Biografie

Noa Levin ist Postdoktorandin in Philosophie, Architektur- und Umwelttheorie und Kulturwissenschaften an der Università della Svizzera italiana und assoziierte Forscherin am Centre Marc Bloch. Ihre Forschungsschwerpunkte sind politische und ökologische Philosophie und Medientheorie. Sie besitzt einen Doktortitel vom Center of Research in Modern European Philosophy der Kingston University in London nachdem sie als Gast-Scholar der Cambridge Universität eine Meisterung der europäischen Kultur und Literatur und eine Philosophie-Lizens an der Universität Tel-Aviv erwarb.;

Noa Levin est chercheuse postdoctorale en philosophie et théorie de l’architecture et de l’environnement à l’Università della Svizzera italiana et chercheuse associée au Centre Marc Bloch. Ses recherches portent sur la politique du changement climatique et la théorie des médias environnementaux. Elle est titulaire d’un doctorat du Centre of Research in Modern European Philosophy de l’université de Kingston, à Londres, après avoir obtenu une maîtrise en culture et littérature européennes en tant que Gates Scholar à l’université de Cambridge, et une licence en philosophie et cinéma à l’université de Tel-Aviv. ;

Noa Levin is a postdoctoral researcher in philosophy and theory of architecture and the environment at the Università della Svizzera italiana, and an associated researcher at the Centre Marc Bloch. Her research interests include the politics of climate change, philosophy and history of science and environmental media theory. She holds a PhD from the Centre for Research in Modern European Philosophy at Kingston University, London, an MPhil in European Culture and Literature from the University of Cambridge, and a BFA in philosophy and film from Tel Aviv University.

Zusammenfassung

This thesis argues for the significance of G.W Leibniz’s concepts of ‘expression’, ‘force’ and ‘perspective’ to the writings of Walter Benjamin and Gilles Deleuze. By triangulating the philosophical projects of Benjamin, Deleuze and Leibniz, the thesis opens up new perspectives and provides new readings of all three. Designating a structure of relations in which every simple substance or monad serves as a ‘living mirror’ of the universe, Leibniz’s concept of ‘expression’ denotes virtual inclusion or immanence. His concept of ‘force’ denotes the self-incurred drive that motivates the monad to action, while his ‘perspectivism’ defines the monads individuality through their infinite points of view on the world. Deleuze and Benjamin, I suggest, appropriate Leibniz’s concepts as part of their respective critiques of epistemology, which target Kant’s conception of experience as a hierarchic relation of representation, allowing them  to redefine experience as non-hierarchal, de-centred and embodied. At the same time, for both, Leibniz’s philosophy serves to criticize historicist views of chronological time. Leibniz’s perspectivism is reformulated by Deleuze and Benjamin as part of their respective critical theories of the image, culminating in their later formulations of the ‘dialectical’ and ‘crystal’ image, respectively. The conclusion however, highlights the diverging paths formed by their returns to Leibniz. Benjamin develops a politically effective ‘historical perspectivism’ in which the discontinuity of history enables ‘true historical time’ to replace chronological time. Deleuze, on the other hand, opts for an a-historical pure form of temporality, his ‘mannerist perspectivism’ describing a continuous, perpetually repeated ‘becoming’.;

This thesis argues for the significance of G.W Leibniz’s concepts of ‘expression’ and ‘force’ and ‘perspective’ to the writings of Walter Benjamin and Gilles Deleuze. By triangulating the philosophical projects of Benjamin, Deleuze and Leibniz, the thesis opens up new perspectives and provides new readings of all three. Designating a structure of relations in which every simple substance or monad serves as a ‘living mirror’ of the universe, Leibniz’s concept of ‘expression’ denotes virtual inclusion or immanence. His concept of ‘force’ denotes the self-incurred drive that motivates the monad to action, while his ‘perspectivism’ defines the monads individuality through their infinite points of view on the world. Deleuze and Benjamin, I suggest, appropriate Leibniz’s concepts as part of their respective critiques of epistemology, which target Kant’s conception of experience as a hierarchic relation of representation, allowing them  to redefine experience as non-hierarchal, de-centred and embodied. At the same time, for both, Leibniz’s philosophy serves to criticize historicist views of chronological time. Leibniz’s perspectivism is reformulated by Deleuze and Benjamin as part of their respective critical theories of the image, culminating in their later formulations of the ‘dialectical’ and ‘crystal’ image, respectively. The conclusion however, highlights the diverging paths formed by their returns to Leibniz. Benjamin develops a politically effective ‘historical perspectivism’ in which the discontinuity of history enables ‘true historical time’ to replace chronological time. Deleuze, on the other hand, opts for an a-historical pure form of temporality, his ‘mannerist perspectivism’ describing a continuous, perpetually repeated ‘becoming’.