA and JIGLĂU 2011) are part of the category of political-institutional and electoral factors.





Fig. 3: Romanian residents identifying as Hungarian as a percentage of county populations




Fig. 4: Slovakian residents identifying as Hungarians as a percentage of county populations

Finally, the electoral campaign and the recent local/regional interethnic events (MAYER and PERRINEAU 1992) are to be included among the conjunctural (contextual) factors.

This comprehensive (and, certainly, still open) list of factors characterising multi-ethnic regions highlights an essential element for the study of (inter)ethnicity and its effect on voting behaviour, namely the complexity of such a multidisciplinary endeavour. Unfortunately for researchers of politi-

cal behaviour in multi-ethnic regions, it is obvious that the communication between the scientific literature on minorities and (inter)ethnicity, on the one hand, and the one on voting and elections, on the other, is still strongly deficient. The explanations are quite simple. First, few authors (LIJPHART 1979; STROSCHEN 2001; BIRNIR 2007; CAPELLE-POGĂCEAN and RAGARU 2008) so far have been interested in explaining the relation between (inter)ethnicity and voting behaviour. Second, their research is projected

as case studies or comparisons of a small number of cases and, therefore, does not advance generalizable theoretical conclusions. The theoretical approaches of voting behaviour are not yet consistently applied outside the ethno-culturally homogeneous regions. Therefore, it is not possible to draw forth necessary information about the standard and the deviant effects of (inter)ethnicity. The habitual expectancies are all based on a static/mechanical conception of ethnicity or, in other words, on an essentialist ethnicizing conception. For these reasons, it seems that defining ethnicity in direct relation to interethnicity represents a first important step towards a dynamic theoretical approach in this specific field of study.

In order to research voting behaviour in multi-ethnic regions and, hence, to measure the effect of (inter)ethnicity on political preferences, choices, and alignments, this paper aims to explore the multiple research possibilities exposed in the paragraphs above and, at the same time, to discuss the limitations caused by quantitative data availability. Thus, for an (“ecological”) analysis of the territorial distribution of the minorities’ and majorities’ votes in a certain country or region, two categories of data are absolutely necessary: data on the ethno-linguistic structure of the electorate and data on the morphological characteristics of the territory. Unfortunately, data on the ethno-cultural structure of the electorate is collected in very few countries and, if it happens, it happens only now and then and not for every level of electoral constituency and not for every election year. Exit polls that take into account the ethnic dimension of voting are really rare. Sociological and psychological analyses of voting behaviours in multi-ethnic regions would also need data on the ethnic composition of the electorate. What should we do when these data are absent? There are several possible answers. First, exit polls could be carried out upon request or conducted by the very team of researchers interested in the respective issue; but, of course, the adjacent costs are not negligible. Second, the ethnic variable could be deduced – but only in particular cases – from questions that are related, for example, to the mother tongue, the first language spoken at home, etc. Third, when none of these situations is possible, we can use the size of the local/regional minority instead of one of the local/regional “ethnic” electorate – a partial solution on which the present study is based. Nevertheless, this solution is not completely effective and, as a matter of fact, can be used only if “ethnic voting” or “non-ethnic voting” is evident. For example, if participation turnout among the members of the minority is similar

to that of the majority and if one of the candidates (leader or party) wins in spite of having a tiny traditional electorate, then it is clear that we are observing a non-ethnic vote. Fourth, interviews and focus groups could replace – to a certain extent – the polls or, in a happy case, they can add valuable qualitative information to the research, thereby enriching the psycho-sociological approach. Qualitative comparative research is maybe one of the most appropriate methods for explaining the similarities and dissimilarities between countries or between culturally heterogeneous regions/ communities.

The aim of the following paragraphs is to start from available quantitative data for deducing massive non-ethnic voting, and, afterwards, to focus on the obvious atypical cases. The interpretation will follow the line of every discipline that was mentioned in the introduction that might be useful to understand the topic of this paper. The intersection of quantitative and qualitative data will be privileged whenever it is possible. As a matter of fact, there is a certain number of factors for the investigation of which the qualitative approach is more suitable (the evolution of interethnic relations, the relations between the kin- and the host-state, ethnic stereotypes, etc.).

### 3 Factors analysis

The major objective of this article is to identify and discuss the methodological limitations in studying the effect of (inter)ethnicity on voting behaviour at the local level. In so doing, the case examples and their number could have been totally different from the ones chosen for the present research. The factors analysis for the three case examples included in this research serves as a pretext for the discussion of the above-mentioned limitations. This is the reason why the paper did not insist on the analysis of symmetric statistical data (anyway, inaccessible, most of the time); neither did it develop the comparative angle of the research. The information extracted from the three case examples does not enable us to draw generic conclusions about the patterns of voting in the multi-ethnic regions, but only to illustrate the methodological limitations of such a scientific endeavour.

The discussion is mainly based on the electoral data contained in the two following paragraphs, data about some of the cases that definitely contradict the sociological traditional theory. The first one is the massive Romanian electoral support for the Germans’ party in Romania (DFGR – Democratic Forum of Germans in Romania/DFDR – Demokratisches

Forum der Deutschen in Rumänien), at the last four local elections (2004–2012). This support could be considered symptomatic of a positive local/regional interethnic experience. The same is valid for the success that Hungarians' most important parties in Romania (DUHR – Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania/RMDSZ – Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség) and Slovakia (PHC – Party of the Hungarian Coalition/MKP – Magyar Koalíció Pártja) achieved in certain localities where the Hungarian population (and, hence, their traditional electorate) is under 50%: Jimbolia and Reghin (Romania), in 2004 and 2008; Nové Zámky (Slovakia), in 1998. Besides the positive interethnic experience, a second important aspect to be taken into account when explaining non-ethnic voting is collective memory (which largely depends on everyday interrelations).

From all these atypical cases, the DFGR is the most noteworthy. Its ex-leader, Klaus Werner Johannis – the current president of Romania since December 2014 (a subject that definitely deserves to be treated separately) – was elected four times (2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012) to the seat of mayor of Sibiu (where Germans' percentage is around 1.6%). The DFGR usually obtains an overwhelming majority of votes in the towns where the German population is estimated at less than 3%. The non-ethnic support that DUHR received at the last local elections is not negligible: more than 20% of Hungarian mayors in Romania are consistently elected in towns and villages with Romanian majoritarian population. In Slovakia, the evident cases of non-ethnic voting are very few and, the same as in Romania, this situation is due to both the majority and the minority: while in Nové Zámky, the capital of Nitra region, Slovaks (69.7% of the local population – SUSR 2013) elected a Hungarian mayor, Stúrovo represents the opposite example, of a locality with Hungarian majoritarian population (68.7% – SUSR 2013) and a Slovak mayor. In Bulgaria, where ethnic parties are constitutionally forbidden, MRF, the Movement for Rights and Freedom (DPS – Dvizhenie za Prava i Svobodi), was created as a party defending the minorities' particular interests. In practice, MRF functions as an ethnic party. It is principally sustained by the Turkish-speaking population and, secondly, by Pomaks (Muslim Bulgarians). One half of the Pomak population and a third of the Muslim Roma population are estimated to consistently vote for this party. An important number of MRF members and leaders are Bulgarians, not Turks. So, although there are no accessible data about the ethnic structure of the MRF electorate, a part of it is presumably of Bulgarian ethnic origin.

The situations of non-ethnic voting discussed above are among the most known in the three countries. Unfortunately, because of the absence of systematic exit polls data on the minorities' and majorities' electoral choices, we cannot count the exact number of ethnic and non-ethnic votes in the three countries. At the same time, we cannot identify all of the so-called atypical cases that could help us understand the variety of effects that the process of ethnic identity formation and the historical evolution of the relationship between minorities and majorities might have on regional solidarities, political attachments and, implicitly, on voting behaviour.

### 3.1 Ethnic identity formation and the historical evolution of the relationship between minorities and majorities

The national minorities included in the present study are all formed through contingency (the Turks from Bulgaria, the Hungarians from Romania, and Slovakia) with one single exception: the Germans from Transylvania. The *Rumäniendeutsche* resulted from German migration to the Eastern European territories, which began in the 11<sup>th</sup> century (HIGOUNET 1989, 95.) Historians characterized this migratory movement as a complex process, inspired not by a nationalist vision, but by objectives of economic, social, and religious (the transmission of Christian religion to the pagan Slavs) natures. The German-Romanian communities from Transylvania-Banat atound, among other aspects, through their propensity for common myths and reciprocity: “[...] between the sixteenth and the late seventeenth century, the Saxon intellectual elites have created a new collective genealogy which made them the descendants of the Goths and of the Geto-Dacians. With this new genealogy occulting the migratory past, the Saxons legitimized their presence in the Transylvanian region. The creation of a local mythical origin was then intended to make from the *Sachsen* ‘real’ Transylvanians [...]” (MICHALON 2002). The Romanian perspective on the Germans invests the latter with a major role in the construction of medieval cities and, later on, of the modern Romanian State.

In Bulgaria, from the 13<sup>th</sup> century until the decline of the Ottoman Empire (1878), the Turkish community enjoyed privileged social positions. Hungarians from Romania and Slovakia, as well as the Germans of Transylvania, had similar special statutes during the Austro-Hungarian Empire (until 1918). The new national states that emerged from

the dissolution of these two empires introduced important new regimes of rights but, at the same time, they destroyed all the old privileges. These changes affected primarily ethno-cultural minorities. Not only did they lose their privileges but they were also severely injured by the politics of cultural homogenization.

In Bulgaria, between 1878 and 1908, several measures had as a principal objective to limit the access of the Turkish population to education in their mother tongue. In the '20's, in order to prevent the spread of Turkish nationalism (inspired by Kemal Atatürk), the Bulgarian government enforced repressive measures against the Turkish minority. During communism, Bulgaria experienced several similar episodes. In spite of an apparent political correctness with regard to Turks (asserted by the Constitution of 1947), Bulgaria initiated the nationalisation of Turks' schools, the confiscation of private property, the forced Slavisation of Muslim names, etc. (ŞİMŞİR 1988). In Slovakia, during the communist regime, the use of the Hungarian language in public institutions was prohibited, Hungarian schools were closed, and minorities' property was confiscated. In Romania, during the process of nation-building, Hungarians and Germans were massively discriminated against (VERDERY 1991). The interwar period marked an important transition from Austro-Hungarian rule to Romanian administrative supervision of the territory, to the granting of new political rights for the German population but, also, to new forms of "minorization" and oppression (CIOBANU 2001). The year 1939, the Second World War, and the communist regime changed the situation and the destiny of the German minority dramatically and irreversibly but, at the same time, that of all the other minoritarian ethnic groups living in Romania as well (GIURESCU 2003; WAGNER 2000).

The year 1989, with the fall of the communist regimes and the restoration of the democratic order violently interrupted after the interwar period, triggered a continual movement of minorities to their "motherlands", "external homelands," or "kin-states" (BRUBAKER 1996). Actually, ethnicity is not the only factor of departure. In the case of German migrants, for instance, family cohesion and personal well-being are equally important considerations (MICHALON 2002). The year 1989 also marked the beginning of ethnic mobilisation in South-East Europe; all the four minorities mentioned above are among the first ethnic groups that created their own political organizations in the early years following communism.

The process of ethnic identity formation and the major events in the history of culturally heterogeneous communities can be considered the starting point of the present research. Although they took place long before the period that the present paper is concerned with, these events are crucial for understanding interethnic relations and, thereby, the structure of political behaviours and opinions. In the academic literature, the relations between majorities and minorities formed through deliberate migration are expected to be peaceful and rather cooperative (which, as a matter of fact, is the case of German-Romanian communities). By contrast with minorities resulting from migration, (national) minorities formed through contingency are associated with steadfast hostile attitudes towards the dominant ethnic group (PLASSERAUD 1998). These two assumptions seem to largely correspond to the interethnic realities in South-East Europe. The first context described above, favourable to transcultural identifications, is definitely generated by a positive interethnic experience and, also, by a non-contradictory collective memory. The second context is more likely to determine separate points of view and negative attitudes towards the Other. Therefore, even if they were subject to similar acts of violence in the past, the national minorities' attitudes towards the dominant groups strongly differ depending on the first interethnic experience on the given territory. And the explanation of this fact is to be found in a more in-depth analysis of the construction of collective memory. The relations between the host-state and the kin-state (tense in the case of Romania and Hungary, and Slovakia and Hungary) and the acts of oppression implemented by the host-state are differently perceived in the two types of interethnic context. In difficult situations, the largely pre-existing feeling of insecurity among the members of minorities formed through contingency is very likely to augment and to set off negative identification within the multi-ethnic community of origin (identification through exclusion). In such a case, the vote is mainly ethnic, nationalist. On the contrary, non-ethnic voting could indicate the presence of certain elements that are predominantly met in the first context described above.

### 3.2 Interethnic relations, ethnic stereotypes, and solidarities

The history of German-Romanian communities from Transylvania-Banat is, to a certain extent, a chronicle of ethnic conflicts but, at the same time, a



chronicle of important efforts of cultural accommodation. Today, the German-Romanian communities still bear the irrefutable mark of the major injurious events from the last two centuries: the civil war of 1848; the nationalist policies of the young Romanian State created in 1918; the communist measures against minorities, *i.e.* deportations, dispossessions (LIVEZEANU 1995; HITCHINS 1999), and perpetrating the ferocity of the two World Wars against the “Other”, whoever this may have been. Despite the Germans’ last two main waves of emigration from Romania (that took place at the end of the Second World War and during the first years following the Revolution of 1989) and the resulting implicit demographic homogenization, the old German-Romanian communities from Transylvania-Banat continued to preserve their multi-ethnic character.

The German-Romanian communities are distinguished from the majority of similar communities in Romania, and also in Europe, by the formation process (the voluntary migration of Germanic people), the voluntary acculturation (demonstrated by the linguistic loans within the mixed work group over time), the positive mutual stereotypes, the attachment to and the identification with the multi-ethnic community of origin, the propensity for common founding myths, etc. Researchers in the field show that interethnicity survives in collective memory and continues to influence the subjective identities and everyday life within these communities. They also demonstrate that ethnicity and interethnicity are still relevant phenomena in local narratives despite the absence of interethnic contact (GOLOMOZ 2013; PAP 2013). Moreover, in Transylvania-Banat, unlike the situation of the Hungarian-Romanian communities, relations between Romanians and Germans are usually characterized as open and socially constructive. The solidarities specific to the Romanian-German communities are generally considered non-opposable and non-reactive, but competitive.

Along these lines of thought, it should not be surprising that political scientists and sociologists analysing the spectacular success of the German minority party in the county of Sibiu and the neighbouring counties, after 2000 until the present, have revealed that the massive non-ethnic voting is due to the phenomenon of transculturation (DRAGOMAN and ZAMFIRA 2008; ZAMFIRA 2012). The proof of such an extraordinary phenomenon are to be found, for instance, in the creation of common myths (MICHALON 2002) and mutuality-based relationships.

Even if the social distance between Romanians and Germans is smaller than that separating Romanians and Hungarians, differences alone cannot account for the two types of voting tendencies (non-ethnic voting in the Romanian-German regions and ethnic voting in Romanian-Hungarian regions). Generally, Romanians associate positive stereotypes to Germans; the measure of sympathy Germans enjoy is definitely more important than the Hungarians’ (DRAGOMAN 2005). Similarly, in Slovakia, the amount of sympathy Hungarians enjoy (apparently not higher than in Romania) is surpassed by the Czechs’ (BOISSERIE 2003). In Bulgaria, the interethnic climate was generally peaceful and one of the reasons for this situation is represented by the good relations between Bulgaria and Turkey (ROGER 2002). Nevertheless, it is very important to mention that ethnic stereotypes and solidarities slightly vary from one region to other and one local community to other. They seem to depend, among other factors, on the ethnic fragmentation of the population, the size of the minority group, etc.

### **3.3 The ethnic fragmentation of the population and the size of the minority group**

Today, after a continuous exodus, the German-speaking population in Romania is estimated at 0.17%. By comparison, in 1930, official statistics reported a proportion of 4%. The percentage of Hungarians living in Romania is 6.1%, of Turks in Bulgaria – 8.8%, of Hungarians in Slovakia – 8.46% (NSI 2011; INS 2011; SUSR 2013). The index of ethnic fragmentation (RAE and TAYLOR 1970), calculated on the basis of the data gathered by LECLERC (2010), is about 0.27 for Bulgaria, 0.19 for Romania and 0.25 for Slovakia, values which are situated in the first inferior quarter of the interval. In the multi-ethnic regions from these countries, this index is much higher. In Bulgaria, the Turkish-speaking population is the majority in two regions – Kurdzhali and Razgrad. In Romania, Hungarians are the majority in two counties (Covasna and Harghita) and, in Slovakia, in two Southern districts – Dunaszerdahely (Trnava) and Komarom (Nitra).

The general expectancy is that the number of non-ethnic votes in favour of the minority party is more important when the territorial concentration is low and the dominant group is largely majoritarian. The explanation for this situation is to be found through an analysis of how the feeling of insecurity emerges and evolves within multi-cultural commu-

nities. What about the effect of these factors on ethnic voting in the three ex-communist countries? In Romania, for instance, the relevance of the index of ethnic fragmentation is debatable. As we can already observe, in the past two local elections, Romanians overwhelmingly supported the party of a tiny minority in Sibiu (1.6%) – the DFGR –, but at the same time, they voted almost equally enthusiastically for the main party of the Hungarians (who are much more numerous than the Germans) in Jimbolia (14.75%) and Reghin (28.77%) (EDRC 2002), etc. The situations of Nové Zámky and Stúrovo (Slovakia) are very similar to these. Anyway, the overall impression is that the weight of the two factors here analysed, the ethnic fragmentation of the population and the size of the minority group, is not marginal. On the contrary – there is no evidence of cases of non-ethnic voting in localities with a tight numerical rapport, e.g. 50%–50%. Nevertheless, for a correct measurement of the effect of the ethnic fragmentation of the population and the size of the minority group, both indicators should be calculated at the local and national levels. Psychological pressures might differ considerably from one level of analysis to another.

### 3.4 The territorial system of political administration and the socio-economic situation

Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Romania inherited a centralized administrative structure from the communist period. Despite several laws and administrative reforms that were introduced after 1990, these countries continue to have numerous difficulties in implementing local and regional politics.

All the 28 administrative territorial units in Bulgaria are endowed with equal prerogatives; each of them is headed by a governor whose institution is responsible for the implementation of national policies at the local level and, at the same time, responsible (but only in principle) for solving minorities' problems. In fact, for the simple reason that the governor's authority is limited by the Law on Local Autonomy and Local Administrations (a law which does not include any provisions regarding ethno-linguistic rights), the major part of minorities' specific interests and problems cannot be pursued at the local/regional level. In spite of the fact that several regionalisation projects were discussed after 1989, Romania kept a unitary system of political administration. The territory is divided into 41 counties (and the capital) without political autonomy. The 8 development regions, created in 1998, did not have

a precise administrative status; the counties are the only territorial units offering to both minorities and majorities the possibility to integrate their specific interests to the political agenda. In Slovakia, two important laws on decentralisation were adopted in 1996 and 2001. The 8 regions created in 1996 were empowered with administrative autonomy in 2001. Consequently, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, important areas of decision and competence were transmitted by the state to the new local communities. A president and an assembly of deputies now represent each region.

In the centralized or partially regionalized countries (Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia), the possibility to solve the problems of minorities other than through parties is practically absent. This is the reason why ethnic issues become so important in electoral campaigns, especially at the legislative level. The presence of ethno-regionalist parties in the local/regional and national political structures is one of the few instruments through which minority groups can express their needs and dissatisfactions. This is the reason why most minority parties prefer to present ethnic offers and to keep their exclusive interest in ethnic issues.

Some of the multi-ethnic regions in the ex-communist countries are among the poorest ones, with a monthly income and an employment rate lower than the national average – the cumulative and presumably intended effect of the politics of inequality largely practiced in centralised administrative systems. It is the case of Silistra and Shumen in Bulgaria (NSI 2001), Covasna and Harghita in Romania (INS 2011), Trnava and Nitra in Slovakia (SUSR 2013). Very often, socio-economic inequalities become the main subject of the negative electoral campaigns, a pretext for exclusivist ethnic offers, and one of the main causes of nationalist voting and of the negative attitudes against the Other. It is interesting to note that in the Western countries where the central institutions have granted important degrees of political autonomy and economic responsibility to the multi-ethnic regions (Italy, Spain, Belgium, Switzerland, etc.), the ethnic problems are no longer relevant issues within the electoral campaigns. That being said, the territorial system of political administration and the socio-economic situation could also be considered to stand for relevant indicators in the study of ethnic and non-ethnic voting. Also, the type of scrutiny (local/regional vs. national) seems to have a significant effect on the issues debated during campaigns and, implicitly, on voting. In general, the effect of ethnicity is greater in the national elec-

tions than in the local ones, most probably because of the personalistic character of the local vote and the lower importance that parties and voters accord to ethno-cultural issues at the local level (than at the national one). This is, of course, another explanation for the larger number of non-ethnic votes in the local elections.

#### 4 Conclusions

Although primarily focused on a methodological issue, this article also attempts to raise scholars' awareness of the multiple significance embodied in the ethnic and non-ethnic votes. As well as mixed marriages (marriages between people with different ethno-linguistic membership or, extrapolating, between nationals of different countries), non-ethnic voting could be considered a particularly conclusive indicator of (social) integration and, in addition to mixed marriages, of competitive solidarities, of intercultural relations based on dialogue and cooperation, and, to a certain extent, of transculturality. Transculturality constitutes a major achievement of post-nationalism and post-materialism, often present in the regions of Western Europe that have redefined their genealogical myths in accordance with the post-modern(ist) usages of ethnicity (Alsace, Aosta Valley, South Tyrol, etc.).

Unfortunately, little research has been done so far on (non-)ethnic voting and, in most cases, important conclusions for sociologists and political scientists remained without an echo in socio-psychological and socio-cultural anthropological circles. Intriguing findings on the contemporary (multi)ethnic imaginary could be extracted from the electoral studies carried out in countries like Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia or, at the opposite pole, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Spain, where intercultural relations are no longer defined in exclusionist terms.

The ethnically heterogeneous communities included in the present study offer a veritably rich and fascinating research field, which could help us better understand the mechanisms of interethnicity, the identity dynamics within multi-cultural societies and the process of transculturation. As emphasized in the text, non-ethnic voting is symptomatic of a non-contradictory collective memory and, implicitly, of a positive interethnic experience. Non-ethnic voting is favoured by a specific type of (inter)ethnic context, characterized by the following elements: the formation of the minority through voluntary migration; voluntary acculturation; positive mutual stereotypes;

attachment to (and the identification with) the multi-ethnic community of origin; the propensity for common founding myths; tolerance towards the Other; social relationships based on reciprocity and cooperation; high social capital, etc. The interesting positive metamorphoses of the *alter*-images – despite the historical episodes of formal and informal discrimination, forced cohabitation, cultural uniformisation, and deportation in forced-labour camps – demonstrate once more the complexity of the mechanisms of interaction specific to the multi-cultural communities and, at the same time, the high dynamics of interculturality. The recent (positive and negative) interethnic encounters or changes in ethnic self-definition (and group identification) also show it.

Despite all these theoretical insights and empirical findings, mechanical models are still predominant in the analysis of social and political behaviours in multi-ethnic regions. No systematic study of (non-)ethnic voting that has taken into account the series of factors considered in this paper has been done so far. This situation could give the impression that atypical cases – the non-ethnic votes – are mere accidents or exceptions without scientific relevance. Maybe this very perspective, that ethnicity has an inherent static character and, consequently, a determinant effect on human behaviour in general is responsible for the little attention which has been paid to non-ethnic voting. The operationalization of ethnicity in direct relation to interethnicity – its approach as a continual and dynamic process – could constitute a crucial step to be followed from now on. Ethnicity alone does not reveal much about individuals' political choices, for instance, not even in cases of ghettoization. The absence of interethnic contact does not go together with identities exclusively based on in-group mechanisms and this situation occurs on account of two causes. First, ethnic identity construction is triggered exactly by the comparison with an Other; self-images proceed by hetero-images. Second, as a lot of scholars argue, the imagined interethnicity might have comparable effects with the ones of lived interethnicity.

Certainly, the political factor plays a significant role in structuring or, on the contrary, in deconstructing social interaction and solidarities, on mobilizing or demobilizing (inter)ethnic local collectivities, and on promoting or hindering intercultural communication and exchange. Therefore, social and political behaviour in multi-ethnic regions should not be studied independently of the action of institutions, parties, and leaders. Whenever nationalist rhetoric and exclusivist ethnic offers are launched during

electoral campaigns, people vote traditionally, supporting the party(-ies) representing them ethnically. The territorial system of political administration and the socio-economic situation have also important effects on voting behaviour. In the countries where the only instrument that the local groups have for accomplishing their specific objectives is participation within the political structures (which is the case for all the minorities presented in this study), ethnic issues gain a particular discursive importance during electoral campaigns, especially at the legislative level. At the local level, the effect of ethnicity is weaker because of the personalistic character of the vote. When the regions with a high concentration of (national) minority population are among the poorest (which is the case of Silistra and Shumen in Bulgaria, Covasna and Harghita in Romania, Trnava and Nitra in Slovakia), economic and political inequalities become a powerful pretext for ethno-nationalist politicians to formulate exclusive electoral offers and, sometimes, extremist claims. In response, voters definitely choose to give more power to the anti-majority candidates. Besides, these are the explanations for a large number of ethnic votes in the local elections discussed in the article.

The exceptional cases (of non-ethnic voting) – at least the known ones – are very few: the pro-Hungarian votes in Nové Zámky and the pro-Slovak ones in Stúrovo (Slovakia); the pro-Hungarian votes in Jimbolia, Reghin, and some other small Romanian localities; and, certainly the most impressive votes, the pro-German votes in all the Transylvanian localities where the German Forum is electorally present. In Bulgaria, notwithstanding the missing data, departing from the fact that the Turkish party includes also ethnic Bulgarians among its members and leaders, we can presume that a part of the electorate is formed by ethnic Bulgarians. Regarding the ethnic fragmentation of the population and the size of the minority group in localities where people vote non-traditionally, we have to admit that no regularity has been observed. But this situation could be caused by the insufficient data. Indeed, there are no known cases of non-ethnic voting in localities with a tight numerical rapport, e.g. 50%–50%. Nevertheless, we should not rush to conclude that the influence of these two last factors is marginal.

At present, we cannot know much more about the effect of (inter)ethnicity on voting behaviour. The first reason is, as it is pointed out above, the insufficient available demographic and electoral data, i.e. data on the ethno-linguistic structure of the population and of the electorate (per circumscription).

In an important number of European countries (Belgium, Italy, France, Netherlands, etc.) ethnic census is outlawed and this measure was taken for preventing individuals from being unequally treated. The same is valid for the exit polls. Along these lines of thought, methodological limitations are evident. In the absence of data that would allow researchers to calculate the size of the (non-)ethnic votes, inferential statistical methods and comparative analyses are doomed to fail. Solely qualitative research could compensate in a considerable degree for this void and, also, could provide us with more in-depth explanations. This being said, the discussion remains open to further interdisciplinary research devoted to minorities, (inter)ethnicity, and (non-)ethnic voting.

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## SPATIAL MULTIDIMENSIONALITIES IN THE POLITICS OF REGIONS: CONSTITUTING THE ‘PHANTOM REGION’ OF CENTRAL GERMANY

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With 4 figures

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**Summary:** This paper provides a new perspective on the multi-dimensional character of regions as ‘spatial phantoms’ and contributes to the ongoing debate on interconnected relational and territorial approaches to regional space (cf. ELDEN, 2005, 2009, 2010; JONAS 2012a, 2012b, 2013; JONES 2009; MURPHY 2013; PAINTER 2010). Using the example of the Central German Metropolitan Region, we show that regional spatialities co-constituted by relational and territorial concepts simultaneously, leading to a multitude of spatialities-in-becoming. We argue that, ontologically, regions are multidimensional polysemic spaces and can be realised as spatial phantoms with contextually changing and fluid spatialities. Due to discursive practices of ‘Geography Making’ in the context of culture and politics, however, these regions frequently, but not always, appear as bounded territorial containers.

**Zusammenfassung:** Der Artikel eröffnet eine neue Perspektive auf die Mehrdimensionalität von Regionen als „räumliche Phantome“ und erweitert gegenwärtig geführte Debatten über die enge Verzahnung von relationalen und territorialen Konzepten in der Neuen Regionalgeographie (siehe ELDEN, 2005, 2009, 2010; JONAS 2012a, 2012b, 2013; JONES 2009; MURPHY 2013; PAINTER 2010). Am Beispiel der Metropolregion Mitteldeutschland werden regionale Räume aufgezeigt, die diskursiv sowohl von relationalen als auch territorialen Elementen konstituiert werden. Die Region als mehrdimensionaler polysemischer Raum, so das Argument, kann somit ontologisch als räumliches Phantom mit fluiden, sich kontextuell ständig verändernden, räumlichen Erscheinungsformen und Inhalten angesehen werden. In der diskursiven Praxis alltäglichen „Geographie-Machens“ erscheinen sie aber nach wie vor regelmäßig, aber nicht ausnahmslos, als territoriale Container.

**Keywords:** Political geography, Eastern Germany, regions, multidimensionality, spatial containers

### 1 Introduction

This paper illustrates the interplay of multiple, coexistent, and becoming spatialities that constitute what we call ‘phantom regions’. Consequently, we consider regional spaces as constructed of interrelated material and symbolic processes and structures; as multidimensional spatialities in-becoming. As an example, we refer to the everyday use of various spatial concepts by political stakeholders in the context of the ‘Cultural Region’ Central Germany. The paper follows up on research into processes of everyday linguistic regionalisation (see SCHLOTTMANN 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2008, 2012, 2013) and on earlier work on the construction of the Central German region in public media and everyday-language use (FELGENHAUER 2007, 2010; FELGENHAUER and SCHLOTTMANN 2007; FELGENHAUER et al. 2005; SCHLOTTMANN et al. 2007). One major finding of this work was that the Central German Broadcast Company MDR succeeded in promoting its version of the Central German entity by constructing a nar-

rative around the history of this particular region. In everyday communication, however, multiple variants and meanings of the region were proven (still) abundant (ibid.). An initial assumption of this research was that irrespective of particular meanings, the linguistic and social constitution of spatial constructs is based on specific spatial concepts and perceptions. This assumption could be evidenced empirically in the narrative construction of the broadcasting council, media content and in common perception. However, the focus of the argument here is founded on the everyday use of the container concept and its essentialisation in everyday language use, while virtually ignoring contemporaneous geographical concepts. The overall objective here is to reconstruct the spatial multidimensionality of regions (and their borders) in-becoming, based on the assumption that particular sub-fields of the politics of regions are dominated by particular spatialities.

The entity of the Central German Metropolitan Region comprises the three German federal states of Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia and was

established in 2008 as a political alliance between the nine core cities Chemnitz, Dessau-Rosslau, Dresden, Gera, Halle, Jena, Leipzig, Magdeburg, and Zwickau. Regional cooperation in business and science, culture and tourism, transport and mobility, and family friendliness weave the fabric of the area. The nine core cities are essential elements of the metropolitan region concept to form the city-network (Fig. 1). Nevertheless, as will be demonstrated in this paper, besides the network concept the territorial containers of the three federal states also play

an important role in the conception and articulation of the Central German Metropolitan Region. Elucidating the multiple spatialities of the region in specific context (and their overlap), we suggest, opens up the possibility of revealing conflicts and frictions between related discourses and practices in the field of regional politics. Such a perspective is crucial to understand the, often contradictory, political processes and motives that are simultaneously translated into and, shaped by discourses of everyday region-making.



Fig 1: Map Central German Metropolitan Region



The concept of discourse varies in different strands of scholarly inquiry. In our approach we refer to a pragmatic concept of discourse which is related to “Sociology of knowledge” (KELLER 2005), compatible with actor oriented micro-analysis used in earlier work on the constitution of Central Germany (FELGENHAUER and SCHLOTTMANN 2007; SCHLOTTMANN 2008). According to HALL (1997, 4) we understand discourses as “ways of referring to or constructing knowledge about a particular topic of practice: a cluster (or formation) of ideas, images and practices, which provide ways of talking about forms of knowledge and conduct associated with a particular topic, social activity or institutional site in society”. These types of pragmatic discourses involve signification rules and normative orientations around ways of saying things as well as resources for action, be they social (actors or actors’ positions) and/or material (KELLER 2005, 14). There has been some debate as to whether such a perspective, which centres on the discursive dimension of language use, is political (HANNAH 2006; SCHLOTTMANN 2006). However, we claim the analysed discourse on Central Germany is political. This is evidenced in the particular speech that actors communicate with due to their political functions. The particular ways of region-making in the communication process we analyse, are a crucial part of the politics of regions. On the other hand, the discourse we analyse is also a cultural discourse in the sense that, firstly, all language use is culturally informed, and, secondly, that it is explicitly about a ‘cultural region’ that is constructed and implemented politically.

Accordingly, this paper considers the discourse of Central Germany communicated by the institutional body of the Central German Metropolitan Region. Publicly available documents (e.g. brochures, maps, press releases) issued by this registered association were the main source of data. In addition, semi-structured expert interviews with political stakeholders of the Central German Metropolitan Region responsible for culture and tourism and the official website ([www.region-mitteldeutschland.com](http://www.region-mitteldeutschland.com)<sup>1)</sup>) were used as points of reference. In the subsequent section we first give an overview of recent theoretical debates in human geography that are concerned

with the material-relational nexus of regional spaces. Subsequently, we utilise the case-study of the Central German Metropolitan Region to demonstrate how regions are constructed in different cultural contexts through the interplay of multiple spatial dimensions (territory, place, scale, and network). This is followed by a critical discussion of spatial multidimensionalities and in the last section, we draw some conclusions to inform current debates on the conceptualisation of regions as polysemic spaces.

## 2 Multidimensionality of regions

In (political) geography current debates on theoretical conceptualisations of multidimensional polysemic spaces illustrate the recent move beyond the long lasting opposition of relational and territorial approaches to regional space (cf. ELDEN 2005, 2009, 2010; JONAS 2012a, 2012b, 2013; JONES 2009; MURPHY 2013; PAINTER 2010). In their inspiring paper on socio-spatial theory JESSOP et al. (2008) identified four distinct spatial lexicons that have been developed by social scientists over the last thirty years to conceptualise space: territory, place, scale, and network (TPSN) (see also DICKEN et al. 2001; LEITNER et al. 2008; PAASI 2004, 2012; SHEPPARD 2002). Within this TPSN framework, the spatial lexicons are each associated with certain forms of the so-called ‘spatial turn’, and should be theoretically and empirically considered to be closely intertwined (LEITNER et al. 2008), though they problematize partially different topics. Advocates of a given turn, however, are often tempted to focus on one dimension of spatial relations only, so neglecting the role of other forms of socio-spatial organisation (LEITNER et al. 2008). Such one-dimensionalism falls into the trap of conflating one part (territory, place, scale, or networks) with the whole (the totality of socio-spatial organisation). In contrast, JESSOP et al. (2008) argue that all four (or more) dimensions need to be put into play, albeit not necessarily all at once. Although JESSOP et al. (2008) do not discuss the spatial concept of regions explicitly, their proposed TPSN framework is a source of inspiration for this paper, considering the idea of regions as the interplay of multiple conceptual spatial dimensions (cf. JONES 2009).

TERLOUW and WESTSTRATE (2013) argue for an overdue shift of attention from the historical evolution of regions to the circumstances in the pre-

<sup>1)</sup> End of 2014 the Central German Metropolitan Region and the Industrial Initiative Central Germany merged into the new European Metropolitan Region Central Germany with their old webpages no longer accessible.

sent in which regions are actually constructed. The starting point, then, is not the social construction of one specific region, but how multiple dimensions of regions are constituted by political stakeholders in different contexts. We call these multidimensional spatial effects (PAINTER 2010) ‘phantom regions’ that take different forms of appearance in varied contexts. In other words, when conceptualised as phantoms, regions are ontologically indistinct spatial entities, without clear boundaries. They are spatialities that are constantly (re)emerging in different forms and with different emphasis and meaning. These regions can, however, appear as distinct and bordered entities due to essentialising discursive practices of ‘Geography-Making’ (SCHLOTTMANN 2008) in particular spatio-temporalities. Regions and socio-spatial relations, thus, can be conceived of as temporarily stabilised spatial phantoms of political action (METZGER 2013). We observe that TERLOUW and WESTSTRATE’S (2013) analytic approach is limited to a one-dimensional focus on scale and ignores other conceptual dimensions of region-making practices. We perceive this as highly problematic as it means that other spatial dimensions are overshadowed by scale as *primus inter pares* – first among equals (CASEY 2008). This contrasts the claimed importance of the interplay of different spatial dimensions when conceptualising regions (JESSOP et al. 2008) and echoes JONES’ (2009) concept of ‘phase space’ as theoretical middle ground that “insists on the compatibilities between, rather the mutual exclusivities of, flow-like (networks, etc.) and more fixed (scales, territories, regions, etc.) takes on space” (JONES 2009, 489). (Regional) space, then, is both territorially anchored and fluid, and perhaps more importantly, framed by the balance between different political forces, which “can be activated in strategies, practices, and discourses, some of which are bounded and others unbounded (JONES 2009, 499). Of interest for our work is, though drawing on an empirical case, not the social construction of a particular region and its implicit boundaries, but both the linguistic and discursive actions and instruments through which different regional ‘space layers’ (JONES 2009) are made possible in multiple contexts.

In the subsequent section, we elucidate the making of Central Germany as a ‘Cultural Region’. We then illustrate how multiple, sometimes contradicting, spatial layers of the phantom region are discursively constituted, by drawing on three different strands of this discourse.

### 3 The ‘Cultural Region’ of Central Germany

In the discourse of Central Germany, shaped by the institutional body of the Central German Metropolitan Region, the region is addressed as a space of long cultural traditions. The Central German Metropolitan Region is a polycentric city-network stretched across three federal states of Eastern Germany. It is institutionalised as a political association (cf. PAASI 2013) combining the four governmental hierarchies of city, state, nation, and EU to bring together a wide range of energies, identities, potentials and interests in the region. The overriding objective of its activities is the long-term strengthening of the overall region as a location for business and science, as well as a cultural landscape. The principles of voluntary commitment, decision-making on a consensual basis and a variable geometry apply at all levels of the Central German Metropolitan Region. Although the mental map (DOWNS and STEA 1977) of Central Germany is most commonly associated with the three federal states of Thuringia, Saxony, and Saxony-Anhalt (FELGENHAUER 2010) the discourse of the region draws on multiple spatial dimensions (e.g. territory, network, place) and creates numerous different and temporary spatial layers of the region (JONES 2009) in the context of Central Germany as a cultural region. Over the centuries Central Germany has had major influences on the development of culture and thought in Europe. Again and again the region has been the origin of major developments in religion, architecture and art. From 1517 onwards, the Reformation began its worldwide course from Central Germany with the writings and preaching of Martin Luther. Weimar Classicism, as represented in the works of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Friedrich Schiller, Johann Gottfried von Herder and Christoph Martin Wieland, influenced an entire cultural epoch. The region also supposedly has a long musical tradition. With Johann Sebastian Bach, Georg-Friedrich Händel, Georg Philip Telemann, Heinrich Schütz, Richard Wagner and Kurt Weill, numerous major composers lived and created their masterpieces in the region. The Dresden-Hellerau Festival Theatre (Festspielhaus) was attracting the artistic avant-garde of Europe even before the First World War, including famous names such as Rilke, Kafka, Kokoschka and Le Corbusier. It was in Central Germany, where the Bauhaus movement and its protagonists such as Walter Gropius, Wassily Kandinsky, Paul Klee, Ludwig Mies van der Rohe and Lyonel Feininger revolutionised architecture, design and art.

### 3.1 Cultural discourse of the Central German Region

Arguably seven strands of the cultural discourse of Central Germany can be identified (CENTRAL GERMAN METROPOLITAN REGION 2013). The Cultural Heritage discourse strand draws on the Garden Kingdom Dessau-Wörlitz with its historic parks and buildings, the history of modern architecture and the Bauhaus movement in the region, Central Germany's unique medieval towns and its important milestones in German history. The second discourse strand is that of Musical Traditions in the region. Central Germany's famous composers, its orchestras and festivals, and the importance of music from classic to modern times are essential aspects of this discourse of Central Germany. Cultural Routes is a discourse strand stressing the region's pilgrims' ways, its Romanesque Road, and the Martin Luther Way, all of them being cultural routes through Central Germany. Fine arts are the focus of the discourse strand of Cultural Locations in Central Germany. The creative sites of painting, design, theatre, and literature in the region are communicated through this discourse. Central Germany's eventful past, its medieval treasures, baroque jewels, and contemporary art, which are displayed in various collections and museums in Central Germany, are the focus of the discourse strand Cultural Treasures. Central Germany's castles, churches, and historic buildings are part of the Cultural Edifices discourse strand and represent another facet of the region's cultural discourse. The last discourse strand identified in this study is Cultural Landscapes, which draws on the region's historic gardens, forests, and parks. Due to space limitations in this article, we subsequently limit our analysis on the three discourse strands of Cultural Heritage, Cultural Routes, and Musical Traditions to illustrate Central Germany's multidimensional facets and emergences in a cultural context.

### 3.2 Cultural heritage

The Cultural Heritage discourse strand draws on the region's rich cultural heritage and its historic sites. The Dessau-Wörlitz Garden Kingdom (Fig. 2) was created in the spirit of the Enlightenment between 1764 and 1800. Six castles, seven historic parks and more than 100 smaller architectural edifices are in the heart of the UNESCO Heritage Site. The historic starting point of this cultural place and centre of the 142 km<sup>2</sup> sized Garden Kingdom is the Wörlitz

Gardens, the first landscape garden in continental Europe. In the form of the Wörlitz Castle Germany's first neo-classicist edifice was built between 1769 and 1773. Only a few kilometres away in Oranienbaum, the only Dutch-inspired Baroque Park and castle complex in Germany can be found. In the gallery of the Rococo palace of Mosigkau Baroque paintings by the Dutch and Flemish masters are displayed. The Georgium, a castle set in an English-style park of the same name, is home to another collection of paintings which forms the "Anhaltische Gemäldegalerie".

Not far from the site of the Dessau-Wörlitz Garden Kingdom lies the Bauhaus Building, which was constructed in 1925/26 based on the designs of Walter Gropius (Fig. 2). Until 1932 it was the creative hub of the world famous "Hochschule für Gestaltung" (Academy of Design), whose works and ideas influence concepts of modern architecture and design to the present day. Since 1994 the building has been the headquarters of the Bauhaus Dessau Foundation and is a contemporary place of research, teaching and experimental design. However, the Bauhaus was founded in Weimar in 1919 (Fig. 2), before it had to move to Dessau in 1925 on account of political pressures. Both Bauhaus locations in Dessau and Weimar are UNESCO World Heritage Sites. Today, the building where the Bauhaus movement was founded is the main building of Bauhaus University and part of its design faculty.

The origins of the Protestant Church lie in Central Germany, where the birthplace of the Reformation can be viewed at the Luther memorial sites in Eisleben and Wittenberg (Fig. 2). Since 1996 these have been part of UNESCO's World Heritage and include the entrance to the Castle Church in Wittenberg, where Martin Luther attached his 95 theses on 31 October 1517, and the City Church in Wittenberg, where he preached his prominent 'Invocative Sermons'. At the City Church he gave lectures and wrote his most important works. Martin Luther was born in Eisleben in 1483, where a museum was established as early as the end of the seventeenth century. The house in which Luther died is the site of another museum, which is an important memorial and place of remembrance to Luther's death.

The Wartburg near Eisenach in Thuringia (Fig. 2) is a significant place of German history and an outstanding monument of the feudal period in Central Europe. At the Wartburg, well-known poets such as Walther von der Vogelweide, Wolfram von Eschenbach and Albrecht von Halberstadt fought their legendary 'combat of the minstrels'.



Fig. 2: Map discourse cultural heritage

In the year 1521 Martin Luther found refuge in the Wartburg, where he translated the New Testament into German. Three hundred years after the start of the Reformation, in 1817, 'Burschenschaft' student fraternities from all over Germany celebrated the Wartburg Festival in an early demonstration of German unity. In the nineteenth century the Wartburg was turned into a national monument and represents an architectural mixture of Romanesque, Gothic, Renaissance and Historicist influences. Highlights include the Romanesque Palas, a roofed hall built in 1155, which is today regarded as the best-preserved secular Romanesque edifice in Northern Europe.

With no fewer than approximately 1200 timber-framed houses from six centuries and an enclosed medieval centre, the historic old town of Quedlinburg (Fig. 2) is one of Germany's best-preserved heritage sites of the Middle Ages. Quedlinburg is an outstanding example of a European medieval town and is under protection of the UNESCO World Heritage programme. On the Castle Hill high above Quedlinburg rests the Collegiate Church of St. Servatius, a masterpiece of Romanesque and Gothic architecture. Its crypt contains the graves of the first

German king, Heinrich I, and his wife Mathilde, whose palatine was established on Quedlinburg's Castle Hill. In the east of Saxony, astride the Neisse River and the border between Poland and Germany, a gardening artwork of worldwide significance can be viewed. What looks like pristine nature is in fact a landscape cultivated by men. The creator of Muskau Park (Fig. 2), Prince Hermann of Pückler-Muskau, describes his concept of landscape design as 'nature painting'. Laid out between 1815 and 1844, the 700 hectare sized park is a joint Polish and German World Heritage Site and represents an important site of cultural cross-border work in Europe.

As a synopsis it can be said that the Cultural Heritage discourse strand communicates six historically significant sites in Central Germany: Bad Muskau (Muskau Park), Dessau (Garden Kingdom), Eisenach (Wartburg), Quedlinburg (Medieval Town), Weimar (Bauhaus), and Wittenberg (Martin Luther Memorial Site). All nine Core Cities of the Central German Metropolitan Region, however, are silenced (with the exception of Dessau) in the cultural discourse. Consequently, in the context of Cultural Heritage the phantom region of Central Germany takes a different shape to the one seen above (Fig. 1).



The Cultural Heritage discourse strand places a strong focus on the two federal states of Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia and seems somewhat bounded by their territorial borders. Interesting, however, is the heritage site of Bad Muskau, which is the only site located within the federal state of Saxony. It also crosses two discursively bounded spaces: the region of Central Germany and the national border between Germany and Poland. Thus, in the Cultural Heritage discourse strand, the region of Central Germany stretches beyond its territorial containers of Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia, and illustrates the ‘phantomisation’ of both federal and national borders in Central Germany.

### 3.3 Cultural routes

The Cultural Routes discourse strand illustrates a network of several walks, from cultural, over historic to religious trails, as constituting the region of Central Germany. The Route of Kings, Merchants and Pilgrims is one example of historic roads linking together people and places and encouraging trade and cultural encounter. The Via Regia, the Ecumenical Pilgrims’ Way, and the Way of St. James of Saxony are also part of the regional discourse of Central Germany. The Romanesque Road, which connects over 80 cathedrals, fortresses, cloisters, and churches of Medieval Germany and the Trail of Classic Writers, a track of major literary personalities of Central Germany (e.g. the Goethe Route or the Schiller Trail) are other examples of spatial networks communicated in the discourse. Perhaps the most prominent aspect, however, is the Martin Luther Ways, a network of numerous trails connecting historic sites of the Reformation in Central Germany, thereby following the footsteps of Martin Luther (Fig. 3).

In 1483 Martin Luther was born in Eisleben (Saxony-Anhalt). The town of Stotternheim near Erfurt saw the beginnings of historic events, which were to change politics and culture in Europe for ever, when Martin Luther commenced his study at Erfurt University in 1505 and entered the Augustinian monastery in Erfurt two years later. It is here, that all four routes of the Thuringian Luther Way converge. The Northern trail connects Erfurt with Stotternheim, while the Eastern loop leads from Erfurt over Weimar, Jena and Gera to Altenburg. The Southern loop links Erfurt with the historic sites of Arnstadt and Paulinzella, while the Western loop combines the cities of Gotha, Eisenach

and Mühlhausen (Fig. 3). By the five hundredth anniversary of the Reformation in 2017 it is anticipated to combine all 30 of the most important historic places in the federal state related to Martin Luther. In the neighbouring state of Saxony the Luther Way links the two cities of Torgau and Löbnitz. A subsequent circular route integrating Leipzig, Zwickau and other towns and villages in which Luther and his wife Katharina von Bora have lived and worked are still at the planning stage. In the future, the Saxon Luther Way will connect all major places of the Reformation in the state of Saxony. The Luther Way in Saxony-Anhalt is one of the most extensive pilgrimage networks in Central Germany and leads from the towns of Wittenberg and Eisleben to Mansfeld. More than three dozen important sites of Luther’s life are linked by the Saxon-Anhalt Luther Way, which consists of 421 km tracks today.

Interestingly so far all Luther Ways are confined by the territorial borders of Germany’s federal states, although to the 500<sup>th</sup> Luther Anniversary in 2017 one united Central German Luther Way is planned that connects all local networks and crosses the borders between the three federal states. Today, only two examples of border-crossing trails are implemented in Central Germany: the Luther Way between Nordhausen in Thuringia and Stolberg in Saxony-Anhalt and the Luther Way connecting Eisleben in Thuringia and the city of Coburg in Bavaria, with the latter not only crossing the boundaries of Thuringia, but even exceeding the discursively constructed container of Central Germany (Fig. 3).

### 3.4 Musical traditions

The discourse strand Musical Traditions in Central Germany focuses on prominent composers and musical accomplishments of the region. The musical history of the region is closely linked to the two composers Bach and Wagner, who are the main protagonists communicated in the discourse strand Musical Traditions. The composer Johann Sebastian Bach was the musical director at St. Thomas Church in Leipzig (1723–1750) and significantly shaped the city’s musical history. The name of Johann Sebastian Bach is inseparably linked with the city of Leipzig, where he spent most of his life (Fig. 4). At the Bach Museum Leipzig original Bach manuscripts and devotional objects from his life are shown. Leipzig’s Bach Archive is another historical site devoted to scientific research into the musical Thuringian-Saxon Bach family. As part of its work, system-



Fig. 3: Map discourse cultural routes

atic research has been carried out since 2002 into documents relating to Bach in all the archives and libraries of Central Germany. Another historic site related to Bach is the Bach House in Eisenach, the birthplace of Bach, which has been disseminating in-depth knowledge about his work and maintaining the composer's musical legacy. Opened in 1907, it was the world's first museum devoted to the musician and composer.

Richard Wagner was also born in Leipzig and was musical director at the Saxon court in Dresden (until 1843) and composed some of his masterpieces while visiting his friend Franz Liszt in Weimar (Fig. 4). Richard Wagner, the precursor of modern music drama, was born in 1813 and a memorial was created near his birthplace on the 200<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the composer's birth. In 1814 the Wagner family moved to Dresden, where Richard was appointed musical director to the Saxon court in 1843. During a holiday in the year 1846 in the village of Graupa (near Dresden) Wagner composed large sections of his opera 'Lohengrin'. Here the world's oldest Wagner museum at the Richard Wagner Stätten Graupa was established. The many visits to his friend Franz Liszt also created a connection

between Richard Wagner and the city of Weimar. Other examples of well-known composers born in Central Germany are Georg Friedrich Händel (born in Halle 1685), Georg Philipp Telemann (born in Magdeburg 1681), and Heinrich Schütz (born near Gera in 1585). The world-class symphonic orchestras and choirs in the region are another facet of Central Germany's Musical Traditions communicated in the discourse with the Dresden Cross Choir (700yrs) and St. Thomas Boys' Choir (800yrs) being just two examples.

The region of Central Germany communicated in the Musical Traditions discourse strand comprises several historical sites in the states of Saxony and Thuringia. The federal state of Saxony-Anhalt, however, is not integrated into this layer of the spatial dimension of Central Germany. Although the discourse strand illustrates the border-crossing between two federal container spaces, the Musical Traditions discourse strand seems to be somewhat confined by the two territorial containers of Saxony and Thuringia (Fig. 4) and confirms the territorial characteristic as one important aspect of this spatial layer of the phantom region Central Germany as observed before (see above).



Fig. 4: Map discourse musical tradition

#### 4 Discussion

The Central German Metropolitan Region network lies at the heart of Europe and brings together [nine core] cities from Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia. (CENTRAL GERMAN METROPOLITAN REGION 2014)

This quote from the official webpage of the Central German Metropolitan Region illustrates once more the coexisting multi-dimensionality of spatiality that constitutes Central German Metropolitan Region and makes it a phantom region as we propose the term in this paper. Different spatial dimensions are drawn upon simultaneously to define a spatial subject, of which only the name is stable, but which turns out to be amorphous and 'phantom-like' in its essence. The relational concept of networks is used as well as the territorial containers of Europe and the federal states Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia. In addition, specific places – core cities – are part of the regional conception of Central Germany. These cities are geographically located in the three federal states Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia and discursively constitute the Metropolitan Region of Central Germany. The participating core cities,

therefore, can be seen as fundamental elements of the regional concept and form the city-network of the phantom region, which fluctuates in contour and structure according to multi-faceted cultural contexts involved.

The Cultural Heritage discourse strand, for example, designates seven historic sites as important cultural locations in the Central German Metropolitan Region. These historically significant places are Dessau (Saxony-Anhalt) and Weimar (Thuringia), Eisleben and Wittenberg (both Saxony-Anhalt), Eisenach (Thuringia), Quedlinburg (Saxony-Anhalt), and Bad Muskau (Saxony). They constitute the cultural region of Central Germany with the 'modern' core cities mentioned before being completely omitted. Interesting, however, is the heritage site of Bad Muskau, which not only crosses the 'border' of Central Germany but also the national border between Germany and Poland. In the discourse strand of Cultural Heritage, thus, the region of Central Germany stretches beyond the territorial container of the three federal states and crosses the border between two nation states.

Another consideration is that all cultural locations addressed in the cultural discourse of Central Germany are clustered into thematic groups disre-

garding their geographical position. In contrast to other debates aligned with economic and security issues the territories of the three *Länder* Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia seem to be less confined in a cultural context, where thematic bridges cross administrative borders and lead to supra-state (i.e. supra-*Länder*) city-networks. One such border-crossing network is the Martin Luther Way – a historic pilgrimage trail through the Central German Metropolitan Region and a cultural and tourism project uniting multiple sites of the Reformation within the region. Although the Luther Way today consists of more or less three separate trails bound by the territories of the three *Länder* Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia, one continuous city-network is planned to be completed by 2017 – the 500<sup>th</sup> Reformation anniversary. Other cultural trails in the region, however, are (and most likely continue to be) contained by the federal boundaries. The Musical Tradition discourse strand demonstrates a similar example of border-crossing networks, although comprising only the two federal states of Saxony and Thuringia. Important events/sites in the life of the composer Johann Sebastian Bach are discursively utilised to constitute a city-network of Leipzig (Saxony) and Eisenach (Thuringia), which encompasses cultural places such as the Bach Museum, the Bach Archives, or the Bach House. Similarly, the history of the composer Richard Wagner forms the backdrop for a city-network comprising Dresden, Leipzig (both in Saxony) and Weimar (Thuringia).

Hence, the spatial concept of network is a constitutive part of the discourse of Central German Metropolitan region. However, all three federal states Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia thought of as territorial containers are likewise crucial elements of its constitution. Although the main political stakeholders are located in the administrative core cities of the region, the federal state system of Germany significantly impacts on the cultural discourse in which another dimension of the region is constituted. The fragile and temporary spatialities of the Central German Metropolitan Region incorporate rigid administrative elements on a regular basis and demonstrate the impact of territorial boundaries on the region's changing spatialities. Territorial sub-regional containers are frequently incorporated into the spatial organisation of the Central German region and illustrate the multi-dimensional character as well as the co-existence of relational and territorial dimensions and the temporality of the phantom region ever 'in-becoming'.

## 5 Conclusion

This paper aims to contribute to current scholarly debates on processes of region building (e.g. COX 2013; CRAWSHAW 2013; GOODWIN 2013; HARRISON 2013) and to provide a new perspective on the multi-dimensional character of what we call phantom regions. Using the example of the Central German Metropolitan Region, we illustrate how regional spatialities can be co-constituted by e.g. network and container concepts at the same time, thereby leading to a multitude of spatialities-in-becoming. Regions understood as products of discursive practices must be conceptualised as constantly changing and always in-becoming due to the variety of spatial concepts performed in discourse in order to serve political calculations. Hence, they can be seen as territorial phantoms with contextually fluid spatialities, despite being frequently criss-crossed by bounded territorial containers. As a future prospect for our work, it seems important to delve deeper into the implications of possible, yet hitherto undiscovered, synergies and frictions between the different phantom shapes of a region over space and time. This would involve, for instance, looking closer at to what extent practices of regulation and governance are affected by the constant concurrence and conflict between spatialities that are involved in the perpetual becoming of a region.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

SCHACHERREITER, JUDITH: Das Landeigentum als Legal Transplant in Mexiko. Rechtsvergleichende Analysen unter Einbezug postkolonialer Perspektiven. XVI und 497 S. Beiträge zum ausländischen und internationalen Privatrecht 103. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2014, € 94,-

Die vorliegende Publikation hätte ebenso gut folgenden Untertitel tragen können: „El drama de la tierra en México“, in Anlehnung an VICTOR MANZANILLA-SCHAFFER, oder auch „La disputa por la tierra“, wie es JOSÉ LUIS CALVA für Mexiko beschreibt. Denn die österreichische Juristin JUDITH SCHACHERREITER beschäftigt sich in ihrer Habilitationsschrift mit der Reproduktion von Kolonialität durch Privatisierung des Bodens in Mexiko. Im Kern geht es um die Schaffung privaten Landeigentums per se als Rechtstransplantat. Dieser Ansatz ist eindeutig neu und innovativ und eröffnet zahlreiche Ansätze und Optionen für anschließende Forschungsfragen. In drei umspannenden, tief dringenden Kapiteln werden – nach dem epistemologischen Rahmen (Teil 1) – das Landeigentum in der kolonialen Moderne Mexikos (Teil 2) sowie das Eigentum als Modernisierungstransplant (Teil 3) behandelt. Es handelt sich um eine sowohl theoretisch wie auch (bodenordnungs-)praktisch wichtige Frage der „Verpflanzbarkeit von Recht“, genauer von Eigentums- und Bodenrecht in Mexiko. Was ist aber nun ein Legal Transplant, und welche Bedeutung hat er für Raumentwicklung, Bodenordnung, Planung und Landmanagement? Und welche (Wechsel-)Beziehung besteht zur Geographie? Unter einem Transplant werden in der Rechtsvergleichung die gegenseitigen Einflüsse zwischen verschiedenen Rechtssystemen und die (nicht selten unkritische) Annahme fremder Rechtsordnungen, -regelungen und -modelle verstanden. Es geht hierbei allerdings nicht (bloß) um rechtliche, daher unmittelbar raumwirksame „Import-Export-Prozesse“. Politisch brisant und länderkundlich interessant wird die Monographie SCHACHERREITERS spätestens zu dem Zeitpunkt, in dem die Autorin darlegt, inwieweit die Mexikanische Revolution sich gegen die Einführung des mit der Privatisierung einhergehenden Eigentums-umwandlungsprozesses richtete. Sie spricht sich stattdessen für ein „autochthones“ (Eigentums-)Konzept aus, „das sich nicht an ein scheinbar universell gültiges europäisches Modell anlehnt“, so die Autorin (S. 9). Sie entwickelt hieraus drei Transplanttypen: den militärisch

aufgezwungenen Transplant (S. 31f.), den fremdbestimmten Transplant (externally dictated transplant, vgl. S. 32ff.) und den Autoritätstransplant (S. 34–37).

Im Kontext ihrer Arbeit sind die beiden letzteren Typen von besonderem Interesse, gehorchen sie doch politischen Einflussnahmen und/oder Drücken vornehmlich in (durchsetzungs-) schwachen politischen Regimen ohne eigene freie Willensbildung. Dieses sind nach Auffassung SCHACHERREITERS Zielländer der Peripherie, in denen externe Akteure wie etwa die USA, EU, Weltbank und IWF versuchen, Ziele durchzusetzen. Man wird an dieser Stelle willkürlich an das Raumbeispiel Griechenland und den Diskurs um die „Troika“ erinnert. Weiteres Kennzeichen eines Autoritätstransplants sei die Übernahme eines (vermeintlich) prestigeträchtigen Konzepts „mit Hauptakteuren als politische Entscheidungsträger im Zielland selbst“ (S. 74). SCHACHERREITER schildert kenntnisreich und durch Auswertung zahlloser Primärquellen, Rechtstexten und Dekreten, wie Lateinamerika gewissermaßen als Kind in die europäischen Rechtsfamilie(n) aufgenommen wurde. Mir gefällt dieser rechtsvergleichende Ansatz gut. Er führt neben einer gut verständlichen Qualifizierungsarbeit als Produkt der Feldforschung der Autorin erneut zur (Er-)Kenntnis, wie nah Geographie und Rechtswissenschaften beieinander liegen. Jedes Recht ist ortsbezogen (AZUELA und MENESES-REYES 2014). Die legal transplants fungieren gleichsam als Transmissionsriemen zwischen der Umwelt, dem Territorium und den Rechtssystemen und -systematiken (vgl. dazu auch die Pionierarbeit von WATSON 1993; MILLER 2003). Auch rechtsgeschichtlich hat die voluminöse Arbeit einiges zu bieten. Die Autorin schildert, wie Umformungen des rechtlichen Status des indigenen Landes – der ejidos – vonstatten gingen (S. 96ff.). Durch die Verteilung von Grund und Boden an Migranten organisierte die spanische Krone die Boden- und Raumordnung ihrer Kolonialgeschichte neu – ein durchaus populäres koloniales Entwicklungsmuster. Die Schaffung von Propiedad, die Eigentumsbegründung und die Herausbildung der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft mit der säuberlichen Grenzziehung zwischen „Mein“ und „Dein“ sind seit jeher eng miteinander verwoben. Dies gilt nicht erst seit Hugo Grotius, John Locke oder Immanuel Kants Rechtslehre, dessen § 12 lautete: „Die erste Erwerbung einer Sache kann keine andere als die des Bodens sein“. Die

Auflösung von indigenem Gemeinschaftsland und des Bodens der „commoner“ fand – nach dem Vorbild europäischer und US-amerikanischer Rechtsdiskurse (als dem „Zentrum“ im Sinne Wallersteins) als wirkmächtige Transplants – in Mexiko seine Begründung darin, dass dieses „common land“ (comunidades) Ausdruck einer prä-modernen und unzivilisierten Lebensweise sei. Das unabhängige Mexiko setzte danach in Gestalt der liberalen Bodenreformen auf rechtsdogmatischer wie wirtschaftlich-sozialer Ebene die Kolonialität als anderes Gesicht von Modernität fort und reproduzierte es somit. Weiterführende Forschungsfragen wären: Welches ist der Ausgangspunkt von Eigentum, speziell von Bodeneigentum in einem ursprünglichen privateigentumsrechtlichen „Niemandland“ bzw. von ausschließlich gemeinschaftlich genutztem Boden als comunidades, fundo legal oder ejido? Mit dem Übergang vom Naturzustand in die Zivilisation qua Eigentum geht einerseits die Begründung von Recht, Zivilisation und Staat einher. Andererseits führten und führen Transformationsprozesse nicht nur die Auflösung des überkommenen feudalen Ober- und Untereigentums herbei. Sie bewirkten in Mexiko vor allem, dass die durch Privatisierung ihres bäuerlichen Gemeinschaftslandes landlos gewordene rurale Bevölkerung nunmehr auf Lohnarbeit in den Fabriken und Haciendas unter teilweise unwürdigen Bedingungen angewiesen war (S. 344).

Besonderes Augenmerk legt die Autorin im dritten Teil auf die Ausarbeitung des Artikels 27 der Verfassung von 1917 durch die Agrarreform von 1992. Es steht die These im Raum, dass diese Agrarreform die Geschichte und die Vorstellung eines einheitlichen Entwicklungspfades wiederholte, dem alle Welt folgen sollte und an den sich auch die indigenen Völker Mexikos mit ihren ejidos anpassen mussten (S. 421). Nachgewiesen wird in dieser Arbeit, inwiefern die (neo-) liberalen Bodenreformen des Unabhängigen Mexiko und die Reformen von 1992 auf vergleichbaren Transplantmuster fußen. Mit der Umwandlung und Implementierung von Landzertifizierungsprogrammen (Land Titling; Formalisierung und Kapitalisierung des ejido-Bodens) wurden gar Landkonflikte in neuerer Zeit legitimiert und provoziert, so SCHACHERREITER (S. 382–399). Es bleibt als Hauptkenntnis der Publikation: Alles Eigentum rührt letztlich vom Boden her. Man kann nun darüber streiten, ob die in Teilen kraftvoll-unjuristische Sprache, die die Verfasserin an zahlreichen Stellen verwendet, einer juristischen Habilitationsschrift angemessen ist. Aus geographischer Perspektive erweitert diese Art der Darstellung fraglos den Kreis der potenziellen Leserschaft. Und der Befund, dass die Lösung und Alternative (nur) lauten könne, „dem Anderen nicht durch Universalisierung des Eigenen seine künftige Entwicklung vor-

zuschreiben (...), sondern das Andere werden zu lassen, was es werden will“ (S. 424), ist gewiss universell gültig und hat zwischenzeitlich in modernen Förderansätzen der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit jenseits des Ethnozentrismus seinen Niederschlag gefunden. Um das Andere werden zu lassen, was es werden will, bedarf es nicht zuletzt einer zeitgenössischen land governance.

Offen bleiben nach der Lektüre Fragen einer intelligenten Besteuerung des Grund und Bodens als Element einer armutsreduzierenden, Demokratie fördernden Bodenpolitik und Bodenreform, in Mexiko wie anderswo. Zu lösen ist auch nach wie vor die wiederaufkeimende „Soziale Frage“, des „derecho social“ in Mexiko im Zuge des 1915 entstandenen „derecho agrario revolucionario“. Eine Klärung oder besser Befriedung der Kontroverse: Privat- oder Gemeineigentum an Boden, die unterstellte Steigerung von Effizienz und Effektivität durch Landprivatisierung, die Kosten der Zertifizierung und dergleichen lässt sich aus meiner Sicht derzeit – und wohl auch auf absehbare Zeit – nicht herbeiführen, weder in Mexiko noch global betrachtet.

FABIAN THIEL

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HÖNNIGHAUSEN, LOTHAR: Von Canyons und Wüsten, von Büffeln und Armadillos. Amerikanische Natur- und Umwelterlebnisse aus fünf Jahrhunderten. 462 S. und zahlr. farb. Abb. Stauffenburg Verlag, Tübingen 2014, € 39,80

What a book! Some people may consider it to be surprising to see this title, compiled and edited by a colleague whose background is in English and American literature reviewed in a geographical journal. But this book, modestly characterized as “Ein Lesebuch”, is



much more: It is a fascinating collection of texts of five centuries, all of them focused on experiences, thoughts and religious as well as philosophical reflections on the relationship between nature and society – from an American perspective.

It is a common public opinion that the American way of life is one where nature is nothing more than a provider of human well-being, to be exploited, subdued and utilized by humankind, even at the cost of its total destruction. Knowledgeable people know better. Americans not only created the first national park on earth (Yellowstone 1872!), but also the Sierra Club in 1892, one of the first groups of environmental activists not only in North America. And also today, Americans are among the forerunners of many environmental activities and worldwide trends in pursuit of the protection of nature!

The voluminous book is divided into eight chapters and the headings will be cited in German in order not to destroy HÖNNIGHAUSEN's intentions and terminologies:

1. Vorgeschichte: Die Puritaner und die Natur
2. Die Entdeckung des Themas "Natur und Umwelt" in der amerikanischen Aufklärung
3. Die Entwicklung des Naturgefühls in der amerikanischen Romantik
4. Das Erlebnis der Natur im 19. Jahrhundert: Fachleute und Naturfreunde
5. Literarische Formen der Umweltkritik im 20. Jahrhundert
6. Natur und Umwelt in postmoderner Zeit
7. Natur als Umwelt
8. Die Umwelt als Gegenstand der Kulturwissenschaften

This is not the place to go into details of the altogether more than 60 authors and more than 250 excerpts of their relevant ideas about the positive or negative interactions between nature and society. And, to be honest, not all of them may be of direct and/or immediate relevance to the crucial problems at stake. On the other hand, however, this collection contains so many fundamental statements by politicians, explorers, scientists, environmentalists, engaged artists resp. environmental organizations that one will not find in any other collection and in such a condensed form anywhere. Short as the selected texts may be, they are always well chosen and down to the point.

Thus, in chapter 2, we find excerpts from Thomas Jefferson's "Notes on the State of Virginia", geographical and biological observations by the explorers Lewis and Clark or by the great naturalist John James Audubon. Chapter 3 juxtaposes literary texts, e.g., by James

Fenimore Cooper, Nathaniel Hawthorne or Herman Melville, in which basic struggles between humankind and nature are described and juxtaposed with those deeply empathic experiences of Henry D. Thoreau's "Life in the Woods". Chapter 4 contains almost exclusively geographical texts: Clarence King, first director of the US Geological Survey, is represented with his interpretations of the geology of the American West and his emotional experiences as a mountaineer in the Sierra Nevada. John Wesley Powell's descriptions of the Colorado and Grand Canyon are "classics"; observations on America's arid regions and their ecological importance underline the critical know-how of Powell. Several sections refer to John Muir's both emotional and rationalistic experiences as a fervent champion of the protection of nature, its flora and fauna, which finally made him founder and first president of the still influential Sierra Club in 1892. Chapter 5 and 6 have their focus on literary texts (e.g., Steinbeck, Hemingway, Faulkner ...) with delightful observations, powerful descriptions and thought-provoking reflections on the virgin state of nature and its deterioration under the influence of "civilization". Closer reading, however, reveals the embeddedness of these literary texts in a series of philosophical and ethical reflections, all of which are deeply disturbing and thought-provoking. The same holds true for chapter 7 and its again ingenious mix of short but always very critical texts. "Nature as Human Environment" presents excerpts from George Perkins Marsh's geographical classic "The Earth as Modified by Human Action"; Rachel Carson is quoted with her "Silent Spring", the mission statement of the Sierra Club, political manifestations of the US Environment Protection Agency, the Earth First Movement and others. A special focus is on the environmental problems, ecologically highly sensitive and fragile. It also includes texts on Alaska and the modern ecology of rural America and its perceptions resp. its modern transformations through technology versus protective endeavours. The final chapter is devoted to basic humanistic discourses on the rule of nature and its ambiguous position between ecology and economy, between unspoiled natural environments as basis of any human existence and the struggle for their protection vis-à-vis the destructive impacts of historical and present exploitation.

Again: What a book! Although the selection of texts cannot give more than just a glimpse of critical questions and remarks, they are always to the point and express the central concerns of the authors. The stimulating mixture of science, policy, poetry, fiction and a wide range texts by environmental protesters make this book an inspiring anthology. The subtitle "Natur- und Umlwelterlebnisse" is surely too modest, since the selection

goes far beyond mere experiences; it covers thoughts, ethical and philosophical discourses, policy statements and so on. The author of this book is to be commended on his superb knowledge and sensitive selection of relevant texts, comprising a time span from the early 17<sup>th</sup> century to the present. And it is a truly transdisciplinary reader since it covers a broad range of disciplines and their specific views on nature-society relationships. And that is why it deserves its appropriate consideration in the review section of a geographical journal!

However the author is also to be commended for equally thorough and fascinating introductions to all 8 sections of this book and to each (!) of its over 60 authors respectively institutions and their specific role in the American discourse on nature and its interactions with and perceptions by individuals or groups of people. This collection is much more than a mere reader. Due to its flawless translation into an elegantly phrased German, it is a book that – in German – one might call a “Lehr-, Lern- und Lesebuch”, i.e., a book for teaching, learning and reading! To the best of the reviewer’s knowledge this book has no comparable counterpart in the English language. It would deserve a reprint of the original texts in English and a translation of their introductory German comments on their origins and backgrounds. Why? Because this book is a commendable example of an almost perfect transdisciplinary/multidisciplinary collection of multi-faceted aspects of human domination of our Planet Earth and its consequences. It should be available in all libraries and research institutions that deal with the broad range of environmental theories and practices – not only in German-speaking countries.

ECKART EHLERS

WILSON, MARY BETH: Impacts of Participatory Development in Afghanistan. A Call to Reframe Expectations. The National Solidarity Programme in the Community of Shah Raheem. 524 pp., 26 figs. and 10 photos. Studien zum Modernen Orient 24. Klaus Schwarz Verlag, Berlin 2013, € 39,80

In den Sprachgebrauch von Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und Entwicklungspraxis werden häufig unkritisch Begriffe aufgenommen, die dann als Fachtermini vermeintlich völlig neue Konzepte und vorgeblich noch nie da gewesene Ansätze vermitteln sollen oder sogar als Allheilmittel gegen das Versagen bisheriger Entwicklungsprogramme hochstilisiert werden. Allzu oft sind die damit verbundenen, zu Programmen gewordenen Modebegriffe jedoch nichts weiter als das,

was der Bonner Geograph ECKART EHLERS in diesem Zusammenhang einmal treffend als „alter Wein in neuen Schläuchen“ bezeichnete. Für das Tagesgeschäft der professionellen Entwickler mag eine solche Praxis in gewisser Weise noch verständlich sein, ist man hier doch in besonderer Weise darauf angewiesen, immer neue Entwicklungsmodeworte zu kreieren, um mit ihrer bisherigen (vermeintlichen) Abwesenheit einerseits früheres Versagen von Entwicklungsprogrammen zu erklären und andererseits Perspektiven neuer Heilserwartungsprojekte aufzeigen zu können. Wenn jedoch auch Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler von Disziplinen, die sich mit entwicklungsrelevanten Themen beschäftigen, ebenso unreflektiert aktualistisch Entwicklungsmodeworte antizipieren, kann dabei der Eindruck unprofessionellen Anbieterns nicht immer verhindert werden. Allzu oft meinen auch bestimmte Fraktionen einer dezidiert *unkritischen* Geographischen Entwicklungsforschung, sich in der übereilten und direkten Übernahme solcher Programmtitel und deren Adaption auf geographische Betrachtungsweisen gegenseitig übertreffen zu müssen. Die Wissenschaft Geographie kommt dabei oft zu kurz und in einer Mischung aus dem beklagenswerten disziplin-charakteristischen Minderwertigkeitsgefühl und dem Andienen an die Diktionen der so genannten *Entwickler* verschwimmen dann oft geographische Kompetenz- und Begriffsfelder, insbesondere solche langer disziplingeschichtlicher Tradition.

Die vorgelegte Studie ist jedoch weit von solchen Verwirrungen entfernt. Vielmehr wird aufbauend auf einer soliden, monatelangen Feldforschung in Nordafghanistan am Fallbeispiel einer Dorfstudie dargestellt, was – bei allem zu unterstellendem guten Willen – *Entwickler* den so genannten *Zuentwickelnden* schon mal antun können. Dargestellt wird dies in erster Linie am Beispiel der Richtlinien des so genannten „Participatory Approach“. Dessen Wirkungsweise hat die selbst in Entwicklungsprogramme eingebettete Autorin ebenso untersucht wie seine Kulturkompatibilität. Dabei wird erläutert, dass der so genannte *Partizipatorische Ansatz* so einzig nicht war und in den Programmideologien von PRA (Participatory Rural Appraisal), CD (Community Development), CBD (Community-based Development) und CDD (Community-driven development)“ seine Verwandten hatte. Sehr schön dargestellt wird auch, dass der *Participatory Approach* in der internationalen Entwicklungsumsetzung gerade dann seinen Implementierungshöhepunkt erfuhr, als zu Beginn der Jahrtausendwende der Wiederaufbau Afghanistans anstand.

Selbst für diejenigen Leser, die primär nicht unbedingt an den Details einer Fallstudie über ein – sagen wir höflich – mehr oder weniger wichtiges afghanisches

Dorf, interessiert sind, sei der Band wegen seiner kritischen Herangehensweise an die Entwicklungsprogramme und Vorgaben der praktischen Entwicklungsarbeit sehr empfohlen. Die Studie macht Mut zum Einnehmen einer kritischen Distanz und kann ggf. dazu animieren, anhand anderer Beispiele vergleichbar kritische Positionen einzunehmen. Vielleicht sind dazu in erster Linie ältere Geographinnen und Geographen prädestiniert, die erstens über die notwendige langjährige Erfahrung zur Beurteilung von Nachhaltigkeiten von Schlagworten der Entwicklungszusammenarbeitspraxis verfügen und für die zweitens die Rituale der Drittmittelwerbung und Projektakquirierung nicht mehr so relevant sind, dass sie sich in selbst auferlegten terminologischen Kniefällen beugen müssten.

Wie sehr die Menschen in Afghanistan von westlicher Entwicklungsideologie und den damit verbundenen, sich teilweise in verschachtelter Kompliziertheit gegenseitig übertreffenden Terminologien verwirrt worden sein müssen, lässt sich nur erahnen. Kritik daran wurde nur selten artikuliert. Insofern stellt die nun von WILSON vorgelegte Studie einen selbstbewussten und begründet kritischen Meilenstein dar. Einen guten Eindruck dazu liefert z. B. auch eine Auseinandersetzung mit den vielen internationalen Programmnamen und Projektakürzungen sowie den immer wieder neu erfundenen Kürzeln. Teilweise lassen sich wahrhaft orgiastische Abkürzungsexzesse identifizieren und es entsteht der Eindruck, dass vielfach Akronyme nur deshalb entwickelt worden sind, um damit ein künstliches Insider-Vokabular zu schaffen, das sich andere erst erarbeiten müssen, um als Eingeweihte gelten zu können. Dieses Erfinden von unnötigen Abkürzungen hat teilweise seltsame Blüten getragen. So steht NSP in Afghanistan sowohl für das sicherheitspolitische *National Security Programme* als auch für das entwicklungspolitische *National Solidarity Programme* und es gab mit PBUH tatsächlich ein offizielles Kürzel für das in Afghanistan in der Kommunikation allgegenwärtige „Peace be upon Him“ für „Frieden sei mit ihm“ (S. 477)!

Die Studie baut im Wesentlichen auf Haushaltsbefragungen in Sha Raheem in der Oaselandschaft von Khulm zwischen Balkh im Westen und Samangan im Osten auf. Gezeigt werden u. a. Beispiele von kleineren Dorfkartierungen in gelungener Umzeichnung und guter Detaillierung sowie die Analysen zur vergleichenden Lebenssituation der Bewohner während der vier Zeiträume der sowjetischen Besatzungszeit, der Mujaheddin-Herrschaft, der Taliban-Zeit und der Post-Taliban-Zeit. Es fließen Experten-Interviews ebenso ein wie Gespräche mit Ladenbesitzern in bestimmten Bazarabschnitten. Bei letzteren dürfte es sich um die seit CENTLIVRES mit „*Un Bazar d'Asie Centrale*“ (1970),

CHARPENTIER zum „Bazaar-e Tasqurghan“ (1972) sowie GRÖTZBACH über „Städte und Bazare in Afghanistan“ (1979) um die detailliertesten Bazaruntersuchungen in Nordost-Afghanistan überhaupt handeln. Materialreich präsentiert sich vor allem auch der Anhang der Monographie. Er zeigt die wichtigsten Fragebögen, eine Liste der Interviewpartner und weitere Dokumente, die es ermöglichen, die Wege der Ergebnisfindung unmittelbar nachzuvollziehen.

Insgesamt stellt die Studie nicht nur eine besonders gut gelungene Dissertation über ein nordafghanisches Dorf bei gleichzeitig wohlthuend kritischer Distanz zu kurzlebigen Entwicklungsmodethemen dar, sondern zeigt auf beeindruckende Weise auch, wie kompetente Regionalmonographien überhaupt aufgebaut sein sollten: Eingebettet in disziplinübergreifende Theoriegebäude, kritisch in der Auseinandersetzung mit Entwicklungsprogrammen und tief greifend in Dokumentation und Analyse regionalspezifischer Prägefaktoren. Vor diesem Hintergrund hat das Werk vor allem auch einen wissenschaftsdidaktischen Wert, der weit über die dargelegte Lokalexpertise hinausgeht. Auch für Nicht- oder Nochnicht-Afghanistan-Interessierte ist das Werk von MARY BETH WILSON daher uneingeschränkt zu empfehlen – PBUH!

ANDREAS DITTMANN

BENZ, ANDREAS: *Education for Development in Northern Pakistan. Opportunities and Constraints for Rural Households*. XXXII and 434 pp., 52 figs. and 44 tables. Oxford University Press, Karachi 2014, € 38,60

Pakistan ranks among the world's weakest countries in terms of literacy rates, gender disparities in school enrolment and other measures of educational performance. Within Pakistan, urban centres, wealthy regions and the densely-populated agricultural heartland enjoy much higher educational attainment than the country's mountain and desert-steppe peripheries where population densities are low. An important exception to this general pattern is Gilgit-Baltistan, a sparsely-populated and comparatively poor mountainous region in Pakistan's northern periphery, where literacy exceeds the national average, male enrolment rates are by far the highest in the country, and rates of female enrolment equal those of the densely-populated and highly-urbanised Punjabi heartland. This was not always the case. Until two or three generations ago Gilgit-Baltistan lagged far behind much of Pakistan; only a small minority of the region's children attended school, and literacy was

almost non-existent in the sub-districts that currently boast the highest rates of education. As ANDREAS BENZ states in the introduction to *Education for Development in Northern Pakistan*, “it is clear that parts of Gilgit-Baltistan today constitute one of the beacons of education in the predominantly gloomy educational landscape of Pakistan, and form an unprecedented exception of a successful and rapid educational expansion in the country” (p. 9). In attempting to explain this striking anomaly, account for variations in educational uptake within Gilgit-Baltistan, and analyse the impacts of educational achievement at the individual and household level, the book provides the most rigorous, comprehensive, and empirically-detailed examination of formal education in northern Pakistan currently available. It is a fascinating and informative work.

The book’s analysis is framed by two main premises, which are outlined in the opening chapters. The first addresses the relationship between education and development: that formal education may either enhance or constrain people’s problem-solving capacities (i.e., development) depending on the circumstances, and at the household or community level may have both enabling and inhibiting effects simultaneously. BENZ develops this theoretical proposition by tracing a pair of dominant conceptual threads through development theory, geographical approaches to development, and sociological and economic theories of education: an optimistic thread, which stresses education’s ability to enhance people’s problem-solving capacities, their opportunities for social and economic advancement, and their capacity for self-determination, as well as to nurture greater social equality and other aspects of progressive social change; and a pessimistic thread, which foregrounds formal education’s potential to reproduce existing social inequalities and hegemonic ideologies, thereby perpetuating relations of domination and limiting people’s self-determination. These opposing threads overlap individual theoretical perspectives in ways that allow BENZ to conceive them as dialectically-related. The book’s second foundational premise addresses the issue of what drives educational expansion. Drawing from conceptual work on sustainable livelihoods, BENZ posits that Gilgit-Baltistan’s rapid uptake in formal education results significantly from calculations by individual households operating within particular socio-cultural, economic, political and institutional contexts that investing in their members’ education is an effective household livelihood strategy (i.e., that education will have ‘optimistic’ rather than ‘pessimistic’ outcomes).

Together, these initial premises allow BENZ to formulate research questions relating to the kinds of educational strategies rural households develop and why;

the outcomes of these strategies at the individual and household level; the influence of ethnicity, religious denomination, gender and other socio-economic variables on educational strategies and outcomes; and the influence of the education system’s structural characteristics on the character and efficacy of household decisions regarding schooling. The overall objective in framing these questions is to understand “the [anticipated and realised] contributions of formal education to the well-being of rural people, securing of livelihoods and improvement of living conditions” (p. 51).

In order to tackle this ambitious set of research questions, BENZ undertakes systematic analysis of existing literature and secondary data on education and socio-economic change in Gilgit-Baltistan, and develops three detailed village-level case studies. Utilizing existing scholarship on socio-economic organization and change in Gilgit-Baltistan, Chapter Three delineates the region’s ethno-linguistic and denominational diversity, and traces its rapid but uneven transition from subsistence agro-pastoralism to a more diversified set of market-oriented livelihood strategies, which occurred in tandem with the development of a road network, fuller (but still incomplete) socio-political and cultural incorporation into the Pakistani nation, and agency-led rural development initiatives. The chapter stresses that an important feature of this relatively recent context of off-farm employment and income diversification is that schooling has become much more important as a long-term strategy for household reproduction. This process of socio-economic change is described in greater detail for each of the three study villages, serving both to contextualise the specific cases and to give readers a sense of regional variation. Chapters Four and Five consolidate the existing bewilderingly-scattered, unreliable, and often incomparable statistical and interpretive material on education in northern Pakistan into a coherent regional and sub-regional picture of spatially-variable educational growth over time. In addition to contextualizing the book’s ethnographic material, these chapters constitute a valuable stand-alone contribution to scholarship on education in northern Pakistan.

BENZ notes that existing literature on education in the region focuses predominantly on supply-side issues (i.e., the spatio-temporal development of different sorts of schooling opportunities, institutional factors shaping supply, and statistics regarding numbers of teachers, schools, enrolments, etc.) and neglects the individual and household considerations that influence demand for education and its uptake among a population. The village-level case studies are designed to overcome this neglect. The three study villages are located in different sub-districts of Gilgit-Baltistan, and were selected



in order to access the three main religious denominations in northern Pakistan – Sunni, Twelver Shia and Ismailia – as well to represent different phases in the process of educational expansion, while also being comparable in terms of functional importance, population, road accessibility and existence of educational facilities for both sexes from primary to college level. BENZ spent several months in each village conducting an intensive program of ethnographic research, including in-depth interviews, surveys, observations, and gathering documents. The resulting data, which are voluminous and remarkably rich, are analysed in the book's sixth and seventh chapters, which focus on household-level educational strategies and outcomes, respectively.

Chapter Six presents empirical material to support the argument that educational expansion in rural Gilgit-Baltistan results from households' decisions to incorporate members' education into their long-term livelihood strategies. The chapter analyses how these decisions and the rationales that justify them vary from village to village, and among households within villages, depending on underlying 'framework conditions' and household circumstances. Empirically-detailed discussions are devoted to households' motives for pursuing members' education; people's expectations in terms of the outcomes of education; the gendered aspects of these motives and anticipated outcomes; parents' considerations regarding the best type of education for their children and their evaluation of the relative merits of government, private and religious educational institutions; the influence of parents' education level on the schooling choices they make for their children; considerations regarding the migration of individuals or households in pursuit of higher education; and the place of distance education, home learning and coaching classes in some households' educational strategies. BENZ compares his participants' explanations with a variety of survey and statistical data on schooling in each village and across the region, to establish a connection between household-level livelihood strategizing and broader spatio-temporal patterns of educational expansion. He makes a strong case that rising enrolments and other aspects of educational growth in Gilgit-Baltistan have resulted from households' increasing tendency to use schooling as a strategic response to the region's changing economic and socio-political context.

The discussions in Chapter Six are inflected with a strong sensitivity to households' constitution "as an arena of cooperative conflict between its members, characterised by hierarchical internal power structures, gender disparities, as well as unequal distribution of labour, responsibilities, resources and opportunities" (p. 234). Although decision-making hierarchies vary some-

what among households and villages and along denominational lines, BENZ demonstrates that it is usually the case that senior members of a household make educational decisions on behalf of others, some individuals are more likely to be sent to school (especially higher levels) than others, household seniors are willing to devote more resources to the education of some children than others (e.g., by sending them to private schools or schools outside the village), and some household members (typically females) disproportionately bear the added financial and labour burden of other members' schooling. These intra-household disparities result largely from senior members' calculations regarding the best way to use education to further their own and their households' long-term material and status interests, as well as in some cases from religious prerogatives. For example, arguments against devoting scarce resources to girls' education relate primarily to the expectation that girls will marry outside the household and therefore take the strategic advantages of their education with them; arguments in favour of girls' schooling stem from the perception that educated girls do better in the marriage market, as well as from religious admonitions to educate both sexes.

Having devoted the sixth chapter to validating empirically the proposition that Gilgit-Baltistan's rapid educational growth is driven by strategic choices made at the household level, BENZ then focuses in Chapter Seven on the actual outcomes of the educational strategies households have enacted. The chapter shows that on average and with considerable variation men with higher levels of education also have greater rates of formal sector employment, higher levels of participation in non-agricultural business activities, and enjoy higher incomes. Educated men are also more likely to seek careers beyond commuting distance from their home villages; this often benefits households in terms of substantial income remittances, but also shifts more of the burden of household reproduction onto the shoulders of women, children and elderly family members remaining in the village. Unfortunately, many young men have not been able to translate educational attainment into these material benefits, resulting in frustration and discontent for parents and children alike.

Educated women are somewhat more likely to work in the formal labour market than their uneducated counterparts, but women's formal labour market participation is extremely low at all levels of education, and higher levels of education seem not to yield higher incomes for women. It appears that education does substantially benefit girls and their households in two other ways. First, the chapter presents evidence that education makes girls more appealing as marriage partners

and daughters-in-law, and well-educated girls are more likely to attract well-educated husbands; second, there is a strong feeling in all three villages that female (and male) education has enabled women to take a more autonomous and agential role in household and community life. In the three study villages, if not in all corners of Gilgit-Baltistan, women's freedom of movement, involvement in civic affairs, and decision-making voice within households have all increased with rising education levels. Strong evidence is presented that socio-political participation among women and men increases in tandem with education, as measured by such things as proficiency in Urdu and English, interest in the news and world affairs, participation in political events, and membership in political and civil society organisations.

The material presented in Chapter Seven goes some way toward addressing the book's second overarching premise: that focusing on education as a livelihood strategy has the potential to both enable and constrain 'development' at the individual, household and societal scales. It seems that in terms of improving livelihood options and prospects, contributing to women's autonomy and decision-making voice, and enhancing individuals' participation in political and civil society, schooling does achieve some of the emancipatory potential identified by 'education optimistic' strands of theory. In these ways education does enhance development, defined in terms of people's problem-solving capacities. On the other hand, the benefits and burdens of education are not equally distributed either within or among households, or across the region, meaning that some groups are relatively disadvantaged in a social context that attaches ever-more value to high levels of education. This propensity for formal education to have inequitable and therefore socially stratifying effects is one of the concerns of 'education-pessimistic' strands of theory, and is taken up in greater detail in the book's eighth and concluding chapter. BENZ argues here that when Gilgit-Baltistan's educational expansion began communities were characterised by a high degree of social and economic equality, and therefore participation in education was not significantly influenced by class factors. Unlike many other contexts, educational expansion in Gilgit-Baltistan did not serve to reproduce existing class or status hierarchies. Rather, education itself "became the single-most stratifying driving force in the region" (p. 355), as early adopters gained an initial advantage in the region's changing economy, and have been able to reproduce that advantage through subsequent generations. With each phase of expansion the level of education required to achieve a socio-economic advantage increased, and the newly-required higher levels of education were most available to children in households

that had already realised a social advantage from education in an earlier phase of expansion. In this way, "the social disparities generated in the early stage of the expansion were not only reproduced, but even deepened and intensified" (p. 359). True to his dialectical theory of education for development, BENZ offers the overall conclusion that although there is no doubt that educational expansion created new opportunities and socio-economic benefits for much of the region's population, these came at the cost of greater social stratification and have left poorer households behind, thereby variably enhancing and inhibiting the region's development.

*Education for Development in Northern Pakistan* is a *tour-de-force* that merits a diverse and attentive readership. It makes significant contributions to scholarship on education in Pakistan and in the rural global South more generally, as well as to the sociology of education and critical development studies. Beyond that, it should be essential reading for those interested in any aspect of social organization and change in northern Pakistan, as well as for students and scholars interested in comparative case study methodology. It is a remarkably thorough, erudite, and thought-provoking study, that successfully draws general conclusions without sacrificing attention to detail, diversity and specificity, which are highlighted by careful analysis of three cases and comparison among them. The book's consistent sensitivity to gender, religious denomination, spatial diversity, and the internal dynamics of households are especially noteworthy strengths. Another significant strength of the work is its sustained commitment to understanding Gilgit-Baltistan's educational expansion in terms of the aspirations and experiences of its inhabitants. At the same time, however, the study's strong focus on education as a *livelihood* strategy aimed at improving *households'* living conditions impedes its ability fully to analyse the ways in which education may be reproducing or undermining hegemonic ideologies, promoting or inhibiting reflexive or critical thinking conducive to progressive social change, or achieving some of the other emancipatory or oppressive effects of institutionalised education identified in the critical education literature. As BENZ acknowledges briefly in Chapter Seven, whether education is emancipatory or oppressive depends not only on its effects in terms of social advancement, political and civic participation, or social stratification, but also on the extent to which it inspires critical self-analysis, awareness of the ideological nature of naturalised truths, and sensitivity to structured relations of domination and oppression. Drawing conclusions about these aspects of Gilgit-Baltistan's educational expansion would involve assessing schools' methodology of instruction and substantive curriculum, neither of which the study does. I

hesitate to identify this as a weakness, as it is beyond the study's remit, but is a noteworthy limitation. My only other criticism of this excellent book is that at 400 plus pages, 44 tables, 52 figures and 13 appendices it is longer than it needs to be. Greater attention to reworking the book from its original shape as a dissertation would have yielded a shorter, more readable, and equally valuable piece of scholarship.

DAVID BUTZ

DÖRRE, ANDREI: *Naturressourcennutzung im Kontext struktureller Unsicherheiten. Eine Politische Ökologie der Weideländer Kirgisistans in Zeiten gesellschaftlicher Umbrüche*. 416 S., 29 s/w und 35 farb. Abb. und 14 Tab. *Erdkundliches Wissen* 154. Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2014, € 64,- [D] / 65,80 [A]

Am Schluss scheiterten sie alle. Ob Agrarexperten der Weltbank, Kollektivierungspioniere der jungen Sowjetunion, lokale Statthalter des Zaren oder des Khans von Kokand – rückblickend misslang ihnen allen der Versuch, mobile Landnutzer und -nutzung im heutigen Kirgisistan gesetzlich zu kontrollieren und wirtschaftlich effizienter zu gestalten. Zu dieser Einsicht gelangt, wer sich durch die knapp 400 Seiten umfassende Studie von ANDREI DÖRRE zur Weidenutzung in Kirgisistan gearbeitet hat.

Am Beispiel einer Gebietskörperschaft im Süden des Landes untersucht der Autor Strukturen und Nutzungsmuster der kirgisischen Weidewirtschaft im Kontext postsowjetischer Transformation. Aus der analytischen Warte der politischen Ökologie erklärt er die gegenwärtigen Verhältnisse unter anderem mittels einer fundierten historischen Analyse der lokalen Landnutzung seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts. Dabei behält er jedoch auch die Handlungsebene von Haushalt und Individuum im Blickfeld.

Zum Auftakt definiert DÖRRE den Begriff struktureller Unsicherheit und beschreibt ihn anhand gesellschaftlicher und politischer Entwicklungen seit dem Ende der UdSSR als zentralen Faktor gesellschaftlichen Handelns im postsowjetischen Kirgisistan. Das zweite Kapitel umfasst eine allgemeine Beschreibung der kirgisischen Weidewirtschaft, ihrer Produktionsmittel, Akteure und aktuellen Konflikte. Kapitel drei widmet sich der Transformation als analytischem Begriff der Sozialwissenschaften, führt in die Grundlagen der politischen Ökologie ein und erläutert und reflektiert den methodischen Zugang der Studie. Der Beschreibung des eigentlichen Untersuchungsgebiets, dem Bezirk

*Bazar Korgon* am Rande des Ferganabeckens, widmet sich Kapitel vier. Es klassifiziert und beschreibt die verschiedenen Weidetypen und deren vielfältige Nutzungsformen, umreißt rechtliche, wirtschaftliche und administrative Problemfelder und identifiziert unterschiedliche Faktoren der Weidedegradation. Schon hier wird deutlich, dass aktuelle Probleme der Weide- und Waldnutzung nicht allein den lokalen Nutzern angelastet werden können, sondern weitreichende strukturelle Ursachen haben. Kapitel fünf untermauert dies mittels einer historischen Analyse über mehr als sieben Seiten. Dabei werden die Weidelandverhältnisse von der Zeit des Kokander Khanats über dessen Kolonisierung durch das zaristische Russland bis in die sozialistische Epoche untersucht. Basierend auf umfangreichen Archivrecherchen und akribischer Quellenarbeit zeichnet DÖRRE im Detail nach, wie einander ablösende staatliche Autoritäten auf unterschiedliche Art und Weise versucht haben, mobile Landnutzung zu kontrollieren und für den Staat finanziell einträglich zu gestalten. Überzeugend legt er dar, weshalb insbesondere die radikalen Eingriffe während der sozialistischen Epoche essentielle Vorbedingungen für die weitere Entwicklung nach 1991 darstellen. Diesen jüngsten Entwicklungen schliesslich spürt Kapitel sechs nach. Am Beispiel dreier Weidegebiete wird illustriert, wie sich eine stetig wechselnde Gesetzeslage, mangelhafte Koordination sowie die eklatante Unterausstattung lokaler Verwaltungsstrukturen auf verschiedene Weidenutzer auswirkt, und wie diese ihre Strategien zur Nutzung der Weiden entsprechend anzupassen versuchen. Durch die Beschreibung einzelner Akteure und ihrer subjektiven Wahrnehmung gelingt es dem Autor, die konkreten Auswirkungen struktureller Probleme – Zugangsrivalitäten, Unregelmässigkeiten in der Zuteilung und Verwaltung, ökologische Schädigung – greifbar und verständlich zu machen. Das abschliessende Kapitel zeichnet dann nochmals die grossen Linien vom 19. Jahrhundert bis in die Gegenwart nach. Es legt schlüssig dar, weshalb Pastoralisten trotz zahlreichen externen Interventionen als handlungsmächtige Akteure verstanden werden müssen.

Wohl ist das Buch nicht der erste sozialwissenschaftliche Beitrag zur Weidewirtschaft Kirgisistans. Mit seiner analytischen Tiefe und der umfangreichen historischen Einbettung stellt das sorgfältig editierte Werk aber eine bedeutende Erweiterung des Erkenntnisstandes dar. Dazu trägt insbesondere auch die starke Gewichtung russischsprachiger Quellen bei, welche von der bisherigen Forschung allzu oft vernachlässigt wurden. Methodisch bedient sich der Autor einer Kombination quantitativer und qualitativer Ansätze und bringt deren Resultate überzeugend in Einklang,

indem strukturelle Analysen vor allem gegen Ende des Buches am subjektiven Erfahren unterschiedlicher Akteure gespiegelt werden. Etwas unklar bleibt hingegen, wie genau sich individuelle Handlungsmacht im Einzelnen manifestiert, und wie sozioökonomische Disparitäten auf Aushandlungsprozesse zwischen unterschiedlichen Akteuren wirken, auch innerhalb der untersuchten Haushalte. In dieser Hinsicht wünschte man dem Buch hin und wieder etwas mehr Nähe zu den untersuchten Menschen – wie etwa zu jener 96-jährigen Frau, welche sich an die Kollektivierung erinnert. Die wirkliche Herausforderung für Leserinnen und Leser ist jedoch sprachlicher Art. Sätze von bis zu 13 Zeilen Länge und teilweise enzyklopädisch anmutende Ausführungen zu Detailfragen lenken bisweilen vom eigentlichen Narrativ ab. So ist es nicht immer einfach, das Wesentliche im Auge zu behalten. Weniger wäre manchmal mehr – und liesse zudem etwas mehr Platz für Abbildungen, von denen sich einige nur unter Zuhilfenahme der Lupe entziffern lassen.

Dies alles trübt den Wert des Buches jedoch nur unwesentlich. Insgesamt ist ANDREI DÖRRE ein überaus wertvoller Beitrag zur laufenden Debatte über die Weidewirtschaft Kirgisistans gelungen. Zu hoffen bleibt allein, dass auch die gegenwärtige Generation von Entscheidungsträgern davon Kenntnis erhält – auf dass der Reigen gescheiterter Regulierungsversuche irgendwann ein Ende finde.

BERND STEIMANN

KOLNBERGER, THOMAS: Zwischen Planung und spontaner Ordnung – Stadtentwicklung von Phnom Penh 1860 bis 2010. 540 S., 143 Abb., 20 Tab. und Anhang. Abhandlungen zur Geographie und Regionalforschung 17. Institut für Geographie und Regionalforschung der Universität, Wien 2014, € 48,-

Ausweislich des Vorworts dieser Dissertation (S. 18) zum Phänomen bzw. System Phnom Penh widmet der Autor THOMAS KOLNBERGER diese Qualifizierungsarbeit dem ehemaligen deutschen Bundesverteidigungsminister Karl Theodor Freiherr von und zu Guttenberg. Jener habe ihn zum eigenständigen wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten motiviert, so KOLNBERGER. Ich muss freimütig gestehen, dass ich die Lektüre der 540 Seiten starken Forschungsarbeit zur Hauptstadt des ehemals als „die Schweiz Asiens“ bezeichneten Königreichs Kambodschas entsprechend zurückhaltend und kritisch begann. Zu Unrecht, wie sich alsbald heraus stellen sollte: In guter geographischer Tradition

und geosystematischer Herangehensweise analysiert der Autor fächerübergreifend die Stadtentwicklung Phnom Penhs. In sechs Hauptkapiteln geht KOLNBERGER gewissermaßen rückwärts vor, indem er versucht, aus den (stadt-) entwicklungspolitischen, stadtgeographischen, stadtökonomischen, juristischen und architektonischen Gegenwartsproblemen der Stadt der Historie Phnom Penhs auf den Grund zu gehen. Da die Geographie bekanntlich die Aufgabe hat, die Geosphären hinsichtlich ihrer Wechselwirkungen zu untersuchen – in dem Fall örtlich begrenzt – liegt hier eine geographische Stadtanalyse im besten Sinne vor. Sie schließt eine Lücke, die viele zeitgenössische Monographien zur so genannten „Stadtgeographie“ (was soll dies eigentlich für eine Forschungsrichtung sein?) hinterlassen haben. Insofern ist der Titel der Arbeit „Planung und spontane Ordnung“ angenehm weit zu interpretieren, ist das Buch weit mehr als lediglich die deskriptive Analyse des Phnom Penher Planungssystems und dessen Evaluierung.

Das erste Kapitel bietet fundierte Analysen zu den Termini „Stadt“ und „Dichte“. Der Diskurs ist sehr breit gefasst. Hier hätte man sich eine stärkere Konzentration auf das Forschungsobjekt „Stadt“ gewünscht (was auch für die anderen Kapitel zutrifft, die sich des Öfteren m. E. nach ohne Not in einer thematischen Überfrachtung verlieren; dazu mehr unten). Eine soziologische, ökonomische und architektonische Fundierung des Planungsbegriffs, zum „spatial turn“ bis hin zum Eigenlogik-Begriff von MARTINA LÖW hilft gewiss, die jetzige Situation dieser Stadt als soziale Raumproduktion zwischen „spontan“ und „geplant“ mit ihren Zäsuren (S. 47) zu verstehen. Über die latente Suche nach einem Zentrum als Schlüsselperspektive der kambodschanischen Landesgeschichte seit des Angkor-Reiches (Kap. 2), die Entwicklung als geplante Kolonialstadt (Kap. 3) – wozu auch die Straßenaufschüttungen und binnenstädtischen Kanalverfüllungen hauptsächlich mit Sand aus dem Mekong durch Schwimmbagger und durch Müll gehörten, um dem Bauflächenwachstum Herr zu werden – über die Entwicklung Phnom Penhs im Kalten Krieg (Kap. 4), wozu KOLNBERGER auch die Khmer Rouge-Periode von 1975 bis 1979 zählt, bis hin zur räumlichen Persistenz einer Großstadt (Kap. 5) spannt sich der Bogen der Arbeit. Insbesondere das Kapitel 4 leidet unter einem thematischen Zuviel. Gewiss verführt das Raumbeispiel Kambodschas gleichsam zur umfassenden Aufarbeitung und Reflexion der (Welt-)Politik, der Struktur und Sinnhaftigkeit von Entwicklungszusammenarbeit („Lords of Poverty“), der kambodschanischen Währung als Spiegelbild der politischen Entwicklung, dem Problem der endemischen Korrup-



tion, der Bürgerkriegsökonomie im Gefolge der UNTAC, der Zwangsruralisierung während der Khmer Rouge, der Geometrisierung und Technisierung des Reisanbaus in der „irrealsozialistischen Plangesellschaft“, der Rolle des (Dauer-) Premierministers Hun Sen oder der Thematisierung des Genozids. Da der Verfasser aber versucht, sämtliche dieser Aspekte – um nur einige zu nennen – in die Dissertation um die Stadtentwicklung Phnom Penhs zu integrieren, droht doch rasch des Öfteren der Rote Faden abhanden zu kommen. Die eingeschobenen Zwischenkapitel, die zeitlichen Rück- und Vorsprünge sowie die zahllosen Exkurse erschweren die Übersicht. Die Monographie hätte guten wissenschaftlichen Gewissens folgerichtig um ca. 170 Seiten gekürzt werden können, ohne an Aussagekraft zu verlieren, im Gegenteil. Aus diesen überzähligen Seiten ließe sich ohne Mühe eine zweite Dissertation anfertigen. Sehr gut hingegen gefällt mir das an vielen Stellen eingeflochtene, durchweg selbst konzipierte Kartenmaterial. Eine derart gründliche Planungskartographie dieser Stadt hat es bislang soweit ersichtlich nicht gegeben. Deshalb keine Frage: Die Arbeit lebt von den Analysen der Quellen aus französischer Protektoratszeit, der anschließenden Unabhängigkeit Kambodschas 1954, der Nach-Pol Pot-Ära (1979–1989) und insbesondere der UNTAC-Mission (1992–1994). Der Leser bekommt seltenes Foto- und originales Dokumentenmaterial zu Gesicht, und zwar zu Phnom Penh wie ebenso zu Kambodscha. Insofern liegt – gleichsam nebenher des eigentlichen Untersuchungsgegenstandes – eine umfassende Länderstudie Kambodschas, ja im Grunde der umgebenden Mekong-Region vor.

Im Kernkapitel 5 sind die Ausführungen zur „Rückkehr der Dichte“ aus siedlungs- und stadtmorphologischer, planungsrechtlicher und auch immobilienökonomischer Sicht sehr bedeutsam und für das Gegenwartsverständnis relevant. Zutreffend beschreibt der Autor, wie sich die Kräfteverhältnisse im „Aktionsraum Stadt“ mittels Kapitaleinsatz nicht zuletzt auf Kosten der urban poor seit Mitte der 1990er Jahre deutlich verschoben haben. Seit der UNTAC ist das Problem der unsicheren Eigentumsrechte an Grund und Boden in Kambodscha im Allgemeinen und in Phnom Penh als Hub der ökonomischen Entwicklung im Speziellen offenkundig akut. Denn die Entwicklung der Neuzeit ist durch eine äußerst rege Bautätigkeit und die Extensivierung nahezu der gesamten Stadt als Produktionsort geprägt. KOLNBERGER nennt dies die „Produktion einer fraktionierten Stadt“ (S. 339ff.). Seine Dissertation endet mit dem Untersuchungsjahr 2010. In jenem Jahr, mit der Abschwächung der globalen Finanz- und Eigentumskrise, gewannen indes die Intensivierung

des Raums als Verhandlungssache und die ungezügelter Landnahmen („room and flat grabbing“; S. 369) durch klientelisierte Machtgruppen und Netzwerkhierarchien erneut an Fahrt. In Erinnerung zu rufen ist stets die Vernichtung sämtlicher Eigentumsnachweise und Katasterunterlagen in der Zeit der Roten Khmer; bis heute sind zahllose Streitigkeiten um Eigentums- und Besitzrechte nach dem Landgesetz (Land Law) von 2001 bei der Katasterkommission Phnom Penh und den Gerichten anhängig. Das Phänomen der Verkaufsketten ist virulent, also die wiederholte informelle Übertragung von ungesicherten Wohn- oder Eigentumsrechten in kurzen zeitlichen Abständen (S. 367). Phnom Penh bleibt eine Stadt der (Geschichte der) Brüche, in der die Kolonialzeit mit einem Zoning und mit der Herrschaft der französischen Tiefbauingenieure erste Orientierungsräume schaffte – der Verfasser nennt es „Tyrannei der Linie“ (S. 412) – die allerdings nach der Roten Khmer-Zeit durch willkürliche Haus- und Landbesetzungen spontaner Ordnung(en) ersetzt wurden, um nach Mitte der 1990er Jahre durch die Akkumulation von Macht als politische Ökonomie und durch „rent-seeking“-Phänomene abermals ersetzt zu werden.

Nach der Lektüre der gehaltvollen Publikation zur als „Perle Südostasiens“ titulierten Stadt schließen sich zahlreiche Forschungsfragen an, beispielsweise Aspekte der (Boden-) Besteuerung und Grundstückswertermittlung als Teil der urbanen Landpolitik sowie das Verhältnis zwischen Immobilienentwicklung und Entstehung der Grundrente als zentraler Begriff von Raumordnung und ökonomischer Raumforschung. Hierin schlummert ein erhebliches, bislang allerdings nur unzureichend gehobenes Potenzial für die Einnahmegenerierung des kambodschanischen Staatshaushalts. Beträchtliche finanzielle Ressourcen stünden beispielsweise für die „von oben“ initiierte Housing Policy gemäß des „Circular No. 3 on Squatter Settlement Resolution“ zur Verfügung, womit ein weiterer Schritt hin zu einer partizipativen Stadtentwicklung(splanung) „von unten“ getan wäre. Die steuerliche Bemessungsgrundlage ist angesichts der rapide fortschreitenden urbanen Landentwicklung – „urban sprawl“ – und der Immobilienentwicklung in den Agglomerationen nicht nur Phnom Penhs, sondern auch anderer Städte Kambodschas wie Siem Reap und Battambang zu verbreitern. Mein Gesamtresümee: Hier liegt ein Grundlagenwerk zur (Stadt-)Planung in bester geosystematischer Herangehensweise vor, dessen Lektüre allerdings Durchhaltevermögen und fundiertes Hintergrundwissen erfordert.

BERTRAMS, MANUEL: Late Quaternary landscape evolution in the Wadi Sabra (Jordan) based on sedimentological and geochemical investigations. III und 154 pp., 40 figs. and 16 tables. Aachener Geographische Arbeiten 49. Selbstverlag Geographisches Institut, RWTH Aachen 2013, € 20,-

Die Wiege der Menschheit liegt in Afrika, so auch der Ursprung des anatomisch modernen Menschen, des *Homo sapiens sapiens*. Doch wann und auf welchen Wegen wanderte der anatomisch moderne Mensch nach Europa ein? Nach aktuellem Kenntnisstand spielten der im östlichen Mittelmeer gelegene Raum der Levante eine zentrale Rolle, denn dieser Korridor stellt eine Möglichkeit dar, die unsere Vorfahren auf ihrem Weg von Ostafrika nach Europa zur Einwanderung nutzten, so eine plausibel begründete und mit archäologischen Befunden belegte Lehrmeinung. Allerdings ist dieser Korridor, der im engeren Sinne die heutigen Staaten Israel, Jordanien, Libanon und Syrien umfasst, aktuell durch großräumige aride und semiaride Klimate gekennzeichnet, was sicherlich für die Wanderungsbewegungen des *Homo sapiens sapiens* eine Herausforderung, wenn nicht gar ein Hindernis darstellte. Das Quartär, also die Zeit, in der die Wanderungsbewegungen stattfanden, ist bekanntermaßen durch eine hohe Klimavariabilität gekennzeichnet, die auch im östlichen Mittelmeer bestand hatte, so dass sich trockenere Phasen immer wieder mit feuchteren Phasen abwechselten. Die Wanderungsbewegungen waren deshalb vermutlich auf die feuchteren Phasen des Pleistozäns beschränkt, in denen die lebensnotwendige Wasserverfügbarkeit gegeben war. Es stellt sich also ganz allgemein die zentrale Frage nach den Paläoumweltbedingungen während der Zeit der Wanderungsbewegungen. In diesem Kontext ist auch die hier zu besprechende Monographie von MANUEL BERTRAMS einzuordnen, der in seiner Arbeit der Frage nach den Klima- und Umweltbedingungen während bestimmter Zeitabschnitte des Pleistozäns nachgeht. Dabei ist die Arbeit innerhalb des von der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft DFG geförderten Sonderforschungsbereichs SFB 806 *Our Way to Europe* angesiedelt, in dem explizit die nach Europa gerichteten Wanderungsbewegungen im Kontext der Paläoumweltbedingungen des *Homo sapiens sapiens* untersucht werden.

Die hier vorliegende Arbeit stellt die kumulative Dissertation des Autors dar, die in englischer Sprache verfasst wurde. Die Arbeit ist in neun Kapitel untergliedert, wobei die ersten drei Kapitel die Fragestellung (Kap. 1), den konzeptionellen Rahmen (Kap. 2) sowie die physiogeographische und geoarchäologische Ausstattung des Untersuchungsraums (Kap. 3) umfassen. Die folgenden vier Kapitel (Kap. 4 bis 7) sind Abdrucke der in internationalen Zeitschriften publizierten Artikel, bevor in Kapitel 8 Datenmaterial und dessen Analytik präsentiert wird, das nicht Eingang in die oben genannten Publikationen fand. Das

abschließende Kapitel 9 fasst die Ergebnisse der Arbeit in ihrem geoarchäologischen Kontext zusammen.

Um Fragen der Landschafts- und Umweltgeschichte der Levante nachzugehen, konzentriert sich BERTRAMS auf das Wadi Sabra in Jordanien, dessen Einzugsgebiet südlich der bekannten Kulturstätten von Petra liegt. In diesem Untersuchungsgebiet befinden sich zahlreiche archäologische Fundstellen, die in das Jung- und Epipaläolithikum einzuordnen sind, so dass sich der zeitliche Rahmen der Untersuchungen auf das Jungpleistozän beschränkt. Die damit verbundenen Fragen zur Paläoumwelt während der Besiedlungsphasen versucht der Autor anhand von Sedimentarchiven zu beantworten, eine der wenigen Quellen dort vorhandener Zeugnisse vergangener Umweltbedingungen. Die zur Anwendung kommenden Methoden zur Sedimentanalytik beinhalten sedimentologische, paläopedologische und geochemische Analytik, eine chronologische Einordnung der Sedimente wird u. a. durch OSL Datierungen vorgenommen. Zusätzlich wird eine weiträumigere Erfassung verwitterter Wadisedimente fernerkundlich erfasst.

Basierend auf den vorliegenden Sedimentarchiven, stellt die Landschafts- und Paläoumweltrekonstruktion in diesem Raum eine sehr große Herausforderung dar. Die untersuchten Sedimentarchive liegen nur sporadisch vor und sind größtenteils stratigraphisch unvollständig. Darüber hinaus sind in den untersuchten Sedimenten weitere Paläoumweltproxies nur sehr spärlich vorhanden und die wenigen Indizien wie beispielsweise initiale Paläoböden schwer zu interpretieren. Hinzu kommen große Schwierigkeiten bei der chronostratigraphischen Einordnung der vorhandenen Sedimentarchive, so dass die normalerweise gut anwendbare OSL Datierung im Wadi Sabra ebenfalls an seine Grenzen stößt. So lässt sich festhalten, dass trotz der widrigen Umstände der Autor das Mögliche versucht, um aus den vorhandenen Sedimentarchiven eine Landschaftsgeschichte zu etablieren und Aussagen über die Paläoumwelt des Jungpleistozäns zu treffen. Auch wenn eine umfassende und detaillierte Rekonstruktion der Paläoumwelt das Ziel einer solchen Untersuchung sein muss, es wäre dennoch illusorisch zu glauben, mit den im Wadi Sabra vorhandenen Sedimentarchiven wäre dies zu erzielen. So gebührt dem Autor Lob nicht nur für dessen Mut, sich dieser Aufgabe einer Paläoumweltrekonstruktion gestellt zu haben, sondern die Arbeit von BERTRAMS liefert natürlich einen weiteren wichtigen Puzzlestein, um Fragen der Landschafts- und Klimageschichte der Levante im Kontext seiner frühen Besiedlungsgeschichte zu beantworten. So ist diese Studie zur jungpleistozänen Landschaftsgeschichte des Wadi Sabra allen denjenigen empfohlen, die sich intensiv mit diesem Raum, dessen jungquartären Umwelt sowie der dortigen Geoarchäologie beschäftigen.

MARKUS FUCHS



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