Trauma of separation: Gillian Rose’s theory of diremption

In this talk, I consider two aspects of Gillian Rose’s reading of post-Kantian philosophy to draw out the concept of separation that underpins her theory of diremption. The first part examines Rose’s critique of Derrida in relation to the latter’s opposition to Carl Schmitt’s concept of the political. I argue that Derrida’s preference for Schelling over Hegel can help elucidate Rose’s theory of diremption, albeit not in the sense intended by Derrida. The second part turns to Rose’s critique of the neo-Kantian basis of Lukács’ Marxism as well as of Adorno’s critical theory as essentially Fichtean. Here, I compare Emil Lask’s reconstruction of the critical philosophy to Rose’s notion of diremption, suggesting that Lask develops his reconceptualisation of the Kantian dualism between understanding and sensibility as an alternative to the Hegelian concept of separation adopted by Rose.